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1. 1On the history of unfair competition law see Ladas, Patents, Trademarks and Related Rights, Vol. 3 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 1676 ff. Schricker, ‘Möglichkeiten zur Verbesserung des Schutzes der Verbraucher und des funktionsfähigen Wettbewerbs im Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs’ (1975) ZHR, 139 ff., 208 ff.; Beier, ‘The Law of Unfair Competition in the European Community - Its Development and Present Status’ (1985) 16 IIC, 139 ff.
2. 2Schricker (1975), 208 ff., at 209.
3. 3Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 1883 (PC). Revised at Brussels 1900, Washington 1911, the Hague 1925, London 1934, Lisbon 1958 and Stockholm 1967. Unfair competition was included in the subject-matter of the Paris Convention with the Brussels Revision of 1900, Zweigert/Kroppholler, Sources of International Uniform Law, Vol. 3 (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1973), 129 ff.
4. 4Ulmer, Das Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs in den Mitgliedstaaten der EWG. Band I Vergleichende Darstellung (Köln: Carl Heymann, 1965).
5. 5For a perceptive analysis of the reasons for the failure of the harmonisation project see Ohly, ‘Die Bemühungen um eine Rechtsvereinheitlichung auf EU-Ebene von den Anfänge bis zur Richtlinie über irrefuhrene Werbung von 1984’ in: Schricker/Henning-Bodewig (eds.), Neuordnung des Wettbewerbsrechts (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998/99), 69 ff.
6. 6Bourgoignie, ‘Consumer Law and the European Community: Issues and Prospects’ in: Bourgoignie/Trubek/Trubek, Consumer Law and Federalism (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1987), 89 ff.
7. 7Directive 84/450/EEC, OJ 1984 L 250/17 (Misleading Advertising Directive).
8. 8Economists have defined ‘positive integration’ as the creation of equal conditions for the functioning of the integrated parts of the economy and ‘negative integration’ as the elimination of obstacles to trade. See Molle, The Economics of European Integration (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1990), 11. See below Ch. 6.
9. 9Directive 97/55/EC amending Directive 84/450, OJ 1997 L 290/18 (Comparative Advertising Directive).
10. 10Directive 89/552/EEC, OJ 1989 L 298/23, amended by Directive 97/36/EC, OJ 1997 L 202/60 (Television Directive).
11. 11Directive 97/7/EC, OJ 1997 L144/19 (Distance Selling Directive). On specific marketing methods see also Directive 85/577/EEC to protect the consumer in respect pf contracts negotiated away from business premises OJ 1985 L 372/31.
12. 12Directive 2000/31/EC, OJ 2000 L 178/1 (Electronic Commerce Directive).
13. 13In the area of general consumer information see also the Directive 98/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 on consumer protection in the indication of the prices of products offered to consumers, OJ 1998 L 80/27.
14. 14See for instance Directive 90/496/EEC of 24 September 1990 on nutrition labelling for foodstuffs, OJ 1990 L 276/40; Directive 2000/13/EC on the labelling, presentation and advertising of foodstuffs, OJ 2000 L 109/29; Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use; Directive 1999/45/EC on the classification, packaging and labelling of dangerous preparations, OJ 1999 L 200/1; Directive 2003/33/EC on advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products, OJ 2003 L 152/16 (Tobacco Advertising Directive).
15. 15Directive 98/27/EC, OJ 1998 L 166/51 (Injunctions Directive).
16. 16Schricker, ‘Probleme der Angleichung des Rechts des unlauteren Wettbewerbs’ in: Bernstein/Drobnig/Kötz (eds.), Festschrift Zweigert (Tübingen: Mohr, 1981), 537 ff.
17. 17Schricker, ‘Die Bekämpfung der irreführenden Werbung in den Mitgliedstaaten der EG’ (1990) GRUR Int.,
18. 18ff.
19. 19For a discussion on the efforts for European harmonisation in the area of comparative advertising see Kur, ‘Die vergleichende Werbung in Europa: Kurz vor dem Pyrrhussieg?’ in: Levin (ed.), Vennebog till Mogens Kokvedgaard (Stockholm: Nerenius & Santérus, 1993), 436 ff.; Henning-Bodewig, ‘Vergleichende Werbung - Liberalisierung des deutschen Rechts?’ (1999) GRUR Int., 385 ff; Bernitz, ‘The EC Directive on Comparative Advertising and its Implementation in the Nordic Countries: Especially in Relation to Intellectual Property’ (2002a) 42 SSL, 11 ff; Ohly/Spence, ‘Vergleichende Werbung: Die Auslegung der Richtlinie 97/55/EG in Deutschland und Großbritannien’ (1999) GRUR Int., 681 ff.
20. 20Cf. Case C-152/78 Commission v France [1980] ECR 2299 ff.
21. 21Case C-120/78 REWE v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (‘Cassis de Dijon’) [1979] ECR 649.
22. 22Case C-268/81 Oosthoek’s Uitgeversmaatschappij [1982] ECR 4575.
23. 23Case C-362/88 GB-INNO-BM[1990] ECR 1-667.
24. 24On repercussions of Europeanisation on German unfair competition law, see below Ch. 7.
25. 25For a sympathetic view on these influences see Schricker, ‘European Harmonisation of Unfair Competition Law - A Futile Venture?’ (1991a) IIC, 788 ff.; for a critical analysis see Kisseler, ‘Das deutsche Wettbewerbsrecht im Binnenmarkt’ (1994) WRP, 1 ff.
26. 26Joined Cases C-267 & C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR 1-6097
27. 27Case C-405/98 Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v Gourmet International Products (GIP) [2001] ECR 1-1795
28. 28See Dethloff, Europäisierung des Wettbewerbsrechts (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001); Beater, Verbraucherschutz und Schutzzweckdenken im Wettbewerbsrecht (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000).
29. 29More generally for consumer law in Sweden see Olsen, ‘Mot en ny konsumtionsrätt?’ (2000-01) JT, 304 ff., at
30. 30ff.; Olsen ‘Det konsumtionsrättsliga regelverket - en överblick över ett dynamiskt rättsområde’ (2001-02) JT, 815 ff., at 846.
31. 31See Dethloff (2001); Towards a Hamonised View of Fair Trading in Europe, Report of the Conference held in Stockholm, 10 March 2002; Micklitz et al., Study on the Feasibility of a General Legislative Framework on Fair Trading, Volumes I-II, Institut fur Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Verbraucherrecht e.V., November 2000.
32. 32See Micklitz/Keßler, ‘Europäisches Lauterkeitsrecht. Dogmatische und ökonomische Aspekte einer Harmonisierung des Wettbewerbsverhaltens im europäischen Binnenmarkt’ (2002) GRUR Int., 885 ff.; Schricker/Henning-Bodewig, ‘Elemente einer Harmonisierung des Rechts des unlauteren Wettbewerbsrechts’ (2001) WRP, 1367 ff.
33. 33Kur (1993).
34. 34In respect to integration on the basis of a country-of-origin principle in the E-Commerce Directive concerns have been expressed as to the risk of ‘race to the bottom’ or ‘Delawerisation’ of unfair competition law. See Lehmann, ‘Rechtsgeschäfte und Verantwortlichkeit im Netz - Der Richtlinienvorschlag der EU-Kommission’ (1999) ZUM, 180 ff., at 181; Henning-Bodewig, ‘E-Commerce und irreführende Werbung’ (2001) WRP, 771 ff., at 777.
35. 35For a comprehensive summary of the debate see Joerges, ‘The Impact of European Integration on Private Law: Reductionist Perceptions, True Conflicts and a New Constitutional Perspective’ (1997) 3 ELI, 378 ff.
36. 36Joerges (1997), 379.
37. 37Joerges (1997), 383.
38. 38Zimmerman, ‘Civil Code and Civil Law. The “Europeanisation” of Private Law and the Re-emergence of a European Legal Science’ (1994/95) Columbia Journal of European Law, 63 ff.; Wieacker, ‘Historical Models for the Unification of European Law’ in: Krawietz/MacCormick/von Wright (eds.), Prescriptive Formality and Normative Rationality in Modern Legal Systems. Festschrift for Robert Summers (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1994).
39. 39See for instance Lando, ‘Principles of European Contract Law’ (1992) RabelsZ, 261 ff; Basedow, ‘A Common Contract Law for the Common Market’ (1996) CMLRev., 1169 ff. On the Trento ‘common core’ project see Busani/Mattei, ‘The Common Core Approach to European Private Law’ (2002), at http://www.jus.unitn.it/cardozo/home.html.
40. 40See for instance Editorial comments, ‘On the Way to a European Consumer Sales Law?’ (1997) 34 CMLRev.,
41. 41ff.
42. 42See Collins, ‘European Private Law and the Cultural Identity of States’ (1995) 3 ERPL, 353 ff.; Legrand, ‘European Legal Systems are not Converging’ (1996) 45 ICLQ, 52 ff.; Legrand, ‘Uniformity, Tradition and the Law’s Limits’ (1996-97) JT, 306 ff. From the perspective of autopoietic theory of self-referencial societal systems see Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences’ in: Snyder (ed.), The Europeanisation of Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000), 243 ff.
43. 43This was also the tentative term used for the recently advanced proposal of the European Commission for a general clause on fair trading in European Union. See, Micklitz et al. (2000). Meanwhile the Commission has shown preference for the concept ‘fair commercial practices’, which only comes to underscore the volatility of the subject matter under analysis.
44. 44See Bernitz, Marknadsrätt (Stockholm: Jurist och Samhällsvetareförbundets Förlags AB, 1969); Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, A., ‘Unfair Competition Law After TRIPs: Yet Another Challenge to Doctrinal Cohesion’ (1998) NIR, 371 ff.; Micklitz et al. (2000).
45. 45Commercial communication is a term taken from economic theory and applied in Community policy papers. See Green Paper on Commercial Communication in the Internal Market, COM (1996) 192 final.
46. 46In the following, the term ‘unfair competition law’ will be most often used to signify the German approach to fair trading and ‘marketing practices law’ - the Swedish one.
47. 47See Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives. Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics and Public Policy (Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994). In its emphasis on participation costs and benefits comparative institutional analysis is of course closely related with transaction cost economics as developed by Roland Coase in his famous, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 JLE, 1 ff.
48. 48North, ‘Institutions’ (1991) 5 Journal of Economic Perspectives, 97.
49. 49On institutions and institutional changes generally, see North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press, 1990).
50. 50North, ‘Institutional Change: A Framework of Analysis’ in: Sjöstrand (ed.), Institutional Change. Theory and Empirical Findings (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 35 ff., at 36.
51. 51On the peculiar standing occupied by Swedish law see, Zweigert/Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) 276 ff. See, however, Strömholm, 'Comparative Legal Science - Risks and Possibilities’ in: Suksi, M., Law under Exogenous Influences (Åbo: Turku Law School, 1994), 5 ff., at 14.
52. 52See North (1990).
53. 53Knill, The Europeanisation ofN ational Administrations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 13 ff.
54. 54Héritier/Mingers/Knill/Becka, Die Veränderung von Staatlichkeit in Europa: Ein regulativer Wettbewerb (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1994); Koopmans (1991), 495 ff.
55. 55Wieacker, A History of Private Law of Europe, English translation by Tony Weir, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 330; Andreev, Rimsko častno pravo (Sofia, 1975), 75 ff.
56. 56See Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
57. 57See in particular v. Savigny’s plea for viewing legal rules in their ‘organic context’ (“organischen Zusammenhang”), v. Savigny, System des heutigen römischen Rechts I (1840), 14; cf. Reuter, ‘Plädoyer für das institutionelle Rechtsdenken’ in: Immenga et al. (eds.), Festschriftför Mestmäcker (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996), 271.
58. 58See Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1979).
59. 59Raiser, ‘Rechtsschutz und Institutionenschutz im Privatrecht’ in: Summum ius-summa inuria. Individualgerechtigkeit und der Schutz allgemeiner Werte im Rechtsleben (Tübingen: Mohr, 1963), 145 ff.
60. 60Esser, Grundsatz und Norm in der richterlichen Fortbildung des Privatrechts (Tübingen: Mohr, 1990), in particular at 346 ff.
61. 61MacCormick, ‘Law as Institutional Fact’ in MacCormick/Weinberger, An Institutional Theory ofL aw (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986), 49 ff.
62. 62See Weinberger, ‘Einleitung’ in: MacCormick/Weinberger, Grundlagen des Institutionalistischen Rechtspositivismus (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1985), 26.
63. 63See Weinberger, ‘The Norm as Thought and as Reality’ in: MacCormick/Weinberger, Grundlagen des Institutionalistischen Rechtspositivismus (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1985), 31 ff., at 44.
64. 64Ibid., 44.
65. 65Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, reprint (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1915/1962).
66. 66Berle/Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: Macmillan, 1933).
67. 67Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: Macmillan, 1958).
68. 68Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth: Social Power and the Promise of Community (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992), 232.
69. 69A key contribution was DiMaggio/Powell (eds.). The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
70. 70James Coleman and Robert Putnam, to mention two prominent representatives.
71. 71For a detailed account see Posner, Economic Analysis ofL aw (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1992) 21 ff.; MacKaay, Economics of Information and the Law (Boston: Kluwer Nijhoff Publishing, 1982); see also Rose-Ackerman, ‘Progressive Law and Economics and the New Administrative Law’ (1988) 98 Yale Law Journal, 341 ff.
72. 72Stigler, ‘The Economics of Information’ (1961) JPE, 213 ff.
73. 73Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) 4 Econometrica, 386 ff.; Coase (1960).
74. 74Related and equally significant is the assumption of given preferences. Fo a critical analysis see Sunstein, ‘Legal Interference with Private Preferences’ (1986) 53 U. Chi. L. Rev., 1129 ff.
75. 75Arrow, Social Choice and Public Values (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1951).
76. 76Arrow, ‘Rationality of Self and Others in an Economic System’ in: Hogarth and Reder (eds.), Rational Choice (University of Chicago Press: 1987).
77. 77Rose-Ackerman (1988), at 344 ff. See also Rose-Ackerman, ‘Recht und Ökonomie: Paradigma, Politik oder Philosophie’ in: Ott/Schäfer, Allokationseffizienz in der Rechtsordnung (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1989), 269 ff., cf. Kübier, ‘Schlusswort: Vergleichende Überlegungen zur rechtspraktischen Bedeutung der ökonomischen Analyse’ in: Ott/Schäfer (1989), 293 ff
78. 78Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1957). Building on Arrow’s insights in the importance of uncertainty and information problems, Downs demonstrated that seeking to exhaustively inform oneself as a voter was not optimal. Downs offered a more sophisticated understanding of rationality, in which ‘the ideal of looking for what is substantively the best solution is abandoned as unrealistic. Instead, to be rational in this sense means to look for the best solution that it is worth looking for’. Cf. Mackaay (1982), 111.
79. 79Buchanan/Tullock, The Calculus of Consent. Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, 2nd ed. (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1967).
80. 80Coase (1937).
81. 81Coase (1960).
82. 82Pigou argued that the existence of externalities and market imperfection in general formed a sufficient condition for government intervention. The problem of externality is addressed by Pigou in his The Economics of Welfare 5th ed. (London: Macmillan & Co., 1952), 172 ff. See Coase, The Firm, the Market and the Law (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 20 ff. See also Reich, Staatliche Regulierung zwischen Marktversagen und Politikversagen (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller Verlag, 1984), 9.
83. 83See Reich (1984), 9.
84. 84Posner (1992), 251 ff.
85. 85Demsetz, ‘Information and Efficiency. Another Viewpoint’ (1969) 12 JLE, 1 ff.
86. 86This is very insightfully emphasised by Dahlman, ‘The Problem of Externality’ (1979) 22 JLE, 141 ff., at 161.
87. 87Coase (1960), 18.
88. 88Dahlman (1979), 161.
89. 89See Sjöstrand, ‘On Institutional Thought in the Social and Economic Sciences’ in: Sjöstrand (ed.), Institutional Change. Theory and Empirical Fiindings (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 3 ff., at 6, referring to Commons, Institutional Economics (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publisher, 1934/1990).
90. 90Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 219 ff., at
91. 91Especially in his earlier analysis the distinction between organization and institutions is somewhat blurred. Thus in Williamson’s analysis firms and alternative organizations of markets are likewise described as institutions.
92. 92For a review on the opinions of different institutional economists on this particular issue, see Eggertsson, Economic Behaviour and Institutions (Cambridge University Press, 1990), 6 ff. The distinction mentioned here is not universally accepted, though. Moreover, some authors who initially adopted a strict rational choice model, later came to accept modified assumptions regarding social behaviour. See for instance North (1990), 17 ff.
93. 93Williamson (1996), 223.
94. 94Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1985), 44.
95. 95Williamson (1985), 45.
96. 96Komesar (1994). See also Komesar, ‘In Search of a General Approach to Legal Analysis: A Comparative Institutional Alternative’ (1981) 79 Michigan Law Review, 1350 ff.; Komesar, ‘A Job for the Judges: The Judiciary and the Constitution in a Massive and Complex Society’ (1988) 86 Michigan Law Review, 657 ff.
97. 97Shepsle/Weingast, ‘Political Solutions to Market Problems’ (1984) 78 American Political Science Review, 417 ff.; Calabresi, The Costs ofA ccidents (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970).
98. 98Komesar (1994), 7.
99. 99Komesar (1994), 8.
100. 100Olson, The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of the Group (New York: Schocken Books, 1965), 47.
101. 101Olson (1965).
102. 102Olson (1965), 48.
103. 103Of course, even in small numbers situations transaction costs can be high due to information uncertainty, strategic behaviour or other factors.
104. 104“Quite commonly, albeit not always, institutions move together. When one institution is at its best or worst, the alternative institutions are often at their best or worst.” Komesar (1994), 23.
105. 105Stigler, ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’ (1971) 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt Sci, 3 ff.; Buchanan/Tollison/Tullock, (eds.), Towards the Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society (College Station, TX: A&M University Press, 1980). Buchanan/Tullock (1967).
106. 106In contrast to influence, ‘bias’ is described as a normative or prescriptive issue. “From the standpoint of resource allocation efficiency, minoritarian bias occurs when a concentrated high per capita minority prevails over the dormant low per capita majority even though the total social costs imposed on the losing majority are greater than the total social benefits gained by the successful minority.” Komesar (1994), 76.
107. 107As demonstrated by Olson (1965).
108. 108On the theory of agency and the principal-agent problem, see Eggertsson (1990), 40 ff. with further references.
109. 109See Buchanan/Tullock (1967); Rubin, ‘On the Form of Special Interest Legislation’ (1975) 21 Public Choice,
110. 110ff.
111. 111Komesar observes some recognition for the interplay between majoritarian and minoritarian forces in Downs: “Proposition 6: Democratic governments tend to redistribute income from the rich to the poor ... Proposition 7: Democratic governments tend to favour producers more than consumers in their actions.” Downs (1957), 297.
112. 112For a similar argument, see Stigler, ‘Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to the Theories of Economic Regulation’ (1974) 5 Bell J. Econ. &Mgmt Sci., 359 ff.: “The small number solution has a wider scope than a literal count of numbers would suggest, the size distribution (sales of firm, property of family). The large individuals in a group may therefore properly view themselves as members of a small number industry if their aggregate share of the group resources is large.” 5Komesar (1994), 126.
113. 113Another constellation of interests and stake distribution envisaged by Komesar is the so called skewed ‘shifted’ distribution. It occurs where dispersed interests ex ante (for instance consumer interests in product liability cases) transform into concentrated high stake interests ex post (e.g. severe individual injury). Also in this situation the judicial process may prove a more attractive decision-making forum than the market or the political process.
114. 114North (1993), 36.
115. 115North, (1990), 6.
116. 116Alchian, ‘Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory’ (1950) 58 JPE, 211 ff.
117. 117Williamson in his early work does not distinguish between institution and organisation. In the school of sociological institutionalism a joint treatment of institutions and organizations is represented by March and Olsen. They include in the definition of institutions not only “social norms and culturally stabilized systems of meaning but also social entities that are capable of purposive action.” March/Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New Yok: Free Press, 1989). On the definition of institution and the distinction with organisation and corporate actors see Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play. Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research (Westview Press, 1997), 38.
118. 118North (1993), 36.
119. 119North, ‘Economic Performance Through Time’ (1994) 84 The American Economic Review, 359 ff., at 361.
120. 120Alchian (1950).
121. 121A Pareto-superior (or Pareto-efficient) transaction is defined in economics as a transaction that makes at least one person better off without making anyone worse off. See Posner (1992), 13.
122. 122North (1994), 361.
123. 123North (1990), 3.
124. 124North (1990), 95.
125. 125North (1990), 137.
126. 126Knill (2001), 25 ff.
127. 127North (1990), 90.
128. 128North (1990), 81.
129. 129See Hayek, The Constitution ofL iberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).
130. 130North (1990), 80.
131. 131For criticism of ‘nirvana’ type analysis see Demsetz (1969), 1 ff.
132. 132See Buzbee’s emphasis of historical context and the time element as underdeveloped facets of Komesar’s institutional choice analysis in Buzbee, ‘Sprawl’s Dynamics: A Comparative Institutional Analysis Critique’ (2000) 35 Wake Forest Law Review, 509 ff., at 516.
133. 133THE INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH IN THIS STUDY
134. 134See Rose-Ackermann (1988), 348; Komesar (1994), 14 ff.
135. 135North (1993), 36.
136. 136See North (1993), 36.
137. 137This concept is to be distinguished from ‘external legal culture’. The concepts have been coined by Lawrence Friedman. See the discussion between Cotterell and Friedman in Nelken, Comparing Legal Cultures (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996).
138. 138Watson, ‘Legal Transplants and Law Reform’ (1976) Law Quarterly Review, 79 ff.; Watson, Legal Transplants. An Approach to Comparative Law (Edinburgh: 1974).
139. 139Mnookin/Komhauser, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce’ (1978-79) 88 Yale Law Journal, 950 ff.
140. 140See the discussion in Teubner, Dilemmas ofL aw in the Welfare State (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1986); Teubner, Juridification of Social Spheres (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1987); Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993); for an early analysis see Teubner, Standards und Direktiven in Generalklausulen (Frankfurt: Athenäum, 1971).
141. 141North (1990), 4. North’s example of created institution is the Constitution of the United States and of evolving institutions - the common law.
142. 142On this connection, see in particular Watson (1974); Watson (1976); Wieacker (1995).
143. 143On the three-level scheme proposed by Williamson for capturing the research agenda of institutional economics see Williamson (1996), 325 ff.
144. 144It may be objected here that also comparative institutional analysis advances a rather ambitious ‘macro’ framework for analysis. While the approach is indeed ambitious in that it looks at the market, the courts and the political process as separate institutional systems and compares their performance, it simultaneously provides tools for analysis on a ‘micro’ level, for instance a single case (Booman), single doctrine (strict liability, the takings clause in the American Constitution), etc. See Komesar (1994).
145. 145In a similar sense concerning the concept of “Interdependenz der Ordnungen” and with emphasis on ordo­ liberal theory and the new institutional economics, see Drexl, Die wirtschaftliche Selbstbestimmung des Verbrauchers (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998), 203.
146. 146See Cappelletti/Garth, Access to Justice, Vol. I, II, III (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1978/79); Lindblom, Progressiv process. Spridda uppsatser om domstolsprocessen och samhällsutvecklingen (Uppsala: Iustus, 2000).
147. 147Wilson (ed.), The Politics ofR egulation (New York: Basic Books, 1980).
148. 148Komesar (1994), 87.
149. 149Komesar (1994), 84.
150. 150As Komesar notes, “majorities faced with complex issues and limited incentives to independently investigate may be manipulated or misled into supporting positions that are detrimental to them.” Komesar (1994), 83.
151. 151See below Ch. 2.3.1 on the connection with the comparative institutional approach in this respect.
152. 152“Institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient; rather they, or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to create new rules. In a world of zero transaction costs, bargaining strength does not affect the efficiency of outcomes; but in a world of positive transaction costs it does.” North (1994), 359 ff., at 360 f.
153. 153Naturally there are other possible theoretical tools for approaching interests. A classical interest-oriented approach is the game-theoretic one. See Scharpf (1997).
154. 154Komesar (1994), 114.
155. 155Certainly, proponents of comparative institutional analysis may argue that by rigorous analysis of interests (costs and stakes) in a particular situation, historically created institutional dependencies should be taken into account and calculated as high stakes, low costs, or vice versa.
156. 156Williamson (1985).
157. 157See Demsetz (1969), 1.
158. 158For an application of historical institutionalism in the analysis of European influences over national public administrations, see Knill (2001).
159. 159See Weatherill, ‘Addressing Problems of Imbalanced Implementation in EC Law: Remedies in an Institutional Perspective’ in: Kilpatrick/Novik/Skidmore, The Future of Remedies in Europe (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000), 87 ff.
160. 160See Slaughter/Sweet/Weiler, The European Courts and National Courts. Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998); Ladeur (ed.), Europeanisation ofA dministrative Law. Transforming National Decision­ Making Procedures (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002).
161. 161Buxbaum, ‘Die Rechtsvergleichung zwischen nationalem Staat und internationaler Wirtschaft’ (1996) RabelsZ, 201 ff., at 201.
162. 162See Strömholm, ‘Har den komparativa rätten en metod?’ (1972) SvJT, 456 ff. See also Bogdan, Comparative Law (Deventer: Kluwer, 1994). On the method of comparative law, see the detailed account of Constantinesco, Rechtsvergleichung, Band II, Die Rechtsvergleichende Methode (Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1972).
163. 163A compilation of national reports on a specific subject cannot be called a truly comparative work, although it can provide the background for such analysis. See Zweigert/Kötz (1998), 6.
164. 164Strömholm (1972), 464.
165. 165”Icke desto mindre förefaller det jämförande studiet av de rättsliga fenomenen, insatta i deras historiska, idéhistoriska, sociologiska, ekonomiska och allmänt samhälleliga kontext att ha så mycket att bjuda när det gäller att öka kunskap om dessa fenomen, att det vore orimlighet att avvisa detta studium som en värdefull självständig komponent i rättsvetenskapen.” Strömholm (1972), 464.
166. 166For a critical analysis see Van Hoecke/Warrington ‘Legal Culture, Legal Paradigm and Legal Doctrine: Toward a New Model for Comparative Law’ (1998) 47 ICLQ, 495 ff.
167. 167Zweigert/Kötz (1998), 11.
168. 168Zweigert/Kötz (1998), 11 ff. For a critical view, see Gunnerstad/Ingvarsson, ‘Den komparativa rätten -värd en omväg?’ (1996) SvJT, 152 ff.
169. 169Bogdan (1994), 18.
170. 170See the reflections on the ‘what’ and ‘why’ questions of comparative law by Fahlbeck, R‘Pleasures and Torments of Comparative Legal Research’ in: Festskrift till G. Kamell (Stockholm: Carlsson Law Network, 1999), 161 ff.
171. 171Zweigert/Kötz (1998), 45 ff.
172. 172See Reitz, ‘How to do Comparative Law’ (1998) AJCL, 617 ff. See also Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997).
173. 173Rabel, ‘Aufgabe und Notwendigkeit der Rechtsvergleichung’ (1925), reprinted in: Rabel, Gesammelte Aufsätze III (ed. Leser 1967), 1 ff., at 3 ff. Quotation after Zweigert/Kötz (1998), 36. According to Bogdan the comparatist needs to take into account the economic system, the political system and ideology, religion, history and geography, the demographic factor, co-influence of other means of control, accidental and unknown factors, when explaining the similarities and differencies between legal systems. Bogdan (1994), 68 ff.
174. 174Mattei argues that comparative law provides economic analysis with a “reservoir of institutional alternatives, which are not merely theoretical but actually tested by legal history”.See Mattei (1997), 28, with reference to Komesar’s comparative institutional approach.
175. 175See for similar criticism Buzbee (2000), 516.
176. 176For a critical legal approach with affinities to the one proposed here, see Frankenberg, ‘Critical Comparison: Re-thinking Comparative Law’, (1985) 26 Harvard International Law Journal, 411 ff., at 454, quoting Thompson, The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays (London: Merlin P., 1978), 96.
177. 177See the famous debate between Kahn-Freund and Watson in Kahn-Freund, ‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’ (1976) 37 MLR and Watson (1974), 79 ff.
178. 178This is a recurrent theme in Watson’s abundant scholarship. See in particular Watson (1974); Watson, The Evolution of Law (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), Watson, Law out of Context (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2000); Watson, Legal Origins and Legal Change (London: Humbeldon, 1991). For a comprehensive critical analysis of Watson’s scholarship, see Ewald, ‘Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants’ (1995a) 43 AJCL, 489 ff.
179. 179See Watson (1974).
180. 180Kahn-Freund (1974), 5.
181. 181Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality: A Critical Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy (London: Verso, 1992); Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
182. 182Joerges, ‘Quality Regulation in Consumer Goods Markets: Theoretical Concepts and Practical Examples’ in: Daintith/Teubner (eds.), Contract and Organisation (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1986), 132 ff., at 147.
183. 183Buxbaum, ‘Federal Aspects of Corporate Law and Economic Theory’ in: Daintith/Teubner (1986), 8.
184. 184Constantinesco (1972), 150 ff; Bogdan (1994), 45 ff.
185. 185The most important Swedish quotations have been translated into English. Translation is by the author if no other translator is given. German quotations are given in the original laguage proceeding from a (probably unrealistic) assumption of knowledge of the German language among the interested readers. This choice has admittedly been also prompted by considerations of time and space.
186. 186Constantinesco (1972), 146 ff.
187. 187On the presentation of comparative studies in a successive or a simultaneous fashion see Constantinesco (1972), 329 ff.
188. 188See Constantinesco (1972), 31; Zweigert/Kötz (1998), 34 ff.; Dehousse, ‘Comparing National and EC Law: The Problem of the Level of Analysis’ (1994) AJCL, 761, 768 ff
189. 189Zweigert/Kötz (1998), 34 ff.
190. 190Bogdan (1994), 80.
191. 191Bogdan (1994), 60.
192. 192In a similar sense see Dehousse (1994), 768.
193. 193Bogdan (1994), 80.
194. 194Komesar (1994), 115.
195. 195For a recognition of the important “law functions” excercised by private means in early markets, see Komesar (1994), 113; Coase (1988), 7 ff., as well as North (1990), 5.
196. 196Komesar (1994).
197. 197See for an economic analysis of trademarks Landes/Posner, ‘Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective’ (1987) 30 JLE, 265 ff. For an analysis of unfair competition law from the perspective of strengthening the protection of intellectual and industrial creativity and of quasi-property rights in different badges of trade, see Kamperman Sanders, Unfair Competition. The Protection of Intellectual and Industrial Creativity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).
198. 198It is another matter that broader public interests also could be relevant and there may be a problem of establishing and representing these interests in the decision-making process. See Henning-Bodewig/Kur, Marke und Verbraucher, Band I (Weinheim: VCH, 1988).
199. 199Another categorization that may be helpful for defining the focus of this study is the distinction between facilitative and regulative rules. Whereas the rules of the first category described above, i.e. misappropriation, passing off and trade secrets serve mainly to facilitate market transactions, the rules of the second category seek to solve problems of public interest. They can consequently be better described as regulative. This is not folly accepted among lawyers. As we shall see, especially in German law all rules regarding unfair competition law are traditionally treated as private law rules, and hence as facilitative. For the distinction between facilitative and regulative rules, see Ogus, Regulation. Legal Form and Economic Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 2.
200. 200Stigler (1961), 213 ff.
201. 201This classification was first introduced by Nelson, who distinguished only between search and credence qualities, see Nelson, ‘Information and consumer behaviour’ (1970) 78 JPE, 311.
202. 202Darby/Kami, ‘Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud’ (1973) JLE, 67 ff., at 69: “We distinguish then three types of qualities associated with a particular purchase: search qualities which are known before purchase, experience qualities which are known costlessly only after purchase, and credence qualities, which are expensive to judge even after purchase.” As an example of credence qualities of a purchase, the authors then discuss the provision of repair services.
203. 203See Ippolito, ‘Consumer Protection Economics, A Selective Survey’ in: Ippolito/Scheffinan (eds.), Empirical Approaches to Consumer Protection Economics (Washington DC: FTC, 1986), 1 ff., at 5.
204. 204Stigler (1961), 213 ff.; Ippolito (1986), 1ff
205. 205See Posner (1992), 6.
206. 206Ehrlich/Fisher, ‘The Derived Demand for Advertising. Theoretical and Empirical Investigation’ (1982) The American Economic Review, 366. See also Van den Bergh/Lehmann, ‘Informationsökonomie und Verbraucherschutz im Wettbewerbs- und Warenzeichenrecht’ (1992) GRUR Int., 588 ff., at 589 f.
207. 207Nelson (1970), 318 ff. By using the two variables: search/experience and durables/non-durables Nelson demonstrates that: monopoly is greater with experience and with durables than with search non-durable goods; the same goes for third-party information. Clustering of stores is higher for search than for experience goods (since the quality of experience goods cannot be inspected in the shop). National brand advertising is less attractive for search than for experience goods.
208. 208See Arrow (1984), 136 ff., at 142 ff.
209. 209Arrow (1984), 142; Schäfer/Ott, Ökonomische Analyse des Zivilrechtes (Berlin: Springer, 1986), 77.
210. 210See Stigler (1961), 51.
211. 211Arrow (1984), 142; MacKaay (1982), 114 f.
212. 212On the positive side, the better-informed consumers arguably contribute to raising the transparency of the whole market. Shapiro, ‘Consumer Policy in the United States’ (1983) Zeitschriftf iir die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 527 ff., at 530; Beales/Craswell/Salop, ‘The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information’ (1981) JLE, 491 ff., at 503 f.
213. 213In an analysis of mistake and disclosure in contract law Kronman distinguishes beween deliberately acquired information and casually acquired information. In this light Kronman discusses cases under common law when a duty to disclose has been imposed on a seller concerning the properties of his goods. Arguably such solutions are efficient since they do not undermine the seller’s incentive for future investment in acquiring information. Kronman, ‘Mistake, Disclosure, Information and the Law of Contract’ (1978) 7 JLS, 1 ff, 13, 26.
214. 214Posner, Regulation of Advertising by the Federal Trade Commission (1973).
215. 215This is to be seen by some private initiatives for test magazines: they provide only this type of information that would lead to an increased distribution of the magazine. On these issues, see Assmann/Kübler, Verbraucherinformation im Ordnungsgefüge des Privatrechts (Königstein: Athenäum 1981), 29. 160Assmann/Kübler (1981), 29; Shapiro (1983), 530.
216. 216See Akerlof, ‘The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and Market Mechanism’, in: Akerlof, An Economic Theorist's Book of Tales (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 7 ff.
217. 217See Akerlof (1984), 16; Rubin, ‘The Economics of Regulating Deception’ (1991) CATO Journal, 667 ff., at 667.
218. 218Assmann, Prospekthaftung (Köln: 1985), 289.
219. 219Stigler (1961), 218.
220. 220See Nelson (1970), 311; Beales/Craswell/Salop (1981), 507.
221. 221Stigler (1961), 218. Some authors distinguish between signals, bonds and reputation; see Ippolito (1986), 7 ff. Of course, overinvestment in signals can, in tum, give rise to imperfections on the product market since it aims at redistribution of consumers between different brands, which is not always socially efficient. See Beales/Craswell/Salop (1981), 507.
222. 222Akerlof (1984), 20 f. under the concept “counteracting institutions”.
223. 223Stigler (1961), 218
224. 224Shapiro (1983), 530.
225. 225Arrow (1984); Schäfer/Ott (1986), 311 f.
226. 226Signals can be used as indicators of quality but also as an instrument of selection, for instance in the job or insurance market.
227. 227See Jordan/Rubin, ‘An Economic Analysis of the Law of False Advertising’ (1979) 8 JLS, 527 ff., at 530.
228. 228This is, however, a truth with many modifications, some of them related to the characteristics of the product. See the section below.
229. 229Posner (1973), 8 f. On oligopolistic markets see Pitofsky, ‘Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising Regulation’ (1977) 90 Harvard Law Review, 661 ff., at 665. For a sophisticated argument that monopolistic markets may stimulate customer activism (‘voice’) instead of switching to competitive products (‘exit’), see Hirschmann, Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Responses to the Decline in Firms, Organizations and States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).
230. 230A third factor is the size of the market in terms of both dollars and number of sellers. According to Stigler, as the market grows there will appear a set of firms which specialise in collecting and selling information, taking the form of trade journals or specialized brokers. See Stigler (1961), 215.
231. 231See Stigler (1961), 220.
232. 232See Clark, Competition as a Dynamic Process (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1961), 93.
233. 233“Any comparison of the heterogeneity of quality in the street market and the canned qualities of the American supermarket suggests that quality variation is a greater problem in the East than in the West.” See Akerlof(1984), 7 ff.
234. 234Nelson, ‘Advertising as Information’ (1974) 81 JPE, 729 ff., at 730; see also Jordan/Rubin (1979), 530
235. 235See Schäfer/Ott (1986), 306 f.
236. 236Komesar (1994), 117.
237. 237See “Rent-seeking in the market and in political processes”, Komesar (1994), 115. Rent-seeking is a concept coined on the basis of Buchanan and Tullock’s economic theory of the political process, describing politicians as
238. 238Komesar (1994), 117.
239. 239See Nelson (1974), 130.
240. 240Schäfer/Ott (1986), 301. In the same line of argument, the legal system could arguably enhance market transparency by promoting institutions that signal quality. Protection of trademarks as well as creating additional quasi-property rights in different badges of trade are devices that have the aggregate effect of enabling reliable communication of goodwill and quality from producers to consumers. See Van den Bergh/Lehmann (1992); Landes/Posner (1987), Drexl (1998), 593 ff.
241. 241See Kamperman-Sanders (1997).
242. 242See Reich, Internal Market and Diffuse Interests (Bruxelles: Story-Scientia 1990), 15 f.
243. 243Komesar admits the need for multiple interest analysis. He insists, however, that such analysis should also consider the same factors determining political participation, namely: absolute per capita stakes, uniformity of distibution, size of group and complexity of the issue, the cost of information. He adds: “As such, one can imagine a whole range of interest groups concerned about any particular governmental decision. These groups may vary in size, heterogeneity, per capita impact, endowed knowledge, or any of the other factos that have been suggested in this chapter. Their political influence could be ranked according to the factors suggested in the two- force model.” See Komesar (1994), 89.
244. 244Komesar speaks of a stock of “simple symbols” which provides some social issues with easy recognition. Komesar (1994), 73.
245. 245See Reich (1990), 15 f.
246. 246“Each culture has certain subjects such as religion or ethnicity that are part of the common experience of the members of that culture...Because the press and the media provide cheap and accessible information, press and media response is a central element in determining the degree of majoritarian influence.” Komesar (1994), 73.
247. 247“The more complex and extensive the political process, the more difficult it is to understand its rules and discover its channels of influence - both formal and informal. These various costs of information and the associated costs of organizing political action often have a threshold or fixed quality.” Komesar (1994), 72.
248. 248Scharpf (1997).
249. 249See Wilson (1980), 357 ff.
250. 250Wilson provides an example of less felicitous entrepreneurial politics, namely the power of mobilization through the skillful machinations of Joseph McCarthy, launching the ‘McCharthyist’ era in American history. Wilson (1980), 370.
251. 251Knill uses the terms ‘sectoral protectionism’ and ‘interventionism’ to describe the German regulative tradtion. See Knill (2001), 219.
252. 252See Ogus (1994), 51.
253. 253Calabresi/Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral’ (1972)
254. 254Harvard Law Review, 1089 ff., at 1113.
255. 255Calabresi/Melamed (1972), 1111.
256. 256Calabresi/Melamed (1972), 1113.
257. 257In the political science literature this type of decisions are called self-binding, or pre-commitment. The analogy is with Ulysses’ decision to tie himself to the mast of his ship in order to resist the ‘fatal attraction’ of the sirens. In Elster’s reading Ulysses is “the model of rational compensation for irrationality”, see Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 36 ff. Offe, Modernity and the State: East, West (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 38.
258. 258Calabresi/Melamed (1972), 1113. On differing views on paternalist interventions from liberal and antiindidvidualist perspectives, see Ogus (1994), 52 f.
259. 259Calabresi/Melamed (1972), 1115.
260. 260“Es hat den Anschein, als sei mit dem Begriff der Guten Sitten zu allen Zeiten und in allen Ländern der Wissenschaft und der Rechtsprechung ein Rätsel aufgegeben worden.“ Teubner continues this quote from Deutsch (JZ, 1963, 385 ff., 389), as follows: „Diese begriffliche Unklarheit hat weitreichende Konsequenzen. Sie wirkt sich in der verfassungsrechtlichen Deutung aus und in den Methoden der Generalklauselpräzisierung.“ Teubner (1971), 9.
261. 261Komesar (1994), 134 ff.
262. 262It should be recalled that fair trading as defined here does not cover the sphere of contractual relations. Deception leading to contract would typically be examined under the rules of contract law and is therefore not subject to the present analysis.
263. 263Komesar (1994), 123.
264. 264See on such tendencies under German unfair competition law, Jordan/Rubin (1979), 549.
265. 265Schäfer, ‘Die ökonomischen Grundlagen der Bündelung gleichgerichteter Interessen im Prozess’ in: Basedow/Hopt/Kötz/Baetge, Die Bündelung gleichgerichteter Interessen im Prozess (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 67 ff.
266. 266See Olson (1965), 34.
267. 267Komesar (1994), 119.
268. 268Schäfer (1999), 67 ff., at 86.
269. 269Bebchuk, ‘Suing Only to Extract Settlement Offers’ (1988) 17 JLS, 437 ff.; Rosenberg/Shavell, ‘A Model in Which Suits are Brought in for their Nuisance Value’ (1985) 5 International Review ofL aw and Economics, 3 ff.
270. 270Komesar (1994), 136.
271. 271See Reich (1984). Pertschuk, Revolt Against Regulation. The Rise and Pause of the Consumer Movement (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982). For the experience in the UK, see Cranston, Regulating Business. Law and Consumer Agencies (London: Macmillan Press, 1979).
272. 272Posner (1992), 530 ff.
273. 273See Trubek, ‘Environmental Defense’ in: Weisbrod/Handler/Komesar, Public Interest Law: an Economic Analysis of Institutional Innovation ( Berkley, Univ, of California Press, 1978); Trubek, ‘Public Advocacy: Administrative Government and the Representation of Diffuse Interests’, in: Cappelletti, M. / Garth, B., Access to Justice, Vol. III (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1979), 447 ff., at 457.
274. 274See Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1955).
275. 275It should not be forgotten that the intervention of the legislator in some countries is very limited and the evolution of fair trading standards has prevailingly been left to self-regulatory bodies. On developments in the UK, see Circus, Towards a General Rule to Trade Fairly? (Essex: 1988); Miracle/Navett, Voluntary Regulation of Advertising. A Comparative Analysis of the UK and US (Toronto: Lexington, 1987).
276. 276This is rightly observed by Schäfer when analysing punitive damages and similar constructions: “Mit derartigen Konstruktionen entfernt man sich allerdings vom klassischen Zivilrecht und gelangt zu hybriden Lösungen, die nur noch schwer von verwaltungsrechtlichen zu unterscheiden sind. Schäfer (1999), 91.
277. 277See Micklitz et al. (2000).
278. 278Legrand (1996), 52 ff.
279. 279It may be objected that Sweden joined the European Union at a later stage. Yet, as a member of EFTA it had to keep a close eye on European developments and was bound by many of the principles of European law. See Ch. 7.1.
280. 280For a detailed analysis of the influence of German legal thought on Swedish doctrine during the second half of the nineteenth century and until the 1920s, see Sundell, Tysk påverkan på svensk civilråttsoktrin 1870-1914 (Stockholm: Nordiska bokhandeln, 1987).
281. 281It suffices to mention some of the numerous UWG commentaries: Baumbach/Hefermehl, UWG Kommentar, 20th ed. (München: Beck, 1998); Köhler/Piper, UWG Kommentar, 3rd ed. (München: Beck, 2002); Emmerich, Das Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs, 3rd ed. (München: Beck, 1990); Jakobs/Lindacher/Teplitzky, Handbuch des Wettbewerbs (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1994). For an early and still authoritative comparative analysis from a Swedish perspective, see Bernitz (1969), 438 ff.
282. 282See, however, the commentaries by Bernitz, Svensk marknadsrätt, 3rd ed. (Stockholm: Juristförlaget, 1991); Bernitz, Marknadsföringslagen (Stockholm: Juristförlaget, 1997); Bernitz, Otillbörlig konkurrens mellan näringsidkare (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1993); Svensson/Stenlund/Brink/Ström, Praktisk marknadsrätt, 7th ed. (Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik, 1996).
283. 283THE ROOTS OF FAIR TRADING INSTITUTIONS IN Germany And Sweden
284. 284See references in Kohler, Der unlautere Wettbewerb (Berlin & Leipzig: Dr. Walter Rotschild Verlag, 1914), 33 ff. For Sweden references to the „skrå-, hall- och handelsordningar“ of the 17th century can be found in Bernitz/Modig/Mallmén, Otillbörlig marknadsföring (Stockholm: Jurist- och samhällsvetareförbundet, 1970), 37.
285. 285Recent accounts in economic history suggest that the demise of guild control has not been as radical as it sometimes appears. See Fukuyama, Trust (Penguin Books, 1995). 9RG 3, 68. The decision of the Court was severely criticized in legal doctrine. Even nowadays in the influential Baumbach/Hefermehl commentary, the decision is qualified as a misconception. The reasoning in the decision according to the same authors is based on an “ungeheurlichen Gegenschluß” (horrendous a contrario conclusion) that everything outside the Trade Mark Protection Act should be regarded as allowed. See Baumbach/Hefermehl (1998), Einl. UWG, Rdnr. 16, 188.
286. 286Brüggemeier, ‘Probleme einer Theorie des Wirtschaftsrechts’ in: Assmann/ Brüggemeier/Hart/Joerges, Wirtschafisrecht als Kritik des Privatrechts (Athenäum, 1980), 9 ff., at 44 ff.
287. 287See Ulmer, ‘Wandlungen und Aufgaben im Wettbewerbsrecht’ (1937) GRUR, 769 ff., at 770. Efforts in this direction were particularly made by the two fathers of German unfair competition law, namely Kohler, Das Recht des Markenschutzes (Würzburg: 1884), and Lobe, Die Bekämpfung des unlauteren Wettbewerbs, Vol. I-III (Leipzig: Dieterische Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1907), 8 ff.
288. 288See Brüggemeier (1980), 44.
289. 289Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb vom 7.6.1909, RGBl 499.
290. 290See Kleineman, Renformögenhetsskada (Stockholm: Juristförlaget, 1987), 206 ff. with references to early case law.
291. 291Winroth, Om skadestånd. Strödda uppsatser IV, 2nd ed. (Uppsala: 1907), 138.
292. 292Prop. 1931:175, 6.
293. 293See SOU 1966:71, 46.
294. 294See lagen den 19 juni 1919 med vissa bestämmelser mot illojal konkurrens.
295. 295Prop. 1931:175.
296. 296Fukuyama (1995), 246.
297. 297Brüggemeier (1980), 47.
298. 298For a historical account and statistical data see Brüggemeier (1980), 47.
299. 299Ibid., 49. In comparative terms Kitschelt/Lange/ Marks/Stephens speak of a “business-coordinated market economies” (CME) and “liberal market economies” (LME). See Kitschelt/Lange/Marks/Stephens (eds.), Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). The emphasis here is obviously on business-labour relations. Within this taxonomy Germany and Sweden may fall under the same category of CME. Our analysis, however, reveals other aspects that rather produce divergence. In Germany the state much more openly allows protectionist corporate practices and even actively intervenes in a protectionist manner. In Sweden open protectionism is less tolerated and free market attitudes are stronger.
300. 300See Ulmer, Sinnzusammenhänge im Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs (Berlin: Verlag von Julius Springer, 1932), 17 ff., Ulmer summarizes the developments like this: “Der Staat in seiner immer stärker werdenden Tendenz zur Beeinflussung privater Wirtschaft arbeitet zum Teil auf Mehrung der gebundenen, zum Teil umgekehrt auf Wiederherstellung der freien Konkurrenz“. Ibid., 9.
301. 301RGZ 28,238 ff., at 244.
302. 302See the case RGZ 28, 238 („Börsenverein der deutschen Buchhändler“).
303. 303This position was elaborated in the Reichsgeicht’s decision in the Sächsischer Holzstoff case, RGZ 38, 155 referred by Fikentscher, Wettbewerb und gewerblicher Rechtschutz (München: Beck, 1958), 167; cf. Bernitz (1969), 320.
304. 304See RGZ 28,237 ff, at 247 f.
305. 305Wieacker (1995), 433.
306. 306Fikentscher (1958), 172.
307. 307Ibid., 179 ff.
308. 308Waelde/Gunderson, ‘Legislative Reform in Transition Economies: Western Transplants - A Shortcut to Social Market Economy Status?’ (1994) 43 ICLQ, 347 ff., at 369.
309. 309Strömholm, ‘General Features of Swedish Law’ in: Bogdan (ed.), Swedish Law in the New Millennium (Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik, 2000), 31 ff., at 32.
310. 310The first regulation which made decisive steps towards laissez-faire economy was SFS 1846:39.
311. 311Bernitz (1969), 31 ff. “Konkurrensfrihet, konsumtionsfrihet och en vittgående avtalsfrihet torde ha uppfattats som tämligen självklara, ehuru okodifierade utgångspunkter för förmögenhetsrätten, vilka inte fordrade någon närmare normering i sig.”, 32.
312. 312Nilsson, Sverige i förnyelsens Europa (Malmö: Liber-Hermod, 1995), 58.
313. 313Inger, Svensk rättshistoria, 4th ed.(Malmö: Liber Ekonomi, 1997), 219.
314. 314Nilsson (1995), 58.
315. 315For a detailed overview and analysis of the early developments of competition law in Sweden, see Bernitz (1969), 410 ff.
316. 316The history of the trade unions in Sweden culminated in the establishment of the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), an organization uniting the large part of trade unions in Sweden in 1888.
317. 317Bernitz (1969), 411 f.
318. 318Bernitz (1969), 414 ff.
319. 319Westberg, Den demokratiska drömträdgården (Stockholm: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2003).
320. 320Bernitz (1969), 413.
321. 321With the Peace of Prague of 1866 the dissolution of the German Alliance (Deutscher Bund) between the two main powers Russia and Austria was declared. The same year the North German Union was proclaimed. In November 1870 the North German Union concluded the November Treaties with the states of Hessen, Baden and Bayern.
322. 322Eisenhardt, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, 3rd ed. (München: Beck, 1999), 392 ff.
323. 323In contrast to the early Constitution of the German Alliance, the Constitution of 1871 did not contain a catalogue of citizens’ rights.
324. 324See for a detailed account Ewald, ‘Comparative Jurisprudence: What Is It To Try a Rat’ (1995b) 143 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1889 ff, at 2046 ff. According to Ewald, whereas the main idea could be traced back to thinkers like Machiavelli, Locke, Montesquieu and Rousseau, the concept itself was a very German creation with no counterpart in any other language. Kant himself never used the very term Rechtsstaat, which was, arguably, coined by Robert von Mohl; Ewald (1995), 2047.
325. 325As Ewald notes, later on the last principle of independence was substituted by liberal adherents to the Rechtstaat idea with a principle of protection of private property. This, however, was not the original Kantian definition. Ewald (1995), 2046.
326. 326Ewald (1995), 2053.
327. 327Ewald (1995).
328. 328Eisenhardt (1999), 394.
329. 329See about this ideal Sundell (1987), 55.
330. 330Both acts entered into force in 1879.
331. 331Eisenhardt, (1999), 399 ff.
332. 332Ibid., 399 ff.
333. 333See Eisenhardt (1999), 348 ff. and 401 ff.
334. 334See Knill, (2001), 65.
335. 335Hereby a contrast is often drawn to early parliamentary developments in Britain, but, as we are going to see, this consideration is valid also in regard to Sweden. See Heady, Public Administration. A Comparative Perspective (New York: Marcel Decker, 1979). Cf. Knill (2001), 66.
336. 336For a brief review of early Swedish legal and political history see Strömholm (2000), 31 ff.
337. 337See Strömholm (2000), ibid.
338. 338“Den svenska staten vilar sedan gammalt på en egenartad växelverkan mellan kungamakt och folkmakt.” Herlitz, Svensk självstyrelse (Stockholm: Gebers, 1933), 24 ff. Herlitz, Grunddragen i det svenska statskickets historia, 6th (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1964), 216 ff. See also Söderlind/Petersson, Svenskförvaltningspolitik (Uppsala: Diskurs, 1986), 34.
339. 339Söderlind/Petersson (1986), 34.
340. 340See Strömholm, who makes an analogy with the Parliament standing behind the monarchy in Tudor England; Strömholm (2000), 33.
341. 341On the unusually high level of press freedom in late 18th Century Stockholm, see Hallberg, The Age ofL iberty (Stockholm: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2003).
342. 342See Inger (1997).
343. 343Inger (1997), 187.
344. 344Immergut, ‘The rules of the game: The logic of health policy-making in France, Switzerland and Sweden’ in: Steinmo/Thelen/Longstreth, Structuring Politics: Historical institutionalism in comparative analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 57 ff., at 78.
345. 345Inger (1997), 190 ff.
346. 346Söderlind/Petersson (1986), 34.
347. 347Strömholm (2000), 34.
348. 348On a different note Strömholm suggests that harsh natural conditions, a scattered and rather homogeneous population, may have contributed to broad acceptance of collective fiat for dealing with many of life’s hardships. See Strömholm (2000), 37 f.
349. 349Ibid., 79.
350. 350Immergut (1992), 79 ff. with reference to Nyman, Svensk parlamentarism 1932-196. Från Minoritetsparlamentarism till majoritetskoalition, unpublished dissertation, Skrifter utgivna av Statsvetenskplig Föreningen i Uppsala genom Axel Brusewitz, No. 27 (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wicksell, 1947).
351. 351See Inger (1997), 184.
352. 352According to Louis Favoreu, the judiciary is not recognized as the third branch of power in most European countries, and this is certainly so, especially when viewed in comparison with the activist political role played by the judiciary in the United States. However, within the group of European legal systems, the modest position of the judiciary in Sweden is conspicuous. See Favoreu, ‘Constitutional Review in Europe’ in: Henkin/Rosenthal (eds.) Constitutionalism and Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 38 ff., at 53.
353. 353Strömholm (2000), 38.
354. 354Due to the principle of free access to public information preparatory legislative materials were published in a systematic form from a very early date in Sweden. Arguably, this fact accounts for the very strong position of preparatory works in Sweden as a source of interpretation of law. For a detailed account of the history of TF, see Persson, Exklusivitetsfrågan (Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik, 2002). A discussion on the effect of this law on the development of unfair competition law can be found at 75 ff.
355. 355The reason for the reception and for its subsequent diffusion and triumph in Germany is usually found in the absence of a centralised system of courts and of a unified legal profession in the fragmented German territories throughout the Middle Ages. See Wieacker (1995), de Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World (London: Cavendish Publishing, 1999).
356. 356According to the operative Ordinance of the Reichskammergericht of 1495, judges were to decide cases coming before them “according to the common law of the Empire”, meaning Roman law. Statutes and customs were placed on equal footing. See de Cruz (1999), 80.
357. 357It is well known that one of the most celebrated texts in German legal scholarship, Savigny’s ‘Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft’, came as a powerful negative response to early proposals for codification advanced by Thibault. See Savigny, ‘Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft’ (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1967 [1840]).
358. 358On the position of the learned bench and of Faculties in Germany before the unification, see Wieacker (1995),
359. 359ff.
360. 360Zweigert/Kötz (1998), 258.
361. 361See Köhler, ‘Einführung’ in: BGB, 51st ed. (München: Beck’s Texte im dtv, 2002), IX.
362. 362See Wieacker (1995), 371 ff.
363. 363Ewald (1995b): A very pertinent expression of these ideas is to be found in the following passage by Windscheid, a prominent professor on the Pandects and one of the fathers of the BGB: “Law is the ordering of the powers of will that exist in the world. The wills that exist in the world, if left to their natural impulses will collide with one another, begin to fight, and try to subjugate each other. Law creates for each will a space within which alien wills bounce off it, and within which it dominates. Law [Recht] is in the first instance not a constraint, but the acknowledgement of human freedom; the constraint is only the other side of the acknowledgement thus guaranteed. Positive law [Rechtsgesetz] only imposes duties in order to protect rights [Rechte]; the moral law [Sittengesetz] imposes only duties. If one likes epigrams one can say: positive law protects rights, the moral law imposes duties.” Windscheid, as quoted in Ewald (1995b), 2072.
364. 364See Knill (2001), 65, with references to Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe. A Study of an Idea and Institution (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980), 42 and Damaska, The Faces of Justice and State Authority a Comparative Approach to the Legal Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).
365. 365de Cruz (1999), 91.
366. 366See Kohler (1914), 17.
367. 367See Brüggemeier (1980), 9 ff., at 41; Zweigert/Kötz (1998), 143 ff.
368. 368The Germanist school ofj urisprudence was, similar to Savigny, strongly influenced by Herderian ideas. However, in contrast to Savigny, Germanists refused to seek the Volksgeist in Roman law, but insisted on the importance of studying local legal institutions. See Wieacker (1995), 286 ff.
369. 369Die Genossenschaftstheorie und die deutsche Rechtsprechung, 1887. In the words of Wolff, this was „ein groß angelegter Versuch in der Zeit der Pandektistik das Fortleben der Formen und Grundsätze deutscher Genossenschaftsbildung im Rechtsleben aufzuzeigen.“ Wolff, Grosse Rechtsdenker der deutschen Geschichte (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1963), 669 ff., at 689.
370. 370See Wieacker (1995), 358 ff.; Ewald (1995b), 2055 ff. and 2074 ff; Wolff (1963), 669 ff, at 701 ff.
371. 371The following citation is a classic: „In unserem öffentlichen Recht muss ein Hauch des naturrechtlichen Freiheitsraumes wehen und unser Privatrecht muss ein Tropfen sozialistischen Öles durchsickem.“ Gierke, Die Soziale Aufgabe des Privatrechts (Berlin, 1889), 13, quoted after Wolff (1963), 702. On the general clauses as fulfilling the function of such „drops of socialist oil“, see Zweigert/Kötz (1998), 142..
372. 372Wolff (1963), 702.
373. 373Gierke (1889), 12, quoted after Wolff (1963), 701.
374. 374See Ewald (1995b), 2055 ff.
375. 375Lagkommitéens förslag till allmän civillag (Sthlm 1826). See reference in Kleineman (1987), 23.
376. 376Bernitz, European Law in Sweden - Its Implementation and Role in Market and Consumer Law, Juridiska fakulteten, Skriftserien Nr. 70 (Stockholm University: 2002b), 16.
377. 377The systematisation does not follow the Pandects but rather an original Swedish systematization covering both public and private law. The original Äktenskapsbalk, Föräldrabalk, Ärvdabalk, Jordabalk, Handlesbalk, Byggningsbalk, Brottsbalk and Rättegångsbalk have been complemented with time through more modern codes (balks) such as Miljöbalk, Fastighetsbildningslag. See Vogel, ‘Sources of Swedish Law’ in: Bogdan (ed.), Swedish Law in the New Millennium (Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik, 2000), 48 ff.
378. 378See the analysis of the method used by Winroth in Kleineman (1987), 91; cf. Sundell (1987), 77 ff. on the late transition from the concept of 'lagfarenhet (experience in law) to that of * rättsvetenskap’ (legal science) in Sweden.
379. 379On the contemporary debate about the social purposes of civil law, see Wilhelmsson, ‘En social avtalsrätt - Några kommentarer’ (1993-94) JT, 499 ff, and the response by Sandgren, ‘En social avtalsrätt?’ I-II (1992-93) JT, 456 ff., 643 ff.
380. 380Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), Essay 6, ‘Scandinavian Realism’, 161 ff.
381. 381Ross, as quoted by Hart (1983), 162.
382. 382Källström, ’Riddaren av det moderna. Om värdenihilism och samhällsbygge’ in: Hallberg/Lernerstedt, Svenska värderingar (Stockholm: Carlssons, 2002), 21 ff., at 25, quoting Myrdal about the appeal of the Uppsala school among advocates of radical social reform: ”Hägerström tilltalade dem som ville ändra på saker och ting”.
383. 383Quoted after Källström (2002), 22.
384. 384Källström (2002), 23.
385. 385The aim of law-givers is “to impress a certain behaviour on people”. Olivecrona, Law as Fact (Copenhagen: E. Munksgaard, 1939), 31.
386. 386Hart (1983), 162.
387. 387For a critical analysis see Hedenius, Om rätt och moral (Stockholm: Tidens Förlag, 1941).
388. 388See Schricker, ‘Unlauterer Wettbewerb und Verbraucherschutz’ (1970a) GRUR Int., 32 ff., 33.
389. 389See ‘Erste Beratung des Entwurfs eines Gesetzes gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb’ (1909) GRUR, speech by member of parliament Findel, 114.
390. 390GRUR 1909, 119.
391. 391GRUR 1909, speech of MP Linz, 119.
392. 392This quotation has been referred to as justification of subsequent attempts to use the UWG for structural- political goals. According to Ballmann, it confirms that the fathers of the UWG aimed among other things to provide protection for the smaller-sized enterprises against certain practices of their more powerful rivals. Lobe (1907), Band III, 14. Cf. Ballman, Der Machtaspekt im UWG. Die Bedeutung der Macht eines Wettbewerbers för die Anwendung des § 1 UWG (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1990), 146.
393. 393„.. mit der Vorlage des Entwurfs einem neuen Wettbewerbsgesetze erfüllen die verbündete Regierungen einen aus den Kreisen unseres wirtschaftlichen Mittelstands lebhaft lautgewordenen Wunsch, der auch bei den Vertretern der verschiedensten Parteien des Reichstags Widerhall gefunden und sich in mannigfachen Resolutionen verdichtet hat.“, GRUR 1909, 106.
394. 394Cf. the statements in the course of parliamentary debates in GRUR 1909, 106 ff: MP Giese, at 109: „Hoffentlich gelingt es dieser Kommission, ein gutes Stück Mittelstandspolitik zu vollziehen und den Mittelstand in seiner schwer bedrohten und bedrängten Existenz, die ihm die unlautere Konkurrenz bereitet, durch das neue Gesetz zu strärken.“; MP Findel, at 116: „Deshalb werden wir gern an einem Gesetze mitarbeiten, welches berufen ist, Treu und Glauben wieder zu Ehren zu bringen und unserem Mittelstand diejenige Schaffensfreude zu ermöglichen, die er zu seinem Gedeihen braucht und die neben seiner vaterländischen Gesinnung noch immer sein schönstes Kennzeichen war.“; MP Linz, at 119: „Auch meine politischen Freunde haben den Gesetzesentwurf als ein erfreuliches Zeichen des zunehmenden Verständnisses für die Not und die Bedürfnisse des Mittelstandes freudig begrüßt...“
395. 395Denkschrift zum I Regierungsentwurf des UWG vom 27.5.1896: „Auf der anderen Seite würde man unmögliches anstreben, wenn man versuchen wollte, in Handel und Wandel jedem Verstoß gegen die guten Sitten schlechthin durch gesetzliche Bestimmungen vorzubeugen. Nur insoweit, als gewisse Mittel, welche moralisch verwerflich, wenngleich vom Gesetz bisher nicht verboten sind, zu dem Zweck angewendet werde, um unberechtigte Vorteile gegenüber den Konkurrenten zu gewinnen, ist Abhilfe nötig und erreichbar.“, in: Lobe (1907) Band III, 17.
396. 396See Ballmann (1990).
397. 397Parliamentary debates, GRUR 1909, 106.
398. 398See GRUR 1909, speech of MP Giese, 109; MP Findel, 116.
399. 399See GRUR 1909, 116. Speech of MP Frank: „[d]er unlautere Wettbewerb gedeiht auf dem Grenzgebiet zwischen Betrug und Reklame; und die Bekämpfung liegt nicht bloss im Interesse des redlichen Kaufmanns, sondern meist auch im Interesse des konsumierenden und kaufenden Publikums.“
400. 400See authoritative comments (amtliche Begründung) to the 1896 UWG in Lobe (1907) Band III, 51; cf. Schricker (1975), 213; Pause (1984), 259 ff.
401. 401See the evaluation by Bernitz (1969), 145.
402. 402Brüggemeier (1980), 44.
403. 403See also Art. 5, which set forth a general delegation of the Bundesrat to issue regulations on weights and measures.
404. 404One example of this careful drafting technique is § 1 1896 UWG, which exists as § 3 1909 UWG even to this day in a somewhat modified fashion. The fact that the provision yields to broad interpretation, despite the detailed enumeration, is well evidenced by the thousands of cases, which have been decided on its basis throughout the years. In this sense see Beater (2000), 141.
405. 405These restrictions were removed with amendment of UWG in 1969; see Ch. 5.
406. 406See GRUR 1909, 106 ff.
407. 407Speech of MP Bethmann-Hollweg, GRUR 1909, 106.
408. 408Similar interpretation in Bernitz (1969), 145.
409. 409The clause revealed close kinship with the general clause on tort law in the new German Civil Code, drafted some years earlier, § 823 BGB.
410. 410Callmann, Der unlautere Wettbewerb, 2 Aufl. (Mannheim: J. Bensheimer, 1929), 197.
411. 411See speech of MP Linz, referring expressly to “the power sphere of the judiciary” ( “die gerichtliche Machtsphäre”), GRUR 1909, 121.
412. 412Speech of MP Linz, GRUR 1909, 121.
413. 413See speech of MP Linz, GRUR 1909, 121. See also MP Roeren, GRUR 1909, 110.
414. 414See comments of MP Linz, GRUR 1909, 116. Cf. Ohly, Richterrecht und Generalklausel im Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs (Köln: Carl Heymanns, 1997), 202.
415. 415See speech of MP Dove, GRUR 1909, 124.
416. 416On the function of general clauses in German law see Teubner (1971). •
417. 417GRUR 1909, 106 ff., at 107.
418. 418See § 13: der Gewerbetreibende, der Waren oder Leistungen gleicher oder verwandter Art herstellt oder in den geschäftlichen Verkehr bringt.
419. 419See speech of MP Findel, GRUR 1909, 116.
420. 420Pastor, ‘Verbraucherverbände im Sinne des § 13 Abs. 1 a UWG' (1969) GRUR, 573 ff.
421. 421See speech of MP Findel, who called for explicit listing of the chambers among those having standing to sue, GRUR 1909, 116.
422. 422See RGZ 79, 326.
423. 423In German law the disctinction between right of action (a substantive right) and standing to sue is important. For analysis of this dogmatic distinction in relation to recent reforms on association suits see Greger, ‘Verbandsklage und Prozessrechtsdogmatik: Neue Entwicklungen in einer schwierigen Beziehung’ (2000) 113 ZZP, 399 ff.
424. 424See RGSt. 45, 358, quoted by Callmann (1929), 236.
425. 425RGZ 128, 339 ff., at 342 ff. See Schricker (1970a), 32 ff., at 34.
426. 426RGZ 105, 375; RGSt. 45, 361 as quoted by Callmann (1929), 236.
427. 427See Brüggemeier (1980), 47.
428. 428See Beater, Zur ‘Zur Deregulierung des Wettbewerbsrechts’ (1995) ZHR, 217 ff. Brüggemeier (1980), 47.
429. 429See, however, complaints in the speech of Roeren about the tendency of tradesmen under the 1896 UWG to resort to the public prosecutor instead of taking the matter into their own hands, GRUR 1909, 112.
430. 430See Callmann (1929), 58 ff.
431. 431Callmann (1929), 435.
432. 432Of course the injunction finds its limits in the defendant’s right of action for damages caused by an ungrounded preliminary injunction, i.e. by the forced interruption of activities that have been the subject of the injunction. See Callmann (1929), 436.
433. 433See Callmann (1929), 79.
434. 434Callmann (1929), 82.
435. 435See Callmann (1929), 72.
436. 436Callmann (1929), 84.
437. 437Brüggemeier (1980), 47.
438. 438On the history of the Zentrale, see 75 Jahre Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs (Bad Homburg, 1987); Baumbach/Hefermehl (1998), Einl. UWG, Rdnr. 36, 194; Grimes, ‘Control of Advertising in the United States and Germany, Volkswagen Has a Better Idea’ (1971) 84 Harvard Law Review, 1760 ff., at 1784.
439. 439See the list with respective references to decisions of the Reichsgericht in Callmann (1929), 237.
440. 440See Callmann (1929), 237.
441. 441“ohne die Förderung gewerblicher Interessen zu bezwecken, lediglich die Förderung der Interessen von Verbrauchern (Konsumenten) zum Ziel gesetzt hat”, RG St. 45, 360.
442. 442See the Bill to the 1965 UWG amendment, BT-Drs. IV/2217, 3.
443. 443Since German experience was always referred as a model, the absence of commercial courts in Sweden was seen as an obstacle to legal borrowing. See Levin, Lag med vissa bestämmelser mot illojal konkurrens. Lagtext och kommentar (Lund: C.W.K. Gleerups Förlag, 1944).
444. 444See Persson (2002), 76.
445. 445Förslag till lag mot illojal konkurrens, Patentlagstiftningskommitténs betänkanden, band IV, Stockholm 1915 (hereinafter Betänkande).
446. 446Committee Report (Betänkande), 98.
447. 447Betänkande, 55.
448. 448Betänkande, 17, 99.
449. 449See the deliberations on the impact of legislation against untruthful advertising on the interests of competitors and customers. Betänkande, 84 f.
450. 450”Icke mindre vore den illojala konkurrensen av betydelse för hela den köpande allmänheten, i synnerhet om man fåste sig vid den art av konkurrens, som under den ena eller andra formen föregåve sig att erbjuda sällsport gynnsamma tillfallen till inköp... Kommitterade trodde sig därför med skäl kunna påstå, att den illojala konkurrensen hotade att bliva ett farligt samhällsont.” Betänkande, 55.
451. 451It should be noted that the concept ‘consumer’ (konsument) had not been accepted in the Swedish language at that time. The word habitually used was rather ‘customers’ (kunder) or ‘the public’ (allmänheten).
452. 452”Och att kunden merendels skulle draga sig för att med risk av ytterligare förlust själv anställa en ofta kostsam rättegång eller angiva brottet till åtal och således bringa offentligheten att han låtit föra sig bakom ljuset, vore lätt förklarligt, i synnerhet som några större värden i allmänhet ej stode på spel och, enligt vad förut påpekats, det i många fall vore ganska svårt att anskaffa nödig bevisning.” Betänkande, 85.
453. 453Betänkande, 510.
454. 454Prop. 1931:175, 12. See Tengelin, ‘Illojal reklam och annan illojal marknadsföring’ (1959) NIR, 93 ff., 99; Bernitz/Modig/Malmén (1970), 40.
455. 455Prop. 1931:175, 39.
456. 456The Union expressed misgivings as to the introduction of a broad general clause of unfair competition, in line with the 1909 UWG considering such a clause as all too broad. Betänkande, 77.
457. 457See Ch. 4.1.2 above.
458. 458Om patentlagstiftningskomitténs betānkanden 5 maj 1915 medförslag till lag mot illojal konkurrens, yttrande af styrelsen för svenska tidningsutgivarförening, 1915 (Yttrande).
459. 459”Den särställning som vår tryckfrihetsrätt i jämförelse med andra länders intager på olika punkter, komplicerar, såsom redan antytts, i avsevärd mån spörsmålet om införande i vår lagstiftning av stadganden om illojal konkurrens genom tryckt skrift. ...Tryckfrihetslagens ordning i fråga om anonymitätsrätt, ansvarighet, rättegång, juryväsen och åtalsrätt, allt har fått vika för konkurrensskyddets kraft.” Quotation after Persson (2002), 81, referring to Yttrande, 62, 74.
460. 460The Chambers of Commerce in Stockholm, Gothenburg, Skåne, the Association of Leather Producers, the Stockholm Manufacturers’ Association, etc.
461. 461Prop. 1931:175, 8.
462. 462Prop. 1931:175, 57.
463. 463For comparisons with German law concerning free gifts and rebate coupon systems, see Betänkande, 233; on reducing prices of branded products, see Betänkande, 210. 188” [E]tt sådant system, om än ur teoretisk synpunkt tilltalande, vore alltför svävande och hos oss föga lämpligt med hänsyn till vår domstolsorganisation och processordning”, Betänkande, 75.
464. 464”Även kommittén är av den uppfattning, att det franska systemet icke bör läggas till grund för en svensk lagstiftning i ämnet. Utan tvivel skulle nämligen därav uppstå ett osäkerhetstillstånd, som vore i hög grad menligt. I själva verket göras med ett sådant system domstolarna på sätt och vis till lagstiftare å ett område, där den verklige lagstiftaren ansett svårigheter möta för uppställande av speciella bestämmelser. Det är ett betydande krav som sålunda ställes på domstolarna.” See Betänkande, 75 f.
465. 465See prop. 1931:175, 10.
466. 466The Swedish Association for Protection of Industrial Property also had objections against a broad general clause.
467. 467”[P]å ett område som detta även med ett sådant system som 1909 års tyska helt visst skulle, om än i mindre mån än med tillämpning av det franska systemet, uppstå ett osäkerhetstillstånd av betänklig art. Vad som strider mot ”god sed” eller ”sunt affärsmoral" torde i många fall vara synnerligen vanskligt att avgöra, även för affärsmannen själv. Om också straff icke kunde ifrågakomma utan blott förbud mot handlingens fortsättande eller upprepande och eventuellt skadeståndsskyldighet, skulle den redbare affärsmannen ofta komma att draga sig för att använda konkurrensmedel, som rätteligen icke vore att anse som illojala. Fruktan att utsättas för obehaget av en, låt vara obefogad rättegång skulle sannolikt ej sällan avhålla honom t.o.m. från åtgöranden, angående vilkas lagenlighet han visserligen själv icke hyste någon tvivel, men som han befarade kunna av annan, kanske i syfte endast att åsamka honom skada och obehag, stämplas som illojala. Och även om trakasseringssyfte icke förelåge, kunde obefogade rättegångar lätt komma att väckas av dem, som i den hårda
468. 468The Council on Legislation is a specific Swedish institution which exercises ex ante control on constitutionality of most legislative acts. Its status is at present regulated in RF 8:18. The recommendations of the Council are not binding on the Government and Paliament, but are normally given a very thorough consideration and are as a rule respected. See Strömberg, Sverigesförfattning (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1999), 90 ff.
469. 4691 § 1931 IKL read as follows: ”Illojal reklam” Den, som i utövning av näringsverksamhet genom meddelande å vara, anslag eller skylt eller i annons, circular, prospekt eller priskurant eller genom annat för stt större antal personer avsett meddelande i uppenbar strid mot god affärssed angående verksamheten eller däri utbjudna varor eller prestationer lämnar oriktig uppgift, ägnad att framkalla uppfattningen om ett fördelaktigt anbud, straffes, där han haft eller bort hava vetskap om uppgiftens oriktighet, för illojal reklam med böter från och med fem till och med två tusen kronor eller, där omständigheterna äro synnerligen försvårande, med fängelse från och med en månad till och med ett år; ersätte ock uppkommen skada.
470. 470The example given in the Bill was the antiseptic qualities of a mouthwash, but not its nice aroma. Prop. 1931:175,21.
471. 471Prop. 1931:175, 23. Bernitz/Modig/Malmén (1970), 41.
472. 472This restriction was supported by the National Board of Trade with reference to the German clause on misleading advertising as well as by the TU.
473. 473Prop. 1931:175, 10.
474. 474”Enligt förevarande paragraf äro jämväl mål angående sanningslös reklam, vilka ej innefatta yrkande om straff eller ens om skadestånd utan allenast gå ut på meddelande av förbud mot ett visst förfarande, i tillämpliga avseenden att betrakta såsom brottmål däri talan om ansvar föres.” Betänkande, 414 ff.
475. 475The possibility for granting injunction in the absence of express statutory support was rejected by the Supreme Court in the case Bönan Lyx, NJA1948, 642 (“Bönan Lyx”). See the critical comments of Bernitz (1993), 75 ff. and 106 ff. The Court took a more lenient stance in a later decision NJA 1956, 664 (“A-Bilskola”), Bernitz (1993), 76.
476. 476This is still the case under the 2 §5 of the Tort Liability Act (Skadeståndslagen, SkL).
477. 477See SOU 1966:71, 284 ff; cf. generally Kleineman (1987).
478. 478Though see the critical attitude of the Gothenburg Chamber of Commerce towards wider possibilities for damage compensation. Prop. 1931:175, 28. In general it appears that Swedish industry tried to walk a fine line between introducing some restrictions to unfair competitive methods, but at the same time not itself be exposed too directly to the judicial process. In trying to solve this dilemma the fear of litigation often took the upper hand and attractive possibilities like damage compensation were sacrificed.
479. 479SOU 1966:71, 56; 1915 Betänkande, 126.
480. 480Despite this limitation there are a number of decisions in which the courts awarded damages even without conclusive evidence on the size of the loss suffered, NJA 1940, 145, (“Centrum radio”); NJA 1941, 580 (“Svensk uppslagsbok”).
481. 481RB 35:5.
482. 482SOU 1966:71, 56. RB 35:5 ”Om det är fråga om uppskattning av en inträffad skada och full bevisning om skadan inte alls eller endast med svårighet kan föras, får rätten uppskatta skadan till skäligt belopp.”
483. 483SOU 1966:71, 56.
484. 484NJA 1954, 113, interpreting 11 § IKL in connection with RB 20:8.
485. 485See 11 § IKL, SOU 1966:71, 56 ff. It may be interesting to note that in the other Scandinavian countries the resistance to intervention in the freedom of economic enterprise was also rather strong and reflected on the procedural rights of traders to sue on unfair competition grounds. Thus in Denmark the locus standi in the first place belonged to trade associations, particularly authorized for the purpose by the Minister of Trade. Individual
486. 486In a similar sense Treis, Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs und Marktvertriebsrecht in Schweden (Köln: Carl Heymanns, 1991).
487. 487See Betänkande 1915, 130, 134, SOU 1966:71, 56.
488. 488”Gällande lagstiftning mot illojal konkurrens saknar s.k. generalklausul... till följd härav har näringslivets organisationer sedan lång tid tillbaka varit nödsakade att själva söka genom lämpliga åtgärder effektivt bekämpa de skiftande yttringar av illojal konkurrens, som tid efter annan uppkomma, och vilka icke äro kriminaliserade av lagstiftningen."God affarssed och illojal konkurrens (Stockholm: AB Nordiska Bokhandeln, 1953), 5 ff.
489. 489On the history and activity of industry self-regulation see Eberstein, ‘Generalklausulen mot illojal konkurrens’ (1951a) SvJT, 1 ff., at 12 ff.; Körner, ‘God affärssed och illojal konkurrens’ (1954) NIR, 81 ff., Tengelin, ‘Den illojala konkurrensen i blickpunkten’ (1957) NIR, 137 ff.; Tengelin, ‘Självsanering på marknadsföringsområdet’ (1970) NIR, 111 ff.
490. 490See God afferssed (1954), 5. In the following I shall use the abbreviation NOps when I refer to the period when several Councils existed and NOp for the centralized Council established in 1957.
491. 491These were the SI, the Federation of Swedish Retailers (Sveriges Köpmannaförbund, SKF), the Association of Swedish Enterprises (Sveriges Hantverks- och Småindustriorganisationen, SHS), the Swedish Cooperative Union (Kooperativa Förbundet), Ibid, 5 ff.
492. 492§ 1 Rules. For a detailed account on the organization and activity of the NO with references to their Rules of procedure see Eberstein (1951a), 13 ff.
493. 493See Eberstein (1951a), 15. The decisions of the Board were, however, made public in an anonymous form through publications of the chambers of commerce. See Körner (1954), 81 ff.
494. 494Tengelin, ‘Den illojala konkurrensen i blickpunkten’ (1957) NIR, 137 ff., at 140. Otillbörlig konkurrens och god afförssed. Yttranden avgivna av Näringslivets Opinionsnämnd under åren 1957-58 (Stockholm: Norstedt & söner, 1963), 5.
495. 495Tengelin (1970), 119.
496. 496According to estimate by Tengelin individual petitions made for 20 percent of the cases before the Board, Tengelin (1970), 118.
497. 497Tengelin (1957), 141. I have not been able to find references to the ICC Code in reports on the activity of the early NOs.
498. 498See Bernitz/Modig/Malmén (1970), 45.
499. 499Ramsay, Consumer Protection (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989), 91.
500. 500See Ohly (1997).
501. 501See the cases quoted by Pause, Die Berücksichtigung der Interessen der Allgemeinheit bei der Beurteilung wettbewerblichen Handelns (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1984), 18 ff.; cf. also Schricker (1970), 32 ff., at 34.
502. 502See the quotations from the parliamentary debate above.
503. 503RGZ 120, 47 ff., at 49. The RG pointed out that in the first Bill to the UWG there was a proposal to grant those lodging subsequent claims on the same ground (e.g.unions) only the right to step in the proceedings as joint plaintiffs. Since this proposal had not been incorporated in the legal text, the court drew an e contrario conclusion of multiple rights of action in the same matter. See also RGZ 128, 330 ff., at 332. Cf. Baumbach/Hefermehl (1998), 197. See Schricker (1970), 34.
504. 504For an even earlier case with reference to public interests in connection with Verbandsklage see RGZ 79, 325, in Leidl, Rechtsprechung des Reichsgerichts in UWG Sachen (Verlag Gisela Liedl, 1968), 349, See also the examples quoted by Pause (1984), 13.
505. 505Pause (1984), 13.
506. 506See Pause (1984), 17 ff. with further references.
507. 507See Schricker (1975), 213, fh. 20.
508. 508See Pause (1984), 235 ff.
509. 509RGZ 79, 327.
510. 510RGZ 48, 114 ff., at 124.
511. 511Breach of statutory duty. See Ohly (1997), 240. A catalogue with examples from case law is provided by Callmann (1929), 130 ff.
512. 512See Schricker, Gesetzesverletzung und Sittenverstoß (München: Beck, 1970b), 21.
513. 513„Eine ein gesetzliches Verbot verletzende Handlung verstößt indessen noch nicht schlechthin gegen die guten Sitten.“ RGZ 77, 217 ff, at 220, quoted after Callmann (1929), 99, § 1, Rdnr. 16.
514. 514See Schricker (1970b), 24 with reference to cases on pyramid sales and on the activity of cooperatives without a license.
515. 515“es ist überhaupt größte Vorsicht geboten, weil vielfach unvergleichbare Interessen einander gegenüberstehen und die moralische Bewertung privatwirtschaftlichen Handelns unabhängig ist von Normen, die etwa ausschließlich von der Staatsräson beeinflusst sind.“ Callmann (1929), 99.
516. 516“ein Verstoß gegen gewerbepolizeiliche Vorschriften noch nicht notwendig eine Sittenwidrigkeit enthielte, auch dann nicht wenn er mit einer vorsätzlichen Benachteiligung eines Mitbewerbers verbunden war.“ Callmann (1929), 99.
517. 517RGZ 77, 217 ff., at 220: “...ihre [der Zuwiderhandlung] gesundheitspolizeiliche [Seite] kommt für den Anspruch des Klägers nicht in Frage...“
518. 518The situation changed only after approximately 50 years when the BGH explicitly dissociated itself from this line of precedent and confirmed a broader range of protected interests under unfair competition law. See Schricker (1970b), 22, with further references. Schricker ascribes the change to altered understanding of courts as to the protected interests under unfair competition law, including the interests of consumers and the general public Schricker (1970b).
519. 519RGZ 115,319. See Schricker (1970b), 23.
520. 520Also in this category of cases Schricker notes a change in attitude in that it would arguably be easier to infer an act against good morals from violation of a criminal prohibition. See Schricker (1970b), 24, with further references.
521. 521RGZ 117, 16 ff., at 20.
522. 522„Der Beklagte verwertet demnach einen durch Rechts- und Vertragsbruch erlangten gewerblichen Vorteil, nämlich die erheblich niedrigeren Einstandspreise seiner gewerblichen Leistungen, dazu, um sich vor den tariftreuen Wettbewerbern durch seine so ermöglichten sehr viel billigeren Vergütungssätze einen Vorsprung im gewerblichen Wettkampf zu sichern.“ RGZ 117, 16 ff., at 24.
523. 523RGZ 166, 315 ff, at 319. The dispute regarded an alleged violation of a prohibition to deal with procurement of real estate and mortgage contracts.
524. 524Kohler (1914), 26. |
525. 525RGZ 88, 9; RGZ 120, 47 („Markenschutzverband").
526. 526Ulmer (1932), 16.
527. 527Kohler (1914), 31.
528. 528Ulmer (1932), 24.
529. 529RGZ 51, 385; RGZ 56, 274; RGZ 76, 43.
530. 530RGZ 28, 238 („Börsenverein der deutschen Buchhändler“) on inneren Organisationszwang; RGZ 56, 271 („Verein deutschen Buchhändler“) on äußeren Organisationszwang.
531. 531Callmann (1929), 106 ff. with further references.
532. 532Quotation as in Callmann (1929), 106.
533. 533See Callmann (1929), 136.
534. 534Callmann (1929), 134.
535. 535Gesetz über Preisnachlässe (Rabattgesetz), 25 November 1933, RGBl I, 1011; Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten zum Schutz der Wirtschaft, 9 March 1932, RGBl. I S. 121 (Zugabeverordnung).
536. 536RG GRUR 1936, 810 (,,Diamantine“).
537. 537RG GRUR 1938, 207 („Persil“). See also the cases RG GRUR 1938, 849 („Eierbrikett"); RG GRUR 1939,
538. 538(„Lockenwickler").
539. 539RG GRUR 1936, 810 („Diamantine“), 811.
540. 540Ibid., 812.
541. 541RG GRUR 1936, 810 (“Diamantine”), 812.
542. 542See BGH GRUR 1965, 489 (,Kleenex").
543. 543RG GRUR 1936, 810 (“Diamantine”), 812; cf. Pause (1984), 15 pointing at the mention of „Verbraucher“ and „kaufendes Publikum“.
544. 544See § 14 UWG. The closest English concept would be that of the tort of ‘injurious falsehood’, which in English law does, however, require proof of intent or negligence (malice). See Ohly (1997), 30 ff.
545. 545See § 15 UWG.
546. 546Callmann (1929), 1329, quoting Kohler (MuW XVI, 128).
547. 547Bastian ‘Comparative Advertising in Germany - Present Situation and Implementation of the EC Directive’ (2000) 31 IIC, 151 ff., at 153, quoting Kohler (NJW, 1917, 127, ff).
548. 548Callmann (1929), 131.
549. 549On this evolution see Ohly (1997), 302 ff.
550. 550On the concurrent application of the general clause and the catalogue provisions see the Markenverband judgement, RGZ 120.
551. 551This concept corresponds closer to the English concepts of defamation and slander. See Ohly (1997), 29.
552. 552RG GRUR 1927, 486, 488.
553. 553RG GRUR 1931, 1299 ff. (“Hellegold”).
554. 554Ibid.
555. 555RG GRUR 1931, 1299 ff., 1301. Ohly and Spence see the gist of this decision in the old saying that no one can be a judge in his own case, see Ohly/Spence (1999), 684; cf. Reich/Ahrazoglu, ‘EG-Binnenmarkts und Werberecht’ (Bremen: ZERP, 1990), 30.
556. 556Callmann (1929), 133.
557. 557The example given by Callmann concerned spreading information about lung disease of a competitor (dentist), RG MuW XI, 436. Since it would be open for everybody to inform the interested customers, this was considered allowed for the competitor as well. The conduct was nevertheless prohibited, but on other grounds. Callmann (1929), 133. In a similar sense RG, GRUR 1916, 186 (information about fatalities resulted from consumption of vinegar essence.
558. 558See Ohly/Spence (1999), 684 with reference to Nerreter, GRUR 1931, 8 ff.
559. 559Beater (2000), 8 ff.
560. 560See Callmann (1929), 160 with further references.
561. 561See Callmann (1929) with further references: RG 58, 239: RG I MuW XIV, 182, RG i. MuW 27/28, 25.
562. 562See Callmann (1929), with references to RG 99, 28, 135; RGSt. 36, 378 and other cases.
563. 563Callmann (1929), with reference to RGZ 77, 431 ff., at 433.
564. 564Ulmer (1932), 31. Similar already earlier Kohler (1914), 104 ff.
565. 565Schricker (1970b).
566. 566RGSt. 36, 378; RGSt. 48, 41.
567. 567See Pause (1984), 15.
568. 568See Kohler (1914). Kohler was not only one of the pioneers in the scholarly analysis of intellectual and industrial property law (cf. his Markenrecht, Autorenrecht), but also a respected scholar in the field of legal history and theory of law (cf. the five-volume encyclopedia devoted to legal science published under his editorship: Kohler, (ed.), Enzyklopädie der Rechtswissenschaft in systematischer Bearbeitung (München: 1913­ 1915).
569. 569Ibid., 22 ff.
570. 570„Die heutige Wirtschaft, welche den Einzlenen als Enzelnen zum selbstentscheidenen Träger der Produktion und des Verkehrs macht, muss durch das Persönlichkeitsrecht bestimmt werden. Hiernach ist die Wirtschaft individualistisch frei, aber so, dass die Persönlichkeit nicht angetastet werden darf. Jede Wirtschaft des Einen hat sich in den Grenzen zu halten, welche die Persönlichkeit des Anderen erfordert. Die Persönlichkeit eines jeden verlangt aber, dass er nicht durch täuschende anstandswidrige Mittel geschädigt, oder unterdrückt wird.“ Kohler (1914), 17.
571. 571On the Kantian influence on Kohler in the context of copyright law see Strömholm, Le droit moral de I’autor, /(Stockholm: Norstedts & söner, 1966), 184 ff.
572. 572Cf. the comparative comments of Kleineman (1987) in this respect.
573. 573Kohler (1914), 16.
574. 574„Man täusche sich nicht: es ist nicht der Verlust des einzelnen Individuums, der Vermögensniedergang eines einzelnen redlichen Arbeiters, um den es sich handelt; es ist die Demoralisation des ganzen Verkehrs, welche eintritt, wenn rechtswidrige Übergriffe ungeahndet ihr Spiel treiben können; es ist der Mangel des Vertrauens, welcher alle Verkehrsoperationen in furchtbarer Weise lähmt“, see Kohler (1914), 42.
575. 575„Trotzdem handelt es sich hauptsächlich um bürgerlich rechtliche Interessen; denn es gilt der Grundsatz: wo das bürgerliche Recht ausreicht, soll das öffentliche Recht in die Verkehrsverhältnisse nicht eingreifen; nur wo das bürgerliche Recht nicht genügt, um den sicheren Lauf der Ding zu gewährleisten, wird es erforderlich sein, auch von Seiten des öffentlichen Rechtes Bestimmungen zu geben, damit der Gang des Verkehrs nicht die Grenzen überschreitet, welche die ruhige Entwicklung der menschliche Verhältnisse verlangt.“ Kohler (1914), 17.
576. 576Joerges, ‘Die klassische Konzeption des internationalen Privatrechts und das Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs’ (1972) 36 RabelsZ, 421 ff., at 443, quotes Kohler as saying: „Man denke an die Grenzbezeichnungen, an das Grundbuchwesen und an das Registerwersen ... - überall der gleiche Zweck und dieselbe ... rechtliche Hilfe“ (Kohler, Warenzeichenrecht, 1910, 68).
577. 577„...Eingriffe der Staatsgesetzgebung in das natürliche Spiel der Privatrechte“ für die jede privatrechtliche Grundlage fehle“ See Mayer, ‘Die concurrence déloyale’ (1881) 26 ZgesHR, 363 ff, at 434; quoted after Joerges (1972), 444.
578. 578See references in Schricker (1970a), 32 ff., at 33; Callmann (1929), 43 ff.
579. 579See Ohly (1997).
580. 580See the retrospective analysis by Fezer, ‘Modernisierung des deutschen Rechts gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb auf der Grundlage einer Europäisierung des Wettbewerbsrechts’ (2001) WRP, 989 ff., at 996.
581. 581Callman (1929), 34.
582. 582Callmann finds support for this view in RGSt. 13, 44; 42, 16.
583. 583Nipperdey, Wettbewerb und Existenzvernichtung (Berlin, 1930) quoted after Ulmer (1932), 16. Interestingly, through the interest of Franz Böhm in unfair competition law ‘Leistungswettbewerbs’ turned into a conceptual building block in the theory of Ordoliberalism, that has been particularly influential when laying down the foundations of the postwar German Sozialstaat. See Gerber, ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo­ Liberalism, Competition Law and the “New” Europe’ (1994) 42 AJCL, 25 ff., at 53.
584. 584Ulmer (1932), 18 with reference to Nipperdey (1930). See also Gerber (1994), 53.
585. 585See Nerreter, Allgemeine Grundlagen eines deutschen Wettbewerbsrechts (Berlin, 1936). On the evolution of the taxonomy in unfair competition law and the Fallgruppen see Baumbach/Hefermehl (1998), Einl. UWG, Rdnr. 158 ff., 246 ff.
586. 586Ulmer (1932).
587. 587Ulmer (1937), 769 ff., at 770: “Die Gewerbefreiheit ist die Wirtschaftsverfassung, unter der ein starkes Aufblühen des Wirtschaftslebens sich vollzieht.”
588. 588Ulmer (1937), 769 ff, at 771.
589. 589„Nun ist kein Zweifel: Der Schutz der schöpferischen Leistung des Einzelnen ist und bleibt in hervorragendem Masse Ziel der Wettbewerbsordnung. Aber daneben stehen doch für uns zwei weitere entscheidende Zielsetzungen: Da ist zunächst das Interesse des Volksganzen an einer gesunden und sauberen Ordnung des Wirtschaftslebens....Und ferner, was oft - in der Rechtsprechung - unter dem Titel des Interesses der Allgemeinheit damit zusammengeworfen wird, in Wahrheit aber auf einem besonderen Blatt steht: es geht auch um die Interessen der Abnehmer, des Publikums.“ Ulmer (1937), 769 ff.
590. 590See v. Gierke, ‘Der Rechtsgrund des Schutzes gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb’ (1895) Zeitschrift jur gewerblichen Rechtsschutz, 109 ff.
591. 591Gierke cited in Wolff 1963), 702; Wieacker (1995), 432 ff.
592. 592Ohly (1997), 288 ff.
593. 593See SOU 1966:71, 59 ff. Bernitz/Modig,/Malmén (1970), 42.
594. 594See prop. 1931:175, 23.
595. 595NJA 1935, 593. SOU 1966:71, 59. See the critique of Eberstein, ‘Generalklausulen mot illojal konkurrens och Pariskonventionen’ (1951b) NIR, 1 ff., 5. Likewise an advertising of glass items, using a geographical indication (“Glas från Kosta”) misleadingly similar to the trade name of a famous glass-factory (AB “Kosta”), was not regarded to fall within the scope of 1 § IKL. The message was indeed misleading, but not incorrect since the advertiser’s workshop was indeed situated in the Kosta area. Cf. NJA 1950, 365, NIR 950, 260. See Bemitz/Modig/ Malmén (1970), 121.
596. 596NJA 1938, 193.
597. 597NJA 1938, 193. The decision led to a change, however not in IKL but in the Criminal Code’s provision on fraud, which originally required evidence of actually suffered damage for a sentence.
598. 598See above, prop. 1931:175, 41 and Bernitz/Modig/Malmén (1970), 41.
599. 599NJA 1957, 188. See for other first instance cases Godaffärssed (1954).
600. 600See decision of Stockholm Rådhusrätt in: God affärssed (1954), 17, 20, 44 ff.
601. 601NJA Avd. I 1941, 580; cf. God affärssed (1954), 18.
602. 602See SOU 1966:71.
603. 603SvJT, 1935, 78; SvJT 1944, 47.
604. 604SvJT 1944, 86; God affärssed (1954), 27, 10.
605. 605See Bernitz (1993), 111.
606. 606NJA 1935, 686 and NJA 1937, 154. Bernitz/Modig/Malmén (1970), 42. See also Levin (1944), 63.
607. 607See Bernitz (1993), 229.
608. 608The problem of compensation of pure economic loss in Swedish law has received its most extensive treatment in Kleineman (1987).
609. 609“Hela det nuvarande samhällsskicket, med dess alltjämt så omfattande möjligheter till fri konkurrens och företagsamhet, bygger på att det i största utsträckning är tillåtet, ja att det är för samhället nyttigt, att vi tillfogar varandra skador”; quoted from Karlgren, SvJT 1938, 373, quotated after Kleineman (1987), 281.
610. 610NJA 1906, 509. Kleineman (1987), 209. See also Heuman, Målsägande (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1973), 381.
611. 611On the situation in German unfair competition law, see Ch. 4.4.1 above.
612. 612See Kleineman (1987), 267 ff.
613. 613Ibid., 267 ff. with further referenes.
614. 614”Om exempelvis någon, i ostridigt afsigt att bringa ruin öfver en konkurrent, säljer varor till underpris, erbjuder icke lagen den senare några skyddsmedel”; cited from Winroth (1907), 138. This is a popular quotation to be found in Eberstein (1951a), 1 ff., at 2; Kleineman (1987), 280, and Helgesson, Affärshemligheter i samtid och framtid (Stockholms Universitet, 2001), 230.
615. 615”Förhållandet ändras icke, om falska uppgifter lemnas till at förklara varornas prisbillighet och göra dem ytterligare begärliga för kunder, ej heller om för ändamålet jämförelse anställes mellan egna priser och konkurrentens eller till sist sjelfa handeln drifves utan laga lof eller anmälan.” Winroth (1907), 138.
616. 616”Först då det tillgripes åtgärd, som ej allenast förkastligt och obehörig utan alldeles oafsedt sitt skadegörande syfte, är en omedelbart mot vederbörande riktad brottslig handling, uppstår rätt till ersättning, nemligen till den del som samma handling haft skada till följd”; quoted in ibid. As examples of such practices prohibited under criminal law Winroth mentions preventing the access to a competitors shop or the dissemination of rumours denigrating his goods. See Eberstein (1951a), 2.
617. 617Bernitz, ‘Otillbörlig konkurrens: det glömda rättsområdet’ in: Bernitz, Festskrift Jan Hellner, (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1984), 115 ff„ at 119. See Kleineman (1987), 17.
618. 618See the reference to Winroth (1907), 350 ff. in Kleineman (1987), 281.
619. 619”Under det att vållande av t.ex. kroppsskada, åtminstone i den mån den förorsakar förmögenhetsförlust, utan inskränkning kan och bör medföra ersättningsskyldighet, skulle det vara orimligt att låta t.ex. förmögenhetsförlust förorsakad av en än så avsiktlig ekonomisk konkurrens, försåvitt en med hänsyn till medlen håller sig inom vissa gränser, medföra ersättningsskyldighet; det skulle vara detsamma som att förbjuda konkurrens och därmed döda samhällets ekonomiska nerv”.
620. 620”Sålunda delar sig hela området för förorsakande av förmögenhetsförlust i två delar: tillåtet och otillåtet - d.v. här säga: ersättningsskyldighet icke-medförande och ersättningsskyldighet medförande. Gränsen mellan dessa båda delområden måste uppdragas genom den positiva rätten (låt vara sedvanerätt: illojalitetsprincipen)”; quoted in Thyrén, Culpa legis Aquiliae enligt justiniansk rätt. Ett bidrag till läran om utomobligatoriskt skadestånd (Lund 1893).
621. 621Kleineman (1987), 83 ff.
622. 622God affärssed (1954), 6 with reference to the Rules of the Boards (stadga).
623. 623About 60percent of the files in the collection of decisions of the NOs for the years 1935-51 (50 of 80 reported) concerned misleading and incorrect advertising, including misleading comparisons and special offers, God affärssed (1954). A similar ratio is reported by Tengelin in a review of the activity of the 1957 NO. See Tengelin (1970), 118. Another big group, especially after the amendment of 1942, formed instances of alleged confusion with trade name, firm, trademark, get-up and other distinguishing and well-established commercial mark. See 9 § IKL. Cf. Körner (1954), 81 ff.
624. 624Mnookin/Kornhauser (1978-79).
625. 625See Godaffärssed (1954), 22 ff.
626. 626The case involved a comparison between methods of production (between inorganic and organic concrete tightening material) that would in Germany be qualified as Systemvergleich. See God affärssed (1954), 13 ff.
627. 627See God affärssed (1954), 9, 22, 36. Likewise spreading discrediting and incorrect information concerning the business organisation (cooperative enterprise) of a competitor to potential foreign customers with the purpose of diverting orders was against good commercial practice, see ibid., 45 ff. On the practice of the 1957 NO see Bernitz/Modig/Malmén (1970), 150 ff. On the change in attitude after 1966, see below Ch. 5.
628. 628See God affärssed (1954), 15, 28.
629. 629See God affärssed (1954), 10 ff., 20 ff.
630. 630”Nämnden anser sig i ärendet kunna göra allenast det uttalandet, att utdelning av gratisprov icke bör ske i sådan omfattning, att densamma inverkar störande på varans omsättning i den allmänna handeln. Nämnden finner nämligen alltför stora svårigheter möta att fastställa någon bestämd gräns, som proven med hänsyn till god affärssed icke må överskrida, även om Nämnden anser önskligt, att provpaketens storlek så långt görligt är inskränkes.” God affärssed (1954), 13.
631. 631See Otillbörlig konkurrens, 1960 (1963), 330.
632. 632SOU 1966:71, 187. See also the succinct comments of Tengelin on the difficulty to balance conflicting business interests in these matters, Tengelin (1959), op. cit., 109.
633. 633On trading stamps see SOU 1966: 71, 189 with reference to NO, 676, 677/63. On ‘lockvaruförsäljning’ - sale under self-cost see SOU 1966:71, 191 with reference to NO 279/60.
634. 634See section above.
635. 635God affärssed (1954), 7; Bemitz/Modig/Malmen (1970).
636. 636Illustrative in this respect is the case with Nordisk Familjebok AB. NO issued three decisions, condemning basically the same practice, but apparently the practice resurfaced after a while in the same or slightly modified form. See God affärssed (1954), 32, 35. The Board found clear case of abuse of the gullibility of he public (in accordance with 2 § IKL); Ref. Nr. 48 this time the misleading offer was combined with negative contract building whereby the customers were bound by their passivity. In all cases complaints were lodged by the Swedish Book Publishers Association (Svenska Bokförläggareförening).
637. 637See the decisions on Nordisk Familjebok. All complaints were lodged by the Swedish Book Publishers’ Association, God affärssed (1954), 32ff, 35ff, 38 ff.
638. 638See Otillbörlig konkurrens (1963).
639. 639See Eberstein (1951a), 1 ff; Eberstein (1951b), 1.
640. 640See the examples of failure of the courts to provide protection in Eberstein (195 lb), 4 ff.
641. 641Eberstein (195 la), 4 ff. He pointed at several general clauses that have entered into force after the Patent Legislative Committee delivered its report, among them 33 § of the 1915 Contracts Act and 4 § of the 1927 Insurance Act.
642. 642This argument had earlier been made by Levin (1944), 16.
643. 643Eberstein (1951a), 6.
644. 644Eberstein (1951a), 8.
645. 645Eberstein (1951a), 14 ff.
646. 646Eberstein (1951b), 1.
647. 647See in this sense Bernitz/Modig/Malmén (1970), 23.
648. 648For a detailed account on the idea of consumer protection in the period between 1871-1933, see Geyer, Der Gedanke des Verbraucherschutzes im Reichsrecht des Kaiserreichs und der Weimar Republik (1871-1933) (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2001).
649. 649”Sverige är veterligen det enda land i den västerländska kulturkretsen, som inte har förbud som påföljd på detta rättsområde.” SOU 1966:71, 287.
650. 650Komesar (1994), 133.
651. 651Briiggemeier (1980), 46 ff.
652. 652See Eberstein (1951a), 5 ff.
653. 653Strömholm, ‘Equity in Swedish law’ in: Newman, R. (ed.), Equity in the World’s Legal System (Brussels: Bruyant, 1973), 443 ff.
654. 654According to Fukuyama, “[i]n Germany, then, the guilds were never ruthlessly destroyed as they were in France. They survived and were transmuted into a modern form, becoming the basis of the country’s postwar apprenticeship system.”...“The Germans hardly preserved the guild system intact...., but neither did they
655. 655Wieacker (1995), 433.
656. 656Ohly (1997), 233: “Diese Mittlerfunktion kommt unter § 1 UWG den Präjudizen zu. Sie liefern die konkreten materiellen Grundsätzen, die Ethik, Konvention, Verfassung und wettbewerbsfunktionale Topoi nicht zu bieten vermögen.“
657. 657The legal method for concrétisation of the general clause is well-illustrated and analysed by Ohly (1997), 253 ff.
658. 658Ohly (1997), 300.
659. 659Indicative of this blocking effect of TF is a statement in the parliamentary debate on the 1931 IKL made by MP Löfgren, who had been involved in the legislative work that led to the 1919 failure of adopting full-fledged law in the area. Commenting on his reserved attitude to the 1915 Draft on unfair competition act, the deputy admits that he at that time did not act out of conviction that the law proposal was unnecessary or not useful. His main motivation was his fear not to enter into conflict with the TF. “At that time one was indeed terribly afraid not to be seen to act against the Constitutional laws”, he adds. Riksdagens protokoll 1931 FK nr. 37, 110 ff. quoted after Persson (2002), 97 (my translation).
660. 660See reference to this trait of the Swedish constitutional system in Lindblom, ‘Civil and Criminal Procedure’ in: Bogdan, Swedish Law in the New Millennium (Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik, (2000b), 201 ff.
661. 661Schricker (1970b), 206, quoting Gehlen, Die Seele im technischen Zeitalter. Rowohlts deutsche Enzyklopädie, Bd. 53, 1957, 74.
662. 662„Im Wettbewerbsrecht tritt die Bildung solcher »Institutionen’ besonders deutlich z.B. beim Fall der Preisbindungsvertöße und der vergleichenden Werbung hervor. Es bedarf erheblicher Anstrengungen, das Augenmerk auf die tragenden Gründe zurückzulenken, auf die sich die herausgebildeten Normen stützen, um eine Revision der einmal getroffenen Vorentscheidungen zu ermöglichen;“ Schricker (1970b).
663. 663See Galbraith, The Affluent Society (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1958); Galbraith, The New Industrial State (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1968). On the history of consumerism see Stearns, Consumerism in World History (New York: Routledge, 2001).
664. 664On different theoretical approaches for explaining the growth of consumer policy see Tarschys, ‘Hur mycket konsumentpolitik?’ in: Måste konsumenten gå till Verket? (Stockholm: Industriförbundets Förlag, 1978).
665. 665Nader, Unsafe at Any Speed: The Designed-in Dangers of the American Automobile (New York: Grossman, 1965). On Nader’s role in the American consumerist movement, see Pertschuk (1982), 29 ff.
666. 666The text of the message is reprinted in v. Hippel, Verbraucherschutz, 2 Auflage, (Tübingen: Mohr, 1979), 225 ff.
667. 667Ibid., 226.
668. 668Mertens, ‘Kollektivrechtlicher Schadensersatz als Mittel des Verbraucherschutzes’ (1975) ZHR, 438 ff., 442: “Class action und Geltendmachung gebündelten Interessen durch Verbände, die diese als Bürgerinitiative kanalisierende Funktionsträger und letzlich als Wahrer öffentlicher Interessen auftreten läßt, sind in ihrer Tendenz nicht auf politische Neutralisierung von Konflikten vor Gericht, sondern eher auf “Politisierung” von Gerichten zum Zwecke der Durchsetzung gesellschaftlicher Interessen gerichtet.”
669. 669Lag om otillbörlig marknadsföring (SFS 1970:412).
670. 670Marknadsföringslagen (SFS 1975:1418).
671. 671On socialisation tendencies in the early legislative activities in the Länder of Hessen, Württemberg-Baden and Schleswig-Holstein, see Eisenhardt (1999), 510 ff. Cf. Gerber (1994), 25.
672. 672The following account on the Freiburg school builds extensively on Gerber (1994), 25 ff. For a comprehensive review of ordoliberal economic thought, see also Drexl (1998), 106 ff. Building on ordoliberal ideas, Drexl proposes a novel approach to consumer protection based on the idea of ‘normative efficiency’, ibid.,
673. 673ff. See also Fikentscher (1958), 14 ff.
674. 674Ibid., 36 f.
675. 675Ibid., 41 ff.
676. 676Müller-Graff, ‘Ordnungspolitische Divergenzen und wettbewerbliche Lauterkeit in der Verfassung des Gemeinsamen Marktes’ in: Festschrift Carstens (Köln, Berlin: 1984), 209 ff., at 213.
677. 677Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (Bern: A.Francke, 1952), 360, quoted after Gerber (1994), 39 f.
678. 678In this respect there is a close kinship between the Freiburg School and modern neoinstitutional analysis. The link is emphasised by Williamson (1996), 221. Similar Drexl (1998), 108 ff.
679. 679The exact meaning of the concept, however, is controversial in contemporary German scholarship. From an economic perspective, the notion ‘economic constitution’ is understood in the sense of ‘economic order’. Viewed as a normative concept, the term is either limited to the Constitution or extended to the legal order as a whole. On the different understandings with analysis of the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court see Drexl (1998), 218 ff.
680. 680Fikentscher (1958), 15.
681. 681See above Ch. 4.4.I.3.
682. 682According to Böhm, the body of doctrine (Lehrgebäude) of classical economic philosophy had to be translated from the language of economics into the language of legal science. See Gerber (1994).
683. 683According to Reinhard Blum (as cited by Gerber) the ideal of Wilhelm Ropke’s economic policy (a member of the Freiburg school) was “a comprehensive Mittelstandspolitik which should free the market economy from its two weaknesses - monopolies and the proletariat.” (Blum, Soziale Marktwirtschaft: Wirtschaftspolitik zwischen Neoliberalismus und Ordoliberalismus, 1969, 94.)
684. 684Eisenhardt (1999), 545; Drexl (1998), 219 ff.
685. 685Eisenhardt (1999).
686. 686These prohibitions were not absolute, however, and were mitigated by a long catalogue of exemptions, such as crises cartels, etc. See Gerber (1994), 65 ff.
687. 687Ludwig Erhard was a liberal economist, minister for economics in Adenauer’s government and succeeded Adenaur in the post of FRG Chancellor from 1963-1966.
688. 688See Gerber (1994), 71 ff.
689. 689Lagen (1953:603) om motverkande i vissa fall av konkurrensbegränsning inom näringslivet.
690. 690See Bernitz (1969), 426; Bemitz/Draper, Consumer Protection in Sweden, 2nd ed. (Stockholm: IFIM Series, No.12, 1986), 32.
691. 691On the legislative history of the GG, see Eisenhardt (1999), 513 ff.
692. 692Ibid., 540.
693. 693Scharpf, ‘The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration’ (1988) Public Administration, 239 ff., at 255.
694. 694In the words of Carlo Schmid, one of the social-democratic participants in the Parliamentary Council drafting the GG the basic rights had to be created so that they: “nicht bloss Deklamationen, Deklarationen und Direktiven sind, nicht nur Anforderungen an die Länderverfassung, nicht nur eine Garantie der Ländergrundrechte, sondern unmittelbar geltendes Bundesrecht, aufgrund dessen jeder einzelne Deutsche, jeder Bewohner unseres Landes vor den Gerichten soll Klage erheben können”, Eisenhardt (1999), 542.
695. 695On the different models of constitutional review in Europe and the reasons for preferring the Kelsenian before the American approach see Favoreu (1990), 38 ff.
696. 696On the Drittwirkung of human rights see Eisenhardt (1999), 543.
697. 697Hellstem, ‘When Courts Intervene: Judicial Control in a Comparative Institutional Perspective’ in Kaufinann/Majone/Ostrom, Guidance, Control and Evaluation in the Public Sector (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1986),
698. 698ff. See Knill (2001), 65.
699. 699See Knill (2001), 69.
700. 700See Knill (2001), 65.
701. 701See Heady (1979). Cf. Knill (2001), 66.
702. 702See Eisenhardt (1999), 348 ff. and 401 ff.
703. 703On these distinctions from an American perspective, see Pierce/Shapiro/Verkuil, Administrative Law and Administrative Process (Westbury, NY: The Foundation Press, 1992), 2 ff.
704. 704RF 1:1 “All offentlig makt i Sverige utgår från folket”.
705. 705Strömberg, Sveriges författning, (Stockholm: Studentlitteratur, 1999), 100 ff.
706. 706See Lidbom, ‘Lagstiftningsmaktens gränser’ (1993) JT, 283 ff, critical Strömholm, ‘Skall lagreglerna spegla eller påverka den allmänna rättsuppfattningen’ (2001) SvJT, 101 ff.
707. 707Strömberg (1999), 101. This feature was particularly distinctive during the time of uninterrupted Social Democratic rule from the mid-1930s to the mid-70s. Recently things have changed and the legislative process has become more complicated as well as genuinely deliberative. See Lejonhuvud, ‘Förarbeten’ in: Bernitz (ed.), Finna rätt (Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik, 1996), 102 ff.
708. 708“In Sweden the political executive could count on decisions being routinely confirmed by the parliament. This pattern of executive dominance was made possible by institutions established to conserve the power of monarchy and the Conservative party during the transition to democracy. Proportional representation and an indirectly elected first chamber helped the Social Democrats achieve stable parliamentary majorities. Because the executive government rested on secure parliamentary majorities executive decisions were automatically ratified by parliamentary votes.” Immergut (1992), 57 ff., at 67.
709. 709Corporativism should be distinguished from a corporate society where corporate representation is the only form of government. On the distinction between corporate society and corporativism see ‘Avkorporativisering och lobbyism - konturerna till en ny politisk model’, SOU 1999:121, 10 ff.
710. 710See Lewin, Samhället och de organiserade intressena (Stockholm: Nordstedts, 1992); Hermansson, Politik som intressekamp. Parlamentariskt beslutsfattande och organiserade intressen i Sverige (Stockholm: Nordstedts juridik, 1993); cf. SOU 1999:121.
711. 711The authors of a government-commissioned report distinguish between decision-making corporativism and implementation corporativism, SOU 1999:121, 22 ff.
712. 712The first Swedish Instrument of Government of 1809 laid down detailed rules on the different powers of the king, the government and the courts, with each of these institutions being endowed with particular powers and in a position to exert some control over the others. Ibid., 72.
713. 713Strömberg (1999), 101.
714. 714RF 11:14 “If a court or other public body finds that a provision conflicts with a rule of fundamental law or other superior statute, or finds that a procedure laid down in law has been disregarded in any important respect when the provision was made, the provision may not be applied. If the provision has been approved by the Riksdag or by the Government, however, it shall be waived only if the error is manifest.” For the debate around this rule see Nergelius (2000), 65 ff., at 79.
715. 715According to Lindblom, ‘the third branch of power’ is a term which by no one in Sweden will be associated with the courts, but rather with the media. See Lindblom (2000), 201.
716. 716See in particular RB 4:4.
717. 717See Nergelius (2000), 65 ff.
718. 718See Lejonhuvud (1996), 90 ff.
719. 719See Nergelius (2000), 65 ff.
720. 720The Convention was signed by Sweden on 28 October 1950, only 14 days after its opening for signature. It was ratified by Sweden on 4 February 1952 and entered into force on 3 September 1953 upon gathering ten ratifications.
721. 721On the subsequent (imperfect) incorporation of the Convention in Swedish law see Bernitz, ‘Europakonventionens införlivande med svensk rätt - en halvmesyr’ (1994-95) JT, 259 ff.
722. 722Söderlind/Petersson (1986), 35. Inger (1997), 81 ff.
723. 723Ibid., 105 ff.
724. 724See also Strömberg (1999), 66, RF 11:7 (självständighetsprincipen).
725. 725Söderlind/Petersson (1986), 88.
726. 726Drexl (1998), 232.
727. 727Damm, ‘Verbraucherrechtliche Sondergesetzgebung und Privatrechtsystem’ (1978) JZ, 173 ff.
728. 728See the symptomatic title of the book by Assmann/Briiggemeier/Hart/Joerges (1980).
729. 729Hart (1983), 161.
730. 730”...den hägerströmska så kallade värdenihilismen kan sammanfattas i ett antal teser som var och en på sitt sätt kunde underblåsa den beredskap till att ”ändra på saker och ting” som Myrdal talade om.” Källström (2002), 21 ff., at 26.
731. 731”I själva verket framstår den funktionella begreppsbildningen numera närmast som förhärskande.” Bemitz (1969), 64.
732. 732See Hart/Joerges, ‘Verbraucherrecht und Marktökonomik: Eine Kritik ordnungstheoretischer Eingrenzungen der Verbraucherpolitik’ in: Assmann/Brüggemeier/ Hart/Joerges, Wirtschaftsrecht als Kritik des Privatrechts (Königstein: Taunus, 1980), 87 ff., at 124.
733. 733Hart/Joerges (1980), 95.
734. 734BT-Drs. IV/2236, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Errichtung eines Warentestinstituts of 6 May 1964.
735. 735This was the coalition SPD/FDP government of Willie Brandt. The coalition government between the Social Democrats and the Free Democrats lasted from 1969 to 1982.
736. 736Hart/Joerges (1980), 87 ff.
737. 737Erster Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Verbraucherpolitik, 18.10.1971, BT-Drs. 4/2724, reprinted in v. Hippel (1979), 175.
738. 738Zweiter Bericht der Bundesregiernung zur Verbraucherpolitik, 20.10.1975, BT-Drs. 7/4181, reprinted in v. Hippel (1979), 239 ff.
739. 739Ibid., 239.
740. 740Joerges/Hart (1980), 129.
741. 741See Joerges/Hart (1980), 133.
742. 742Biervert/Fisher-Winkelmann/Rock, Verbraucherpolitik in der Marktwirtschaft (Rowohlt, 1978), 57.
743. 743Ibid., 57.
744. 744Biervert/Fischer-Winkelmann/Rock (1978), 57. Czerwonka/Schöppe, ‘Verbraucherinformationspolitik und Funktionsfähigkeit des Wettbewerbs’ (1981) WuW, 165 ff, 286. Joerges/Hart (1980), 134.
745. 745See Biervert/Fischer-Winkelmann/Rock (1978), 55; Joerges/Hart (1980), 134.
746. 746Czerwonka/Schöppe (1981), 268; Joerges/Hart (1980), 134.
747. 747Ibid., 66 ff.
748. 748Ibid., 61 ff.
749. 749Joerges/Hart (1980), 132.
750. 750For a comprehensive account and critical analysis, see Drexl (1998), 25 ff.
751. 751The distinction is introduced by Norbert Reich, with reference to Claus Offe’s Strukturproblem des kapitalistischen Staates (1973) and Jürgen Habermas’s Legitimationsproblem im Spätkapitalismus (1973). See Reich, ‘Allgemeiner Teil und Einleitung’ in: Reich/Tonner/Wegener, Verbraucher und Recht (Göttingen: Verlag Otto Schwartz & Co., 1976), 20 f. The same classification is followed by Dauner-Lieb, Verbraucherschutzrecht durch Ausbildung eines Sonderprivatrechtsför Verbraucher (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1983). Drexl also proposes a dichotomous classification, but redubs the two groups into ‘Ordnungspolitische Informationsmodel’ and ‘Soziale Altemativmodelle’. See Drexl (1998), 29 ff. Also Simitis uses the notion ‘information model’ as a summary concept for all approaches proceeding from the premises of liberal economic theory. See Simitis,
752. 752This classification is said to apply beyond legal theory: „Wir unterscheiden zwischen vier Ansätzen oder Stadien von Theorie, Politik und Recht und sehen dabei Verbindungen, die von allgemeinen theoretischen Premissen über rechtstheoretische Positionen bis hin in dogmatische Einzelaussagen reichen.“ Joerges/Hart (1980), 118.
753. 753Tilmann, ‘Zur Rechtsstellung des Verbrauchers bei Wettbewerbsdelikten’ (1977) ZHR, 32 ff., at 33; Tilmann, ‘Das Haftungsrisiko der Verbraucherverbände’ (1975) NJW, 913 ff; Tilmann, ‘Irreführende Werbeangaben und täuschende Werbung’ (1976) GRUR, 545 ff See Joerges/Hart (1980), 161.
754. 754Hart/Joerges (1980).
755. 755Schricker (1970a), 40.
756. 756See Tilmann (1977), 32 ff.
757. 757Schricker (1970a), 40.
758. 758Schricker, ‘Wettbewerbsrecht und Verbraucherschutz’ (1972) 36 RabelsZ, 315 ff, at 316.
759. 759Simitis (1976), 84.
760. 760„Das Wirtschaftsrecht und speziell das Wirtschaftsprivatrecht kann dann nur der Aufrechterhaltung der Funktionsbedingungen des allgemeinen Privatrechts als Sicherung von Eigentum und privatautonomer Entscheidungsfreiheit durch Garantie des ökonomischen, prinzipiell sebstregulierenden Funktionsmechanismus Wettbewerb dienen, nicht aber sich einer folgenunsicheren politischen Detail- und Ergebnissteuerung offenen. Tilmann (1977), 35, referring critically to the positions of Norbert Reich and Konstantin Simitis.
761. 761Schricker (1970a), 44.
762. 762v. Hippel (1979), 82 ff. with references to the experience with administrative agency in Sweden and in the US.
763. 763See Simitis (1976), 108 ff., with reference to Gunnar Myrdal’s classic An International Economy, Problems and Prospects from 1956 and Galbraith (1968). 487„Verbraucherschutz ist also eine Frage der Verteilung wirtschaftlicher und der sich daraus ergebenden politischen Macht.“ Simitis (1976), 161.
764. 764See Reich (1976), 1 ff.
765. 765Simitis (1976).
766. 766Reifoer, Das Recht des Konsumentenkredits - Soziale Zivilrechtsauslegung im Verbraucherschutz, Diss. jur., (Berlin: 1977).
767. 767See Reich (1976), 11; Simitis (1976), 144; Reifher (1977).
768. 768Reifher refutes an understanding of private law as abstract (formal), being able to make the right decision “with eyes closed to social realities“. Reifher (1977), 9.
769. 769Reifher (1977).
770. 770Reifner (1977), 109.
771. 771Joerges/Hart (1980), 120.
772. 772„Die Träger der wirtschaftlichen Macht müssen daher der öffentliche Kontrolle unterstellt werden und sich gegenüber den Verbrauchern verantworten.“ Simitis (1976), 157.
773. 773See Simitis (1976), 157; Reich (1976), 204 ff. and in particular at 221 ff. on extending the possibilities of counterpower through consumer unions.
774. 774Joerges/Hart (1980). The approach receives further elaboration in Joerges, Verbraucherschutz als Rechtsproblem (Heidelberg: Recht und Wirtschaft, 1981); Joerges (1986), 142 ff.
775. 775The link to Teubner’s reflexive law and to Selznik’s responsive law is evident, see Teubner (1993).
776. 776Hart/Joerges (1980), 236 f. For a critique of this approach see Drexl (1998), 34 f.
777. 777See SOU 1971:37, 155 ff., Thorelli/Thorelli Consumer Information Systems and Consumer Policy (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1977), 192 ff.
778. 778SOU 1971:37, 156.
779. 779SOU 1947:46.
780. 780SOU 1949:18.
781. 781SOU 1955:16.
782. 782SOU 1955:45.
783. 783SOU 1971:37, 12.
784. 784Thorelli/Thorelli (1977), 191 f., referring to Arbetarrörelsens efterkrigsprogram, Stockholm 1944, sections 24 and 26.
785. 785Vill Du komma till tals?, Rapport om försöksverksamheten med lokala konsumentkommitteér, 12 maj 1967­
786. 786juni 1970, Bilaga 2 Skoglundsgruppen slutrapport, ”Om konsumentpolitik” (herinafter the Skoglund Report). See also SOU 1993:59, 119.
787. 787Fjellström/Ring, ‘Rödluvan behöver inga råd, sa vargen. En orättvis betraktelse över konsumentpolitiken’ (Stockholm: Prisma, 1982), 42.
788. 788SOU 1971:37, 216. Cf Skoglund’s Report .
789. 789See Bernitz/Modig/Malmén (1970), 52.
790. 790Konsumentutredningen, SOU1971:37; see also Government Bill with Guidelines for and Organisation of Society’s Consumer Policy, prop. 1972:33.
791. 791Reklamutredningen, SOU 1972:7; SOU 1973:10; SOU 1973:11.
792. 792SOU 1972:7.
793. 793This definition was first launched in SOU 1949:18, 18 and then quoted in SOU 1971:37, 159.
794. 794”Det är viktigt att ur samhällsekonomisk synpunkt lika väl som ur den enskildes synpunkt kunna förhindra ett otillfredställande utnyttjande av resurser, dvs. framställning av varor eller tjänster som är olämplig utormade och ej fyller rimliga krav på användbarhet och som konsumenterna därför inte önskar.” Skoglund’s Report, op. cit., 46.
795. 795See in this sense prop. 1972:33, 8.
796. 796”Vid bedömningen av hushållens behov kan man i konsumentverkets arbete inte i någon avgörande grad bygga på konsumenternas anspråk uttryckta genom efterfrågan av produkter och på andra sätt. Det är känt att anspråksnivån på många viktiga områden kan vara alltför låg. Exempelvis kan anspråken beträffande kost vara alltför låga i föhållande till näringsbehoven. Behoven måste - som i annat samhällsarbete - formuleras normativt med utgångspunkt från samhällets ambitioner om individernas välbefinnande.” SOU 1971:37, 13 ff., 52.
797. 797Prop. 1972:33.
798. 798Prop. 1972:33, 62.
799. 799Prop. 1972:33, 64.
800. 800Prop. 1972:33, 60.
801. 801Prop. 1972:33, 61.
802. 802Prop. 1972:33, 65. See the devastating criticism in Thorelli/Thorelli (1977), 189. ff.
803. 803See Bernitz, ‘Consumer Protection: Aims, Methods and Trends in Swedish Consumer Law’ (1976) SSL, 13 ff., at 26 f. Thorelli/Thorelli characterise the political climate in Sweden since the late 1960s as “extensions of statism ... accompanied by considerable antibusiness, antimarketing and, particularly, antiadvertising fanfare.” Thorelli/Thorelli (1977), 197.
804. 804See, for instance, the massive objections on the part of industry against most of the proposals of the Consumer Inquiry Commission, especially the normative definition of the consumer interest and the programme for ‘producer influence’, prop. 1972:33, 31 f. Industry also directed sharp criticism against the way in which the Inquiry Commission described the functioning of a competition economy and the weak position of consumers in respect to producers and traders, see ibid., 28.
805. 805Thorelli/Thorelli (1977), 199.
806. 806See prop. 1956:105, Statsutskottets utlåtande nr. 124, rksd nr. 282. English translations are taken from the official summary of Konsumentpolitik, Riktlinjer och organisation, SOU 1971:37.
807. 807On the KO, see below.
808. 808Until 1994, the official English translation was National Board for Consumer Policy.
809. 809Prop. 1972:33, 12, 67.
810. 810See above, the quote of Alf Ross in Hart’s critical analysis of Scandinavian legal realism.
811. 811See the Consumer Sales Act (Konsumentköplag , SFS 1973:877), later on replaced by (SFS 1990:932); Consumer Services Act (Konsumenttjänstlag, SFS 1985:716).
812. 812On the position of consumer law in relation to general civil law, see Wilhelmsson, ‘Consumer Protection and the Rules and Principles of General Contract Law’ in: Wilhelmsson, Twelve Essays on Consumer Protection (Helsinki: University of Helsinki, 1996a), 120 ff.
813. 813See Bernitz (1976), 13 ff., at 21.
814. 814The term ‘market law’ was first advanced by Sven Tengelin in Juristnytt 1968, 415. See Bernitz (1969), 63, fn. 35. On the impact of the systemic approach developed by Bernitz in other Nordic countries see Madsen, Markedsret, Band I (Copenhagen: Jurist- og 0konomforb.:s Forl., 1990), 15 ff. 538”Marknadsrätt kan på det nationella planet definieras som den del av rättsordningen, vilken har till uppgift att normera bedrivandet av näringsverksamhet och företagens handlande på marknaden genom ramregler om företagens etablering, marknadsföring och konkurrens samt skydd för konsumenterna.”Bernitz (1969), 63.
815. 815Bernitz, ‘Market Law as a Legal Discipline’(1979) SSL, 55 ff., at 62. In this article Bernitz draws the so called ‘Heptagon’ of market law rules, ibid., 63.
816. 816Bernitz (1979), 56 ff.
817. 817Bernitz (1969), 63.
818. 818”Sedd som helhet utgör den [marknadsrätten] uppenbarligen varken genuin civilrätt eller genuin offentlig rätt. Dess regelsystem har inte till uppgift att normera privata rättigheter eller överlåtelser och upplåtelser mellan enskilda men heller inte att ensidigt utgöra ett instrument för offentlig myndighetsutövning.
819. 819BT-Drs. IV/2001. See Rogge, ‘Verbraucherklage und Streitwertsherabsetzung im gewerblichen Rechtschutz’ (1964) WRP, 336 ff.
820. 820Act of 21.7.1965, BGBl I 625, which inserted § 13 la UWG (Klagebefugnis der Verbraucherverbände).
821. 821Notably, in the course of presenting the arguments in support of the draft the order of interests was swapped. Whereas initially, on p. 6 of the Bill, the unions and in particular the consumer unions were mentioned as the main target of the new legislation, on p. 7 the government expressed its belief that “the possibility of reduction of the value in dispute would serve the needs of the small and middle size economy and of the unions in § 13 UWG”. Ibid, 7. “ Der Bundesregierung ist bekannt, dass gerade in Rechtsstreitigkeiten wegen unlauteren Wettbewerbs kleinere und mittlere Unternehmen häufig von einer an sich aussichtsreichen Rechtsverfolgung absehen, weil ihnen das damit verbundene Kostenrisiko nicht tragbar erscheint.”
822. 822See Borck (1964a), 217 ff.
823. 823See Brinkmann, Die Verbraucherorganisationen in der Bundesrepublik Detschland und ihre Tätigkeit bei der überbetrieblichen technischen Normung (Köln: Carl Heymanns, 1976), 5 ff.
824. 824The seven members were more specifically: the German Housewives Association (Deutscher Hausfrauen­ Bund), the Women Section of the German Consumer Co-peratives (Frauengilde Deutscher Konsumgenossenschaften), the Federation of German Consumer Co-operatives (Zentralverband Deutscher Konsumgenossenschaften), the Institute for Self-help (Institutftir Selbsthilfe), the Consumer Federation, Stuttgart (Verbraucherverband), the Federation of Public Dwelling Facilities (Gesamtverband gemeinnütziger Wohnungsunternehmen), the Managing Director of the Assistance Board of the Central Union of the Evangelist Church in Germany (der Geschäftsführer des Hilfswerkes der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland). See Brinkmann (1976), 6.
825. 825Borck (1964a), 217.
826. 826See Drs.
827. 827Jahre später, das Wettbewerbsrecht materiell wesentlich verbessert würde.... (my italics)553
828. 828On the UWG as a reflexive consumer protection law see Schricker (1970a), 32 ff., at 33.
829. 829See Fezer, ‘Europäisierung des Wettbewerbsrechts’ (1994) JZ, 317 ff.
830. 830Ibid., 19.
831. 831See Bundestag Ds.V/2324. On the political history of this reform, see Krieger ‘Die Bestrebungen zur Änderung des Gesetzes gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb’ (1968) GRUR, 511.
832. 832See Krieger (1968), 512.
833. 833“Preislistentäuschung, Werbung mit Lockvogelangeboten, Fabrik- und Großhandelspreisen, Kaufscheinhandel, Werbung unter Einschaltung der Autorität Dritter.” Some of these practices had already been considered by the judiciary to fall under the prohibition of § 3 UWG whereas others had still not been a matter for litigation. Krieger (1968), 511.
834. 834Act of 26 June 1969, BGB1 I 633, amending §§ 3, 23, 24 und introducing the new §§ 6a und 6b as well as §
835. 835II-IV.
836. 836BGB1 I 1969, 633.
837. 837See Schricker (1975).
838. 838v. Falckenstein, Die Bekämpfung unlauterer Geschäftspraktiken durch Verbraucherverbände (Köln: Bundesanzeiger Verlag, 1977).
839. 839v. Falckenstein, Schäden der Verbraucher durch unlauteren Wettbewerb (Köln: Bundesanzeiger Verlag, 1978).
840. 840Meanwhile, some amendments in the UWG were carried through as part of a more general reform of criminal legislation with the overriding purpose to combat economic crime. See EGStGB of 2nd March 1974, BGB1 I 1974, 469. The following sections of UWG were amended: §§ 41, 6 II, 8, 10, 12, 15 I, 17 I and III, 18, 20a, 22,
841. 841I, 27a V and XI. §§ 11 IV, 26 were repealed. With a statute of 10 March 1975, BGB1 I 1975, 685 a new § 7d was introduced.
842. 842See BT-Drs. 7/2049. See Stellungnahme der Deutschen Vereinigung für Gewerblichen Rechtschutz und Urheberrecht, GRUR 1974, 456.
843. 843„Dieses Rechtsgebiet einer ständigen Anpassung an die tatsächlichen Gegebenheiten im Wirtschaftsleben bedarf, um neben einer Erhaltung des lauteren Wettbewerbs auch den Verbraucherschutz zu verbessern.“ BT- Drs. 7/2049, 1.
844. 844The draft is published as attachment to the article of Gaedertz, ‘Ist eine UWG-Novelle erforderlich?’ (1977) WRP, 681 ff., at 686 ff.
845. 845Ibid., 687, proposal for a new § 13 Abs. 1 c.
846. 846BT-Drs. 8/1670, Entwurf des CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion vom 22. März 1978.
847. 847BT-Drs. 8/2145, Entwurf der Bundesregierung, 1 ff.; Stellungnahme des Bundesrat, ibid., 33, Response by the Federal Government (Gegenäusserung der Bundesregierung), ibid., 40.
848. 848From a consumer perspective the most important proposal was the lowering of the subjective threshold for liability through requiring only dolus eventualis. Schricker (1975), 929.
849. 849Krieger, ‘Möglichkeiten einer Verstärkung des Schutzes gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb’ (1978) WRP, 1 ff.
850. 850Tonner, ‘Verbraucherschutz im UWG und die UWG-Reform von 1986’ (1987) NJW, 1917 ff., 1918 and 1922.
851. 851See ZAW, Diskussionspapier zur Werbepolitik Dezember 1975 (Edition ZAW, Band I); ZAW, Stellungnahme zum Entwurf einer UWG-Novelle, WRP 1978, 255 ff.
852. 852See ZAW, WRP 1978, 255 ff.
853. 853The objections were raised already in 1975, and were then reiterated in the Position Paper to the 1978 Government Bill, Ibid.
854. 854“Die bewährte zivilrechtliche Sanktionssytem des UWG würde durch die zusätzliche Einführung der Untersagungsbefugnis einer Behörde gesprengt und die Effizienz dieses Sytems nicht verstärkt sondern im Gegenteil beeinträchtigt.” ZAW, WRP 1978, 255 ff, at 260.
855. 855Ibid., 260.
856. 856Ibid., 261. “Gegen die Schaffung von noch mehr Behördenkompetenz und staatlichen Eingriffsbefugnissen bestehen inzwischen nicht nur bei der Wirtschaft, sondern auch bei den Politikern aller Parteien weitverbreitet Bedenken, insbesondere unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Personal- und Finanzsituation der öffentlichen Hand.”
857. 857Krieger (1978), 1 ff.
858. 858Lindow, ’75 Jahre Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs’ in: 75 Jahre Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs (Bad Homburg: 1987), 15 ff., at 21.
859. 859See Jaschick, ‘Verbraucherpolitik in eigener Verantwortung’ (1974) MA, 242 ff., at 246.
860. 860Gesetz zur Änderung von Wirtschafts-, verbraucher-, arbeite- und sozialrechtlicher Vorschriften vom 25.7.1986 BGBl I 1169, ber. 1867 I 565.
861. 861§ 6e (Öffentliche Werbung mit mengenbeschränkenden Angaben) and § 6e (Gegenüberstellungen eigener Preise mit vorher höheren eigenen Preisen) UWG.
862. 862§§ 7a-7d sowie §§ 9, 9a, 10, 11 UWG were repealed. See Baumbach/Hefermehl (1990).
863. 863See ibid., § 13a Rücktrittsrecht für Abnehmer, die durch unwahre Werbung zum Vertragsschluss bestimmt wurden
864. 864See in particular § 23a, facilitating the reduction of the amount in controversy. More details on this amendment follow below.
865. 865See the speech of the President of the Zentrale, Ernst Wilhelm Lindow (1987), 15 ff., at 21.
866. 86689 entscheidend einzuschränken.
867. 867See Lehmann, M., ‘Die UWG-Neuregelungen 1987 - Erläuterungen und Kritik’ (1987) GRUR, 199 ff.; Treis, M., ‘1986 års revision av tyska UWG - konsumentskydd eller strukturpolitik?’ (1988) NIR, 165 ff.
868. 868Schricker (1975), 216 ff.
869. 869Krieger (1968), 513.
870. 870This was allowed only if producers (§ 6a, 1) and wholesalers (§ 6a, 2) sold exclusively to endconsumers, charged endconsumers and retailes or commercial users the same price, or indicated that consumers are charged a higher price than retailers.
871. 871See BGH WRP 1974, 264 (“Intermarkt”).
872. 872Drs. 7/2049, 1.
873. 873Gaedertz (1977), 681 ff; ZAW Organ Werbung 1977/78.
874. 874Reich, 'UWG-Reform und Verbraucherschutz’ (1978) ZRP, 100 ff., 104.
875. 875v. Hippel, ‘Verbraucherschutz’ (1976) 40 RabelsZ, 513 ff., 522.
876. 876His proposal was, however, conditioned upon failure within a reasonable time-limit to develop viable consumer unions which could manage to provide an adequate control of unfair advertising, something he thought highly unlikely, if judging from the experience so far, see v. Hippel (1976), 522. For an evaluation of the Swedish model see also Günther (1972) WuW, 427 ff.
877. 877v. Hippel (1976), 523.
878. 878See above, Gaedertz (1977).
879. 879Ulmer, ‘Der Begriff “Leistungswettbewerb” und seine Bedeutung für die Anwendung von GWB und UWG Tatbestände’ (1977) GRUR, 565 ff.
880. 880Ulmer (1977), 566 ff.
881. 881See SOU 1983:40.
882. 882See Reich/Tonner/Wegener (1976), 210 ff. The specific proposal was of reforming the Federal Office of Cartels into a Higher Market Authority with competencies of a consumer protection agency.
883. 883Reich, Staatliche Regulierung zwischen Marktversagen und Politikversagen (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller Verlag, 1984).
884. 884On FTC, Grimes (1971), 1770 ff.; Report in 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1064, fn. 14 (1967).
885. 885„Soweit es um die aufklärende und wegweisende Tätigkeit der FTC geht, so wird sie schon heute in der Bundesrepublik von zahlreiche Behörden in Bund und Länder, wie von Verbrauchervebänden und Institutionen der gewerblichen Wirtschaft wahrgenommen. Diese Aktivität sollte zweifellos stärker gefordert und ausgebaut werden; systemsprengender neuer Institutionen bedarf es dazu aber wohl nicht.“ Schricker (1975), 235.
886. 886„Detaillierende Sondernormierungen haben ihren Platz in Wirtschaftsbereichen spezieller Technizität, etwa auf dem Gebiet der Lebensmittel und pharmazeutischen Erzeugnisse, der Verkehrssicherheit von Krafifahrzugen und Maschinen, der Deklaration von Preisen, Massen, Gewichten und des Inhalts von Fertigpackungen u. dgl. Schricker, ibid.
887. 887v. Falckenstein (1977), 21, Fn. 12; Neumeyer (1973) GRUR Int. 686.
888. 888Schricker (1975), 235.
889. 889Schricker (1975), 237.
890. 890Elster (1984), Wettbewerbrecht, 1941, 21 ff. Einschlägige Vorschriften, 69.
891. 891Schricker (1975), 243. The examples - BGH 29.11.1963 Grobdesin, GRUR 1964, 269 (271); LG München 22.4.1958, WRP 1958, 219 (221). See Schricker (1970b), 34 ff.
892. 892See Schricker (1975), 233.
893. 893Lehmann, ‘Zur Notwendigkeit einer massvollen Liberalisierung des deutschen Wettbewerbsrechts’ (1995) GRUR, 380 ff.
894. 894See v. Hippel (1977), 180.
895. 895Brinkmann (1976), 162 ff. v. Falckenstein (1977), 20.
896. 896See Regierungsentwurf, Drs.
897. 897See for instance the comments of the Parliamentary Secretary de With with the Federal Ministry of Justice in an interview with ZAW, December 1977: „Ein vor kurzem veröffentlichtes, im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums der Justiz erstelltes Gutachten des Münchner Max-Planck-Instituts hat ergeben, daß sich die zivilrechtlichen Sanktionen des UWG, die Klagebeftignisse der Mitbewerber, der gewerblichen Verbände und der Vebraucherverbände (§ 13 UWG) in der Praxis bewährt haben, wenn hier auch weitere Verbesserungen möglich und nötig sind. Diese Verbesserungen sollten aber im Rahmen der privatrechtlichen Struktur des UWG vorgenommen werden und zunächst auf ihre Wirksamkeit geprüft werden, bevor man Überlegungen über ganz andersartige, etwa öffentlichrechtliche, Sanktionen anstellt, die sich im übrigen mit der weitergehend generalklauselartigen Ausgestaltung des UWG nur schwer in Einklang bringen ließen. Der Entwurf hat sich daher bewußt darauf beschränkt, bestimmte Verbesserungen bei den zivilrechtlichen Ansprüchen des Gesezetzes und bei bestimmten Verfahrensvorschriften vorzusehen.”, as quoted by ZAW, Stelllungnahme, WRP 1978, 261. Similar view was expressed by Krieger (1978), 1 ff.
898. 898ZAW, Stellungnahme, 261. See also ZAW Diskussionspapier zur Werbepolitik.
899. 899Schricker (1975), v. Falckenstein (1977).
900. 900Schricker, ‘Wettbewerbsrechtliche Aspekte des Verbraucherschutzes’ (1976) 40 RabelsZ, 535 ff., 574.
901. 901BT-Drs. IV/2217, 3. These were some of the arguments in the Bill to the 1965 UWG Novelle. The motives referred to the limitations of the then existing legal framework to take consumer interests into account.
902. 902One alternative discussed already at the time of the 1965 Novelle was the possibility to grant standing not only to consumer associations but also to individual consumers. The Swiss Unfair Competition Act, which had served as a source of inspiration for the 1965 UWG reform, had indeed granted such right. This option, however, was rejected as too far-reaching and because the prospects for making effective use of the individual consumer’s right of standing were estimated as meagre. BT-Drs. IV/2217, 4.
903. 903§ 13 UWG, old wording of 1965: „Sachbefugnis von Gewerbetreibenden und Verbänden, Abs. la, 1 Satz“ „In den Fällen der §§3,6,7 Abs. 1 und des §11 kann der Anspruch auf Unterlassung auch von Vebänden geltend gemacht werden, zu deren satzungsgemässen Aufgaben es gehört, die Interessen der Verbraucher durch Aufklärung und Beratung wahrzunehmen, soweit die Vebände als solche in bürgerlichen Rechtsstreitigkeiten klagen können.”
904. 904BT-Drs. IV/2217, 4.
905. 905Ibid.
906. 906Ibid.
907. 907On the geographical limitations of the right of action, see v. Falckenstein (1977), 48.
908. 908See Borck (1964a), 218.
909. 909See § 13 la UWG-E: “Das gleiche gilt in den Fällen des § 1, soweit der Anspruch unrichtige Angaben über Waren oder gewerbliche Leistungen, die geeignet sind, den Anschein eines besonders günstigen Angebots hervorzurufen.“ BT- Drs. IV/2217, 2.
910. 910BT- Drs. IV/2217, 5. Die Bundesregierung ist jedoch der Auffassung, daß es nicht zu den Aufgaben der Verbraucherverbaende gehört, allgemein öffentliche Belange wahrzunehmen. Aus diesem Gründe braucht sich die Klagebefugnis der Verbraucherverbände auch nicht auf § 7 Abs. 2 und 3 und die §§ 7a-7c UWG erstrecken. Bei diesen handelt es sich vorwiegend um Ordnungsvorschriften.”
911. 911„..oder eine sonstige Handlung zu Zwecken des Wettbewerbs betrifft, durch die wesentliche Belange der Verbraucher berührt werden.“
912. 912Proceeding from an alternative draft elaborated on behalf of the AGV Hans Borck defended a broader right of acion encompassing all situations of unfair competition, but also stretching beyond the scope of UWG to cover other areas of relevant consumer legislation. Borck (1964a), 217.
913. 913Pastor (1969), 575 f.
914. 914See Borck, ‘Erste Erfahrungen im Umgang mit der Aktivlegitimation für Verbracherverbände’ (1968) WRP, 1 ff. He reports in particular on his experience from representing the Verein zum Schutze der Verbraucher gegen unlateren Wettbewerb (Verbraucherschutzverein) e.V., an association constituted on the initiative and with the participation of the Verbaraucherzentrale der Länder and Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Verbraucher, especially with the objective to process the complex of problems connected with unfair advertising that concern and burden all of these organisations.
915. 915See Borck (1968), 2.
916. 916Pastor (1969), 571.
917. 917Pastor (1969).
918. 918Stenographischer Bericht der 240 Sitzung des Deutschen Bundestag, GRUR 1969, 471.
919. 919OLG Köln GRUR 1969, 484 („Verbraucherverband I“). Cf. Pastor (1969), 571; Wilke, ‘Über den Unsinn einer Reform der §§ 13 und 23a UWG' (1978) WRP, 581 ff., at 584.
920. 920OLG Köln GRUR 1969, 484 (“Verbraucherverband I“)
921. 921The threat was all the more effective because it did not refer to injunctive relief, but to a request for punishment due to violation of an already issued preliminary injunctive court order. The fine in these cases could be substantial. Ibid., 485.
922. 922OLG Köln GRUR 1969, 484 („Verbraucherverband I“).
923. 923BGH GRUR 1973, 78 („Verbraucherverband II“). See Wilke (1978), 586.
924. 924BGH GRUR 1973, 78 ff., at 79 („Verbiaucherverband II“).
925. 925BGH GRUR 1971, 516 ff. WRP 1971, 264 ff. (“Brockhaus Enzyklopädie”).
926. 926OLG Frankfurt GRUR 1974, 228 ff. („Verbraucherschutzverband III“)
927. 927Ibid.
928. 928Wilke (1978), 582.
929. 929See in this sense Kur, ‘Der Mißbrauch der Verbandsklagebefugnis’ (1981) GRUR, 558 ff., 559.
930. 930See RGZ 120, 47 („Markenschutzverband“).
931. 931Borck (1968), 2.
932. 932Pastor, ‘Die UWG-Reform und der Mißbrauch der Verbandsklagebefugnis aus § 13 UWG' (1978) WRP, 245 ff., 248.
933. 933Ibid.
934. 934Pastor (1969), 576 ff.
935. 935Ibid.
936. 936In this example Pastor referred to the activity of the influential Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs e.V. in Frankfurt a.M. , see Pastor (1978), 248.
937. 937Wilke (1978), 581 ff.
938. 938Kur (1981), 561;Wilke (1978).
939. 939Kur (1981), 561.
940. 940Kur (1981), 565 ff.
941. 941The proposals were prompted not only from a desire to suppress existing abusive litigation, but also to prevent future abuse. In particular, there was a fear that the proposed possibility of aggregating damage compensation claims could be abused. See Referentenentwurf des BJM, WRP 78, 277 ff.
942. 942Ibid., 278.
943. 943It was in particular Pastor who pointed at the very different nature of the existing business and consumer associations. The divergence in founding principles, objectives, activity and membership called in his opinion for carefully drafted rules adapted to these specifics. The risk of abuse for instance was highly present in the activity of the so-called “socially useful associations” but was negligible for classical interest organizations and, after curbing initial attempts for abuse through a balanced case law, also for consumer unions. The same reasoning was valid when assessing other factors like risks of litigation costs, economic situation of the union, need for promoting litigious activity, etc. Pastor proposed a rule introducing a more rigorous classification of the different organisations and treating differently the respective categories. Pastor (1978), 248 ff.
944. 944Proposed § 13 II 3 UWG-E read: „von rechtsfähigen Verbänden, zu deren satzungsgemässen Augaben es gehört, Zuwiderhandlungen gegen Vorschriften dieses Gesetzes im Interesse der Gewerbetreibndn durch Erhebung von Klagen entgegenztreten, wenn si in diesem Aufgabenbereich tätige Verbände oder mindestens fünf Gewerbetreibende als Mitglieder haben.“
945. 945See § 13 V UWG-E BT-Drs. 8/2145, Regierungsentwurf, 4 f. Wilke (1978), 582 ff. The registration was to take place at the local court, who also had the authority to cancel the entry into the Register if the requirements were no longer met. On the reform proposals, see Kur (1981), 565 ff.
946. 946See Wilke (1978), who emphatically described the reform proposal as nonsense (Unsinn).
947. 947Pastor (1978), 274; Wilke (1978), 587; Schricker, ‘Verbraucherschutz - ein neues Rechtgebiet?’ (1979) GRUR Int., 315 ff.
948. 948Kur (1981), 566.
949. 949Borck, ‘Zuckerbrot und Peitsche für Verbände?’ (1978) WRP, 161 ff.
950. 950Pastor (1978), 247; Wilke (1978), 588.
951. 951Bender/Strecker, ‘Access to Justice in the Federal Republic of Germany’ in: Cappelletti/Garth, Access to Justice, Vol. I (Alphen aan den Rijn; Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1978), 520 ff., 530.
952. 952Similar rules apply by appeal proceedings: an unsuccessful appellant stands for his costs, whereas by partial success § 92 I ZPO is applied accordingly (§ 97 I ZPO). By voluntary settlement litigation costs are regarded as waived, if nothing else is agreed between the parties. The parties can however request a court decision on the division of costs under § 91a ZPO. Melullis (1995), 382 ff.
953. 953§ 7 Federal Ordinance on Attorney’s Fees (Bundesrechtsanwaltsgebührenordnung, BRAGebO) BGB1. I 1957, 861, 907. Nevertheless, there exists a possibility for the client and the attorney to agree on the size of the attorney fee (which does not affect the court’s decision).
954. 954Ibid., 531.
955. 955§ 31 II Nr. 4 BRAGebO.
956. 956Bender/Strecker (1978), 531. The same authors estimate in 1979 that for litigation involving approximately DM 14,400 the cost can total approximately one half of the amount in controversy. Under the present BRAGebO a single attorney’s fees for a sum in controversy of 5 000 EUR amounts to 313 EUR.
957. 957Kur, Streitwert und Kosten in Verfahren wegen unlauteren Wettbewerbs (Köln: Bundesanzeigerverlag, 1980), 14,27 ff.
958. 958§ 3 ZPO „Der Wert wird von dem Gericht nach freiem Ermessen festgesetzt; es kann eine beantragte Beweisaufnahme sowie von Amts wegen die Einnahme des Augenscheins und die Begutachtung durch Sachverständige anordnen.“ See Bender/Strecker (1978), 532 ff.
959. 959Kur (1980).
960. 960Kur (1980), 27. Kur points to the very divergent practices of the various District and Local Courts, with differences between 1600 to 10000 for the same violation; ibid., 14.
961. 961In this sense already the Imperial Court, see Callmann (1929), 444; cf. Kur (1980), 28; BGH GRUR 1968, 106, 107, (“Ratiomarkt”).
962. 962BGH GRUR 1968, 106 (“Ratiomarkt”).
963. 963BGH GRUR 1956, 279 (“Olivin”); BGH GRUR 1957, 606 (“Heilmittelvertrieb”); BGH GRUR 1958, 32 (“Haferschleim”); BGH GRUR 1960, 379 (“Zentrale”); BGH GRUR 1964, 567 (“Lavamat”).
964. 964The case concerned an innovatory retail practice used by a powerful wholesaler to enter the end-consumer market. Retailers could enter a contract with the wholesaler and acquire the right to distribute authorisation purchase cards to their customers. The retailers who entered into such an arrangement were granted 4 percent of the purchases of the recruited customers. The practice was attacked as unfair and contrary to the Rebates Act and the Free Gifts Act. See more on the legislative reaction to this type of practice above.
965. 965Kur (1980), 149 ff.
966. 966§ 945 ZPO: „Erweist sich die Anordnung eines Arrestes oder einer einstweiligen Verfügung als von Anfang an ungerechtfertigt oder wird die angeordnete Maßregel auf Grund des § 926 Abs. 2 oder des § 942 Abs. 3 aufgehoben, so ist die Partei, welche die Anordnung erwirkt hat, verpflichtet, dem Gegner den Schaden zu ersetzen, der ihm aus der Vollziehung der angeordneten Maßregel oder dadurch entsteht, daß er Sicherheit leistet, um die Vollziehung abzuwenden oder die Aufhebung der Maßregel zu erwirken.“
967. 967BT- Drs. IV/2217, 6.
968. 968§ 23a Litigation costs in civil disputes: “(l)If a party to a civil dispute in which a complaint was filed under this Act presents a credible showing that the payment of costs according to the full amount in controversy would substantially endanger his economic situation, the court may direct pursuant to a motion by such a party that the obligation of this party to pay court costs be measured by an amount in controversy that is adjusted according to said party’s economic position. The effect of the order is also that the beneficiary party shall have to pay the fees
969. 969Borck (1978), 161 ff. A similar function of litigation costs is suggested by Kur. She rejects proposals of setting a ceiling (of DM 50,000) to the amount in controversy with the argument that this would favour the violator. “Damit würde es dem Verletzer zu einfach gemacht werden, die Kosten eines möglicherweise zu führenden Wettbewerbsprozesses als leicht zu verschmerzenden Kostenfaktor einer grösseren Werbekampagne einzukalkulieren. Die Neigung zu aussergerichtlichem Einlenken würde verringert.“ Kur (1980), 123 f.
970. 970Kur (1980), 122 ff.
971. 971Pastor, ‘Die Streitwertherabsetzung nach dem Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, des Warenzeichengesetzes und des Gebrauchsmustergesetzes vom 21.7.1965’ (1965) WRP, 271 ff., at 279.
972. 972Ibid.
973. 973See Pastor (1965), 281.
974. 974See in this sense Pastor (1965), 279 (womit das Gesetz seinen Gebührenanspruch zu einem (an sich unzulässigen) Erfolgshonorar umgestaltet hat).
975. 975Drs. IV/2217, 8.
976. 976Pastor (1965), 271 ff., 276.
977. 977Borck, ‘Nochmals: Aktivlegitimation für Verbraucherverbände und Wettbewerbsarmen-recht’ (1964b) WRP,
978. 978ff., at 402.
979. 979See in this sense Pastor (1965), 271 ff. and the reference there to the Position Paper of the Attorney Association, AnwBl, 1964, 169, 170. The Position Paper spoke according to Pastor of an intervention “close to expropriation”.
980. 980See in this sense Borck (1968), 4.
981. 981See Pastor (1965), 283.
982. 982Kur (1980).
983. 983Borck (1968), 1. Kur (1980), 122.
984. 984Most courts rejected attempts on the part of consumer associations to have their economic situation assessed on the basis of their aggregate litigious activity throughout the year. Cf. the analysis in Kur (1980), 113 ff. with further references to case law.
985. 985Kur (1980), 114.
986. 986„Ein Verein, welcher die Interessen der Verbraucher zu vertreten hat und dessen Mittel gering sind, solle mit diesen Mitteln haushalten und sie bei praktisch bedeutsamen Wettbewerbsverstössen einsetzen. Es sei unangebracht, in einem solchen Falle zu Lasten der Staatskasse und des den Verein vertretenden Rechtsanwalts eine Streitwertbegünstigung anzuordnen.“ Quoted after Kur (1980), 116.
987. 987Kur (1980), 114.
988. 988Ibid., 401.
989. 989Borck (1964b), 398 ff., at 401. See also Borck’s view reiterated in his later article, Borck (1968), 4. Kur is critical of such views. She rightly points at the distorted priority setting that would follow, if consumer associations were to select and litigate only the simple, deadsure cases of competition offences. Kur (1980), 123.
990. 990For a positive view on this proposal with the sole reservation that the ceiling was set too high, see Reich (1978), 104.
991. 991BT-Drs. 8/1670, 12. Similar proposals were advanced in the Government Bill BT-Drs. 8/2145. Stellungnahme des Bundesrates, 33, Gegenausserung der Bundesregierung, 40.
992. 992Hart/Joerges (1980), 105.
993. 993§ 93 ZPO, „Hat der Beklagte nicht durch sein Verhalten zur Erhebung der Klage Veranlassung gegeben, so fallen dem Kläger die Prozeßkosten zur Last, wenn der Beklagte den Anspruch sofort anerkennt.“ See Baumbach/Hefermehl (1998), Einl.. UWG, Rdnr. 526, 420.
994. 994Melullis, Handbuch des Wettbewerbsprozesses, 2 Auflage (Köln: Dr. Otto Schmidt Verlag, 1995), 404 ff. It is to be underlined that the a declaration to cease and desist would not make judicial proceedings obsolete and would not respectively have the effect on the allocation of the costs secured by penalty (strafgesicherte Unterlassungserklärung). Only then can the defendant really prove that his commitment to cease with and desist from the infringement is seriously intended. Baumbach/Hefermehl (1998) Einl. UWG 528, 435.
995. 995In any case the plaintiff has to prove in the proceedings that he has given the necessary notification, or that such notification for some reason is obsolete. The defendant has in his turn to prove that he has submitted a voluntary cease and desist declaration under penalty and thus has deprived the plaintiff of his/her cause of action (“klaglos gestellt hat"). Baumbach/Hefermehl (2001), Einl. UWG, Rdnr. 525 ff. with further references.
996. 996This notification is called a finalizing notice (Abschlußschreiben) and is equally useful to avoid unnecessary trials. See Melullis (1995), 405.
997. 997§ 823 BGB, cf. Melullis (1995), 431, 436.
998. 998The courts tended to accept that there was no general duty of compensation of costs in German law. The protection of one’s own legal sphere was a task of each legal person and the costs connected with such protection should only be compensated in case of damages, or in case of special rules of civil procedure. See GRUR 1970,
999. 999(“Fotowettbewerb”).
1000. 1000BGHZ 52, 393; GRUR 1970, 189 (“Fotowettbewerb”) (NJW 1970, 243) „Wer einen Wettbewerbsverstoss begangen hat, muss einem Verein zur Bekämpfung des unlauteren Wettbewerbs die notwendigen Aufwendungen für eine vorprozessuale Abmahnung erstatten.“ According to Reich the doctrine extended only to business unions, Reich (1978), 103, but the dominant opinon seems to be that the rule applies equally to consumer unions.
1001. 1001§§ 683, 670 BGB, Melullis (1995), 436 ff.
1002. 1002See reference in Reich (1978), 103.
1003. 1003BGH, GRUR 1970, 189 (“Fotowettbewerb”). See Halfmeier, ‘Der Anspruch der Verbraucherverbände auf Kostenerstattung anlässlich der Durchsetzung von Unterlassungsansprüchen nach UWG und AGB-Gesetz’ in: Brönneke (ed.), Kollektiver Rechtsschutz im Zivilprozess (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2001).
1004. 1004See Halfmeier (2000), 146 with reference to BGH NJW 1984, 2525.
1005. 1005Halfmeier (2001). See Baumbach/Hefermehl (1998), Einl. UWG, Rdn. 556, 432.
1006. 1006See Borck’s appeal for a specific rule assuring coverage of attorney fees for correspondence and pretrial notification procedure, Borck (1968), 4.
1007. 1007In his view these were the real damages suffered by consumer unions whose compensation was vital for the effective work of the unions. Reich (1978), 100 ff., 103.
1008. 1008See Klaka, Comment on Fotowettbewerb decision (1970) GRUR, 190 ff; Kisseler, ‘Das Klagerecht der Verbände in der Bewährungsprobe’ (1977) WRP, 151 ff.; Pastor, ‘Kostenerstattung bei erfolgeicher Verwarnung’ (1979) WRP, 423 ff.; Borck, ‘Ansichten und Argumente zur Erstattung der Abmahnkosten’ (1981) WRP, 438; Melullis, ‘Zum Unkostenerstattungsanspruch bei der Verwarnung durch Verbände im gewerblichen Rechtsschutz’ (1992) WRP, 1 ff.
1009. 1009Pastor (1978), 249 ff
1010. 1010It was then, as a rule equal to the amount of the notification costs.
1011. 1011The courts tended first, to accept an unrealistically high sum in controversy for the main trial, and in addition calculated the attorney fees on the basis of a higher percentage from the normal attorney fees than usual (7/10 instead of 5/10). Pastor (1978), 249.
1012. 1012One way for the courts to circumvent the risk of abuse was to recognize the right to use the assistance of an attorney only for associations that could demonstrate a regular litigious activity. The expected effect was to suppress the activity of so called “Abmahnvereine” dealing mainly with pretrial notifications as a source of remuneration.
1013. 1013In this sense Schricker, ‘Hundert Jahre Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb - Licht und Schatten’ (1996a) GRUR Int., 473 ff., 478: „Die Rechtsprechung hat gewiss bei der richterrechtlichen Ausgestaltung der Institution der Abmahung rechtsschöpferische Kraft gezeigt; das im Laufe der zeit aufgebaute Regelwerk dient der Vermeidung von Prozessen und der Rechtssicherheit.“
1014. 1014Schricker (1996a), 478.
1015. 1015In this sense see Schricker, Ibid.
1016. 1016BT-Drs. 10/4741, 6, 17.
1017. 1017Melullis/Eheckelmann, ‘Beibehaltung der Kostenpauschale - ja oder nein?’ (1982) WRP, 560 ff.; Uedelhofen, Die kostenlose Erstabmahnung - eine wirkungslose Waffe gegen den unseriösen Abmahnveren, WRP 1982,
1018. 1018Baumbach/Hefermehl (1998), § 13 UWG, Rdnr. 7 ff., 1330.
1019. 1019RG 120,47; cf. Ch. 4.32.3.2 above.
1020. 1020See Kur (1981), 558 ff, 564.
1021. 1021By contrast, in case the perpetrator has submitted to a negatively affected “Gläubiger” (creditor) a cease and desist declaration secured by a penalty (“strafgesicherte Unterlassungserklärung”), then the danger of repeated infringements is usually regarded as eliminated also in view of the interests of other affected parties. The substantive rights of action of these latter parties can therefore be considered extinguished. Everything still depends on the individual case, though. Decisive are the opportunities for sanctioning the infringement, and in particular, the willingness of the Gläubiger to leave no doubt that the cease and desist declaration is seriously intended. Baumbach/Hefermehl (1998), § 13 UWG, Rdnr. 8b, 1330. BGH GRUR 60, 379/381 (“Zentrale“);
1022. 1022See Kur (1981), 565.
1023. 1023Kur (1981), 565, fn. 68 with reference to Hadding, JZ 1970, 306.
1024. 1024On this question, see Baumbach/Hefermehl (1998), UWG § 13, Rdnr. 9, 1330-31. Parallel proceedings may also have an effect on litigation costs and in particular on the value in controversy (Streitwert). According to Hefermehl, there may be a reason to set the value of subsequent lawsuits somewhat lower than in the original lawsuit. Even here, however he underlines that this should not be taken as a rule and has to be weighed for each particular case. See Baumbach/Hefermehl (1998), UWG § 13, Rdnr. 9, 1330-31.
1025. 1025Baumbach/Hefermehl (1998), § UWG § 13, Rdnr. 10, 1331.
1026. 1026See the complaints of Borck (1968), 3.
1027. 1027Pastor (1978), 245, 253 ff.
1028. 1028See § 32 ZPO, “Für Klagen aus unerlaudbten Handlungen ist das Gericht zuständing, in dessen Bezirk die Handlung begangen ist.”
1029. 1029See Borck (1968), 3. With the 1994 UWG Novelle the provision on “fliegende Gerichtsbarkeit” was abolished, see Ch. 7.3.1.1 above.
1030. 1030Schricker (1975), 231. See Baumbach/Hefermehl, Einl., § 25 UWG
1031. 1031The reform proposals built on the well-known empirical study conducted by the Max Planck Institute, attempting to estimate the damages suffered by consumers as a result of unfair and deceptive trade practices. See v. Falckenstein (1978).
1032. 1032See Reich (1978), 104.
1033. 1033BT-Drs. 8/2145, 15.
1034. 1034See proposed § 13 a III UWG-E, BT-Drs. 8/2145, 5.
1035. 1035Mertens, ‘Kollektivrechtlicher Schadensersatz als Mittel des Verbraucherschutzes’ (1975) ZHR, 438 ff.
1036. 1036Schricker (1975), 246.
1037. 1037BGH GRUR 1963, 270 (“Bärenfang”). The dispute in this much celebrated decision concerned a honey liquer traditionally produced in Eastern Prussia. The defendant was marketing his product as “being produced after an old East-Prussian recepy”. The matter was refered back to the second instance court, extensively motivating a possibility to reverse the burden of proof towards the defendant in case the decisive circumstances for the case are in his sphere of control. It should be noted that the reversal in this case was not in any way inspired by concerns for higher protection of consumers.
1038. 1038BT-Drs. 8/1670, 12. For positive comments on this proposal, see Reich (1978), 103.
1039. 1039See Reich (1978), 103.
1040. 1040See Fukuyama for further evidence.
1041. 1041Grimes (1971), 1769 ff.
1042. 1042Kisseler, ‘Verfahren der Wettbewerbszentrale vor dem Bundesgerichtshof in: 75 Jahre Zentrale (1987), 131 ff.
1043. 1043In 1995 Lehmann gives similar estimates, which speaks for a rather stable rate of litigious activity. See Lehmann (1995), 380 ff.
1044. 1044BGH GRUR 1959, 143 (“Blindenseife”); Leistungswettbewerb, rejected in BGH GRUR 1983, 374 („Spendenbitte“); BGH WRP 1984, 399 („Werbung in Schulen“).
1045. 1045The leading case was BGH GRUR 1971, 162 („Diagnose-Zentrum“). The defendant was enjoined from offering free car inspection (worth 10-18 DM) in its garages, in so called “diagnosis centres”. Such offer was qualified as violating good commercial practice while marketing an excessively advantageous offer. It is worth quoting the summary of the case by Kisseler: „Der Bundesgerichtshof sah hierin ein übertriebenes Anlocken von Kunden und ließ demgegenüber auch nicht den Gesichtspunkt gelten, dass die kostenlose Überprüfung von Kraftfahrzeugen der Verkehrssicherheit diene“ Kisseler (1987), 136. See also BGH GRUR 1981, 746 ff. (“Ein­ Groschen-Werbeaktion”).
1046. 1046BGH, GRUR 58, 557 („Direktverkäufe“).
1047. 1047Kisseler (1987), 134.
1048. 1048BGH, WRP 1974, 26 („Intermarkt“); BGH, WRP 1979, 300 (“Verkauf unter Einstandspreis“).
1049. 1049Kisseler (1987), 136.
1050. 1050Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs e.V., Stellungnahme zum Grünbuch der Kommission zum Verbraucherschutz in der Europäischen Union, February 2002, to be found at the site of the Commission DG SANCO: http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/green_pap_comm/responses/business_g ermany/zbuw.pdf.
1051. 1051„Erst der - etwa im deutschen UWG verankerte - Wettbewerbschutz mit Unterlassungsansprüchen für Wettbewerber und deren Wirtschaftsverb’nde führt damit effektiv zu einem umfangreichen Verbraucherschutz.“, ibid., 4.
1052. 1052See v. Falckenstein (1977), 189.
1053. 1053Among them were Verein gegen die Unwesen in Handel und Gewerbe, with a seat in Köln, pro virtute, Vereinigung gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb, Singen, Schutzveband gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft, München. Verein zur Förderung des lauteren Wettbewerbs, Bielefeld, etc. See v. Falckenstein (1977), 188.
1054. 1054v. Falckenstein (1977), 168.
1055. 1055BGH GRUR 1957, 606 ff., at 607, („Heilmittelvertrieb“); BGH GRUR 1966, 267 ff., at 270, („White Horse“).
1056. 1056Schricker (1996a), 478.
1057. 1057Wolf, ‘Zur Zulässigkeit der Verbandsklage’ (1971) BB, 1293 ff. with critical comments on BGH, BB 1971, 1297 („Spezialklinik“).
1058. 1058On the early history of the consumer organisations in Germany, see Brinkmann (1976).
1059. 1059During the time of the Weimar Republic these organizations achieved even some political representation. They were granted 30 (of 326) seats in the Imperial Economic Council. The situation changed drastically with coming to power of National Socialists, which were generally hostile to independent grass root associations. See Brinkmann (1976), 5ff. On early forms of consumer organisation and representation in Germany see Geyer (2001).
1060. 1060Brinkmann (1976), 5 ff.
1061. 1061Falckenstein (1977), 32. Critical Brinkmann (1976), 148.
1062. 1062See Brinkmann (1976), 12 f.
1063. 1063Initially the AGV was mainly financed by the Central Union of German Cooperative Associations.
1064. 1064See Brinkmann (1976), 22 f.
1065. 1065Falckenstein (1977), 33.
1066. 1066Borck, ‘Fälle entgültig abgeschlossen’ (1970) Verbraucher Rundschau, 2 ff.
1067. 1067See v. Falckenstein (1977), 26.
1068. 1068v. Falckenstein (1977), 34, fn. 40 with reference to the Consumer Report of the Federal Government, Bonn, 1975, 59.
1069. 1069The largest organisation, the Deutsche Verbraucherbund (with 50,000 members) specifically aimed to protect consumer interests by purchase of package tours and other travel services, and offered a defence and recovery service up to 500 DM. See v. Falckenstein (1977), 35.
1070. 1070For processing of complaints the VZ of the Länder employed altogether 33 employees, of which 10 full-time lawyers, v. Falckenstein (1977), 41 ff.
1071. 1071Ibid., 42.
1072. 1072Schricker (1976), 574.
1073. 1073Kur (1980), 122.
1074. 1074See Wolf (1971), 1293.
1075. 1075Kur (1980), 16 ff.
1076. 1076Pastor/Ahrens, Der Wettbewerbsprozess (München: Beck, 2001).
1077. 1077See Pastor (1969), 571 ff., 574.
1078. 1078Pastor (1969), 572 ff.
1079. 1079Pastor (1969), 576.
1080. 1080Pastor (1969), 576.
1081. 1081Borck (1964b), 399.
1082. 1082On the history of Nordic legal cooperation, see Sevon, ‘Några reflexioner kring det nordiska lagstiftningssamarbetet’ (1988) TļR, 509 ff. For a critical legal analysis of the use of legal material from other Nordic countries, see Wilhelmsson, ‘Den nordiska rättsgemenskapen och rättskälleläran’ (1985) TJR, 181 ff.
1083. 1083SOU 1966:71.
1084. 1084With the limitation of appreciable effect on consumer behaviour “ägnad att påverka efterfrågan”. See SOU 1966:71, 333.
1085. 1085SOU 1966:71, 295 ff.
1086. 1086Ibid., 296.
1087. 1087Although the Commission did not make an explicit reference to the American model with a Federal Trade Commission, references at other points in the report demonstrate the awareness of and perceptible influence of this model. Proposals in the direction of the US model were nevertheless rejected, but for the most part without comprehensive justification. See SOU 1966:71, 286.
1088. 1088SOU 1966:48, 122.
1089. 1089Prissamverkan och konkurrens, price co-operation and competition., SOU 1966:48, 122.
1090. 1090SOU 1966:71, 49; prop. 1970:57, 59.
1091. 1091See prop. 1970:57, L3U 1970:45.
1092. 1092“Det har redan framgått att jag for min del vill se uppställandet av normer for marknadsföringen som en konsumentpolitisk fråga.” Prop. 1970:57, 57 f.
1093. 1093”Ett vikigt del i konsumentpolitiken är att rikta konsumenternas uppmärksamhet på de faktorer som i första hand bör påverka konsumtionsvalet och öka deras motståndskraft mot säljarargument av irrationell art ...” Prop. 1970:57, 56.
1094. 1094”Min principiella ställning är att samhället bör ha ett förstahandsansvar för att en god etisk standard iakttas i reklam och marknadsföring. Lagstiftningen bör vara så avancerad som behövs för att den skall kunna utgöra grundvalen för utbildandet av fullt tillfredsställande etiska normer, och normbildningen bör vara en uppgift för offentliga organ.” Prop. 1970:57, 59.
1095. 1095Prop. 1970:57.
1096. 1096Interestingly, as evidence of the failure of self-regulation to efficiently combat unfair marketing, a reference was made to a survey within the framework of the Advertising Committee suggesting that about 11-18 percent of the daily newspapers and 20-27 percent of the popular press contained announcements incompatible with valid norms. This somewhat casual reference indicates that the ambitions of the Government as to substantive outcomes were close to complete elimination of any unfair and deceptive advertising in the media. Prop. 1970:57, 59.
1097. 1097Prop. 1975/76:34.
1098. 1098SOU 1973:20.
1099. 1099SOU 1973:10; SOU 1974:23.
1100. 1100Prop. 1975/76:34, 93 ff.
1101. 11010 iundertakings also in this area.
1102. 1102SOU 1979:5.
1103. 1103“På en rad områden, där samhället har tagit ansvar för att medborgarnas intressen tas till vara, har således möjligheter till direkt insyn i företagens aktiviteter tillskapats lagstiftningsvägen. Denna insyn är inte begränsad till situationer där åtgärder från myndigheternas sida antas vara påkallade utan ingår i en allmän tillsyn inom de områden som lagstiftningen omfattar. Ett område där motsvarande möjligheter i stort ännu saknas är konsumentpolitiken.” SOU 1979:5, 11.
1104. 1104See SOU 1979:5, 13.
1105. 1105It may be interesting to note that in the course of its work the Inquiry Commission undertook a comparative survey by sending questionnaires to governments and public authorities in other Western countries. In its response the German Federal Government bluntly stated that any attempt on the part of public authorities to influence undertakings’ decisions about product development would be in Germany perceived as unacceptable encroachment on the free market economy. See, SOU 1979:5, 61.
1106. 1106SOU 1983:40.
1107. 1107SOU 1983:40, 227 ff.
1108. 1108These provisions were integrated in the MFL pending the adoption of a special Act on Product Safety. Prop. 1985/85:121, Inriktningen av konsumentpolitiken.
1109. 110913 a § lag om marknadsdomstol (SFS 1970:417) as amended by SFS 1985:927.
1110. 1110Prop. 1984/85:213; cf. SFS 1985:926.
1111. 1111Treis speaks of “Möglichkeiten politischer Profilierung”, Tries (1991), 24. One can read in the Government Bill that the KF, LO and Husmodersförbundet point out the economic importance of marketing questions to consumers, and that the investigations to be carried out by the new public organs ought to take the social impact of the measures on consumers into account. LO emphasizes that the new organs have a responsibility for developing a consumer-useful advertising and marketing. Prop. 1970:57, 155.
1112. 1112See, however, the Report of the Unfair Competition Inquiry Commission noting the dual role of the KF representing the interests of consumers but also acting in its capacity of producer and retailer, SOU 1966:71, 296.
1113. 1113Prop. 1970:57, 155.
1114. 1114Thorelli and Thorelli call the policy of influencing producers “producer jawboning”, Thorelli/Thorelli (1977), 200.
1115. 1115It is likewise specific for Sweden that the judiciary is among the consulted parties in the course of legislative deliberations. Wee should for instance take note of the Market Court, but also the ordinary courts like Svea Hovrätt, taking a stand on many specific issues that are or could become subject of individual litigation. See e.g. prop. 1975/76:34, 41, where the Market Court takes a negative stand on the desire of the KO to expand the rules on special offers, thereby interpreting the intentions of the law-maker and defending its position in specific cases.
1116. 1116Strömholm, ‘Public Rule-Making and Private: The Swedish Experience’ (1971) 15 SSL, 219 ff.; Strömholm, ‘Nordiskt samarbete - utvecklingslinjer och argument’ in: Festshift til W.E. v. Eyben (Kobenhavn: Juristforb:s forl., 1982), 173 ff.; Bernitz (1979), 53 ff, at 75.
1117. 1117In a recent monograph Bernitz calls the appearance of the Swedish MFL of 1970 the ‘first nail into the coffin’ of a fruitful period in the development of Nordic legal cooperation. See Bernitz (2002b), 108.
1118. 1118Lidbom, ‘Den nordiska rättenhetens problem i dag’ (1973) SvTJ, 273 ff; Lidbom, ‘Konsumentpolitik och lagstiftning’ (1971) SvJT, 81 ff.
1119. 1119See 1 § Draft, SOU 1966:71, 13.
1120. 1120Cf. 2 § MFL (SFS 1975:1418). Improper Marketing: “A tradesman who, in the marketing of any goods, service or other commodity, advertises or takes other action which, by conflicting with good commecial standards or otherwise, adversely affects consumers or traders, may be prohibited by the Market Court from continuing therewith or undertaking any similar action. A prohibition may also be issued to an employee of a tradesman and to any other acting on behalf of a tradesman, as well as to any other person who has substantially contributed to the action.” English translation as in Bernitz/Draper (1986), 321ff.
1121. 11211 § MFL (SFS 1975:1418).
1122. 1122Prop. 1970:57, 63 f.
1123. 1123Prop. 1970:57, 69.
1124. 1124Prop. 1970:57, 69. ,
1125. 1125Prop. 1970:57, 70.
1126. 1126See Bernitz (1993), 110.
1127. 1127See prop. 1970:59, 64.
1128. 1128For a detailed analysis and critique of the inadequate protection of traders against interference with contractual relations in Swedish law, see Bernitz (1993), 199 ff.; cf. Treis (1991), 105.
1129. 1129SOU 1974:23. It may be interesting to note that in part I and part II (SOU 1972:7) of its report the Advertising Committee had proposed a number of alternative measures for stimulating informative advertising. One such measure was, for instance, tax relief for particularly informative advertising and measures for restricting the volume of advertising considered as excessive. See SOU 1972:7, 32. See prop. 1976/76: 34, 121.
1130. 11303 § MFL (SFS 1975:1418).
1131. 1131Prop. 1975/76:34, 109.
1132. 1132SOU 1972:7, 48.
1133. 11333-4 §§ 1970 MFL (SFS 1970:412) = 7-8 §§ 1975 MFL (SFS 1975:1418).
1134. 1134See lag om vissa bestämmeler om marknadsföring av alkoholdrycker (SFS 1978:763); Prop. 1977/78:178, repealed by SFS 1999:1001.
1135. 1135SFS 1978:764, repealed by SFS 1993:581.
1136. 1136See, however, 69 § rusdryckförordningen (SFS 1954:521) and 7 § lagen om handel med drycker (1977:293). Cf. Persson (2002), 161 ff., 187 ff.
1137. 1137See TF 1:9.
1138. 1138The Inquiry Commission on Alcohol and Tobacco Advertising was of the opinion that a ban on marketing of legally produced goods would nevertheless come into conflict with freedom of speech and trade mark law. The Commission therefore proposed only a clause on ‘particular moderation’, to be filled in by special guidelines. See SOU 1976:63, 173 ff.
1139. 1139See 2 § alkoholreklamlagen (SFS 1978:763). With the introduction of commercial telvision and radio in 1991, alcohol advertising was prohibited also in these media, SFS 1991:1076.
1140. 1140“In particular, no advertising or marketing measure may be taken which is intrusive, seeks out prospective customers, or encourages the use of alcohol.” See 2 § (SFS 1978:763). On the recent changes in the regulation of alcohol advertising as a result of European influences see Ch. 7.2.2.
1141. 1141Inrikesdepartamentet. Since 1996 the official translation is Ministry of Public Administration.
1142. 1142The official English translation of the agencies has changed in 1996. Previously KOV has been translated as National Board for Consumer Policies. Since 1996 the official translation is Swedish Consumer Agency. Inrikesdepartamentet has been previously translated as Ministry of Public Administration and since 1996 as Ministry of Domestic Affairs.
1143. 1143Förordning med instruktion for konsumentverket (SFS 1976:429) with multiple subsequent amendments.
1144. 1144”Sakkunskap, medborgerlig omdöme och medborgerlig insyn”. See Verkledningsbeslutet, prop. 1986/87:99. Alternative forms of management are a one-man responsibility model where the head of agency bears exclusive responsibility (with or without "insynsråd") and board with full responsibility. On the discussion about the need for increased control of the executive over the work of independent public agencies see SOU 1985:40; see Söderlind/Petersson (1986), 113 ff.
1145. 1145Prop. 1972:33, 15.
1146. 1146Prop. 1972:33, 75.
1147. 1147See NU 1972:40, rskr 1972:225.
1148. 1148Prop. 1975/76:159.
1149. 1149See prop. 1975/76:159, 25.
1150. 1150It may be interesting to note the careful phrasing of the proposal where the word ”interest representation” is only used for consumer interests. By contrast for industry the expression “experience from” or “representing experience from industry” are used.
1151. 1151See SOU 1983:40, 66.
1152. 1152Prop. 1975/76:159, 25.
1153. 1153Prop. 1975/76:34, 116. See also Bernitz/Draper (1986), 70.
1154. 1154Prop. 1975/76:159, 26.
1155. 1155See the comparison with the Public Food Agency in SOU 1983:40, 444 ff.
1156. 1156The Bill to the first MFL underlined the importance of keeping a parallel between the institutional framework of marketing practices law and antitrust law. See prop. 1970:57.
1157. 1157Prop. 1975/76:34, 96, 106. See more recently SOU 2000:29, 397.
1158. 1158Prop. 1972:33, 65; NU 1972:40; rskr. 1972:225.
1159. 1159The latter was based on voluntary compliance and negotiations, but there were some possibilities of using binding government measures as a last resort.
1160. 1160SOU 1974:23.
1161. 1161SOU 1974:23, 85 ff.
1162. 1162Prop. 1975/76:34, 64 ff.
1163. 1163At the time of the debate KOV and KO constituted two separate bodies. The arguments against stricter sanctioning competencies of KOV were therefore fundamentally of a co-ordination and efficiency character. Vesting formal decision-making powers in the Consumer Agency implied divided competence on questions of unfair marketing and on information disclosure (to be monitored and enforced by KO and by KOV respectively). The risk of overlapping and conflict of competencies was obvious. Moreover, a divided system could confuse both consumers and traders who had to comply with possibly incongruent sets of norms. See ibid., 66.
1164. 1164It may be interesting to compare the powers of KOV with the definition of agency given in the US Administrative Procedures Act (APA). “Agency is a part of government that is generally independent in the exercise of its functions and that by law has authority to take final and binding action affecting the rights and obligations of individuals, particularly by the characteristic procedure of rule-making and adjudictaion.” Judging from this definition rule-making and adjudication seem to be the most important functions characterising a governmental agency. Naturally other functions may be added here: information gathering and processing, negotiation and policy formulation. Yet neither of these has the property of affecting the rights and obligations of individuals, at least not in a direct manner.
1165. 1165Prop. 1970:57, 148.
1166. 1166“Som jag tidigare påpekat bör ombudsmannen i första hand försöka komma till rätta med otillfredsställande förfaranden på frivillig väg. I många fall torde utsikterna härför vara goda. Erfarenheterna från den utomrättsliga
1167. 1167Prop. 1970:59, 84.
1168. 1168Prop. 1970:59, 84.
1169. 116922 § (SFS 1976:429): “Anföres klagomål mot viss marknadsföringsåtgärd och är fråg endast om prövning enligt 2-4 §§ marknadsföringslagen (SFS 1975:1418), får klagomålen lämnas utan åtgärd, om det från allmän synpunkt är av ringa betydelse att saken prövas.” Cf. 12 § (SFS 1995:868).
1170. 1170See SOU 1983:40,633.
1171. 1171See this Ch. below.
1172. 1172This prerogative was first intoduced in 9 § lag om otillbörlig marknadsföring. See prop. 1970:57, 84. It was taken over in 14-15 §§ MFL 1976:1418 and constitutes 21 § of the present 1995 MFL (SFS 1995:450).
1173. 1173See Ch. 48 RB, cf. SOU 1983:40, 303.
1174. 1174SOU 1983:40, 444.
1175. 1175This was also confirmed by prop. 1994/95:123 where the possibility of reconsideration of individual administrative decisions under 27 § Administrative Procedure Act (Förvaltningslagen, FL) is explicitly envisaged for the consent orders. In the Bill it says that a consent order has the power of a court decsion that has entered into force, this without prejudice to the possibility to appeal under 27 § FL.
1176. 1176See Strömberg, Allmanförvaltningsrätt (Malmö: Liber-Hermods, 1995), 160 ff.
1177. 1177Prop. 1970:59, 99.
1178. 1178SOU 1983:40, 212 f.
1179. 1179Prop. 1970:59, 84.
1180. 1180As the Committee puts it: ”Ever since the rules entered into force it had been customary to send consent orders only to traders who could be expected to respond to KO.”, SOU 1983:40, 304.
1181. 1181SOU 1983:40, 213 ff., 303.
1182. 1182See prop. 1984/85:213, 219; cf. the reservations expressed by Holm and Tengelin, SOU 1983:40, 341.
1183. 1183Ibid.
1184. 1184See Cranston (1979), 116 ff.
1185. 1185Revesz, ‘Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System’ (1990) 138 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1111 ff.
1186. 1186The critique cooled down during the 1980s. See 1983:40, 466.
1187. 1187SOU 1983:40, 56.
1188. 1188Ibid., 56.
1189. 1189See SOU 1983:40, 100.
1190. 1190The seeds for a flexible co-operative approach were planted already with the reference to “voluntary and unbound forms” of producer influence in the Governmental Bill on Consumer Policy, prop. 1972:33, 65.
1191. 1191Prop. 1975/76:34.
1192. 1192Examples from this category are the guidelines on skateboards (KOVFS 1977:3), riding and skiing helmets (KOVFS 1977:7), automatic fire-detectors (KOVFS 1978:3).
1193. 1193Examples from this category are the guidelines for information on fuel consumption of new cars (KOVFS 1977:2); for information to consumers upon temporary price promotions in retail trade (KOVFS 1977:1; for marketing of dipers (KOVFS 1977:4); for information to consumers in the marketing of potatoes (1977:6).
1194. 1194See the statistics in SOU 1983:40, 59.
1195. 1195SFS 1976:429 (amended 1979:826, 1980:873 and 1981:494).
1196. 1196SFS 1976:429.
1197. 119711 § 1 Standing Instruction of KOV (SFS 1976:429) as amended.
1198. 1198SOU 1983:40, 235.
1199. 1199Prop. 1975/76:34, 109. See also SOU 1983:40.
1200. 1200Prop. 1975/76:34, 93, 99.
1201. 1201Prop. 1975/76: 34, 108.
1202. 1202”[Riktlinjerna] kommer nu att öka i betydelse genom att de enligt statsmakternas beslut kommer att vara vägledande för marknadsdomstolens avgörande i enskilda fall.” Prop. 1975/76:159, 10. See the critical comments of Stjernquist, ‘Riktlinjer i svensk offentlig rätt’ (1992) 15 FT, 233 ff., at 240 f.
1203. 1203Prop. 1976/77:123, 345 ff., at 350.
1204. 1204Prop. 1976/77:123, 370.
1205. 1205Ds 1982:11, Större klarhet i fråga om olika reglers rättsliga karaktär och syfte.
1206. 1206See Lagrådet in prop. 1976/77:123.
1207. 1207SOU 1983:40, 440.
1208. 1208SOU 1983:40,286.
1209. 1209The Committee also noted that the Market Court always opened its deliberations by analysing whether the information was “of particular significance for consumers”, as required by the legal text of 3 § MFL and only then proceeded with reference to the guidelines. See SOU 1983:40, 163.
1210. 1210SOU 1983:40, 108 ff., 162 ff.
1211. 1211MD 1981:20 (“Saab”); MD 1981:21 (“Ford Company”); MD 1981:22 (Svenska Renault”).
1212. 1212SOU 1983:40, 103.
1213. 1213SOU 1983:40, 103.
1214. 1214SOU 1983:40, 111.
1215. 1215The report “More clarity in the question of the legal character of different regulations” (Ds 1982:11) had proposed to treat the guidelines as “general advice” (“allmänna råd”) since the term was conventional in Swedish administrative law. See SOU1983:40, 286.
1216. 1216It is defined in 1 § of Regulation on the collection of administrative rules 1976:725 (Författningssammlingsförordningen, FSamlF) as “such general recommendations on the implementation of a normative act which specify how someone can or should act in a certain context”. These are consequently not binding prescriptions, but at the same time classified in the category rules of the same Regulation (27 § FsamlF). See Bejstam, ‘Föreskrift och föreskriftsprövning enligt 1974 års Regeringsform. En Bokanmälan’ (2000) FT, 23 ff.
1217. 1217SOU 1983:40, 292. On the difference between ‘shall’ and ‘should’ (‘skall’ och ‘bör’ regler), see SOU 1983:40, 104.
1218. 1218See SOU 1983:40, 73.
1219. 1219SOU 1983:40, 76.
1220. 1220See SOU 1983:40, 50. For the budgetary year 1980/81 the direct financing of the activity of KOV was reduced with 2.3 million crowns announcing additional 1.7 million cuts for the next year.
1221. 1221See prop. 1981/82:100, bilaga 14.
1222. 1222SOU 1983:40, 415 ff.
1223. 1223SOU 1983:40, 693.
1224. 1224SOU 1983:40, 235.
1225. 1225”Det är vårt intryck att organisationerna föredragit att söka påverka det konsumentpolitiska skeendet på ett mera allmänt plan, inte minst genom sina representanter i KOV:s styrelse. De konkreta åtgärderna har man överlåtit till verket och till KO.” SOU 1983:40, 238.
1226. 1226Prop. 1984/85:213, 137.
1227. 1227SOU 1983:40, 65.
1228. 1228Thus 30 consumer complaints were sufficient to launch negotiations concerning the design of baby-dummies. See SOU 1983:40, 67.
1229. 1229SOU 1983:40, 239. In his analyis of the practice of the FTC Bernizt underlines that in the US rule-making is an extremely formalised procedure, whereby a draft is first made public, then anybody interested is invited to participate, and finally there is a possibility to appeal.
1230. 1230For the negative reaction of KOV to the idea of public hearings see prop. 1984/85:213, 116.
1231. 1231Similar general formulations are characteristic for the instructions of most Swedish public agencies. See Söderlind/Petersson (1986), 38.
1232. 1232See RF 11:7 on the independence of administrative authorities in the exercise of administrative power (myndighetsutövning) and in law enforcement (lagtillämpning). The principle of independence of public authorities in relation to the executive has been a matter of debate in a number of investigations and in the public administration literature. This principle is seen by some to contravene the major premise of parliamentary democracy, namely that the process of government should be carried out and closely controlled by democratically elected parliament and government. Therefore demand for increased and more formalised control through the executive is sometimed advanced. See Förvaltningsutredningen, SOU 1983:39, 19; Cf. Söderlind/Petersson (1986), 110 ff.
1233. 1233See prop. 1981/82:100, Bilaga 14 on the Consumer Agency.
1234. 1234Söderlind/Petersson, (1986), 23 ff. Orig.: den lagstyrda förvaltningen; den folkstyrda förvaltningen (demokratisk-parlamentarisk styrningskedja; den administrativa korporatismen; kommunal självstyre; självförvaltning); den marknadsstyrda förvaltningen.
1235. 1235Lag om marknadsdomstol (SFS 1970:417).
1236. 1236See Bernitz/Draper (1986), 85.
1237. 1237The decision to join the handling of competition and marketing practices cases into one judicial body was evidently influenced by the US American experience and the Federal Trade Commission..
1238. 1238See Johansson, Rättegången i marknadsdomstolen (Uppsala: Justus Förlag, 1986).
1239. 1239See Bernitz (1969), 425 ff.: Johansson (1986), 25 ff.
1240. 1240In most cases, disputes were resolved already with the NO. Proceedings before the Board were extremely rare.
1241. 1241Prop. 1970:57, 156.
1242. 1242Prop. 1970:57, 167.
1243. 1243Prop. 1971:30, 610, 695, 713.
1244. 1244Notably by experts in administrative and procedural law, Strömberg, Allmän förvaltningsrätt (Lund: Gleerup, 1974), 34, 94; Heuman, Process och straffrätt för Juridisk översiktskurs, (Lund: Juridiska föreningen i Lund, 1974), 7. Reference in Johansson (1986), 19 ff.
1245. 1245Bernitz/Modig/Mallmén (1970), 297.
1246. 1246On ‘resning’ as an extraordinary remedy, see Lindblom (2000), 229.
1247. 1247MD 1974:23, NJA 1975, 589 (“Helg-Extra”); MD 1977:1; NJA 1977, 751 (“Vivo-Favör”); see Bernitz/Draper (1986), 86 ff. On the relations between Swedish marketing practices law and freedom of information, see Levin, ‘Werbung und Informationsfreiheit’ (1987a) GRUR Int., 207 ff.
1248. 1248MD 1976:6, NJA 1975, 461 (“Scientologikyrkan i Sverige”). The Supreme Court found that the application of the law forming the basis of the order was manifestly inconsistent with the relevant statutory provisions.
1249. 1249See Johansson (1986), 22, referring to the critical comments of Ragnemalm, ‘Regeringsformer 11:11, några reflektioner i anledning av ett färskt HD-avgôrande’ (1976) FT, 80.
1250. 1250Prop. 1970:57, 157.
1251. 12513 § lag om marknadsdomstol (SFS 1970:417).
1252. 12529 § lag om marknadsdomstol (SFS 1970:417).
1253. 1253See Johansson (1986), 35; Westerlind, ‘Marknadsdomstolen i nuet och inför framtiden’ (1976) SvJT, 417 ff., 423.
1254. 1254Bet. 1992/93:NU17.
1255. 1255Johansson (1986), 37 ff.
1256. 1256See MD 1977:22 (“Alcro”).
1257. 1257See Bernitz., ‘Brand Differentiation Between Identical Products. An Analysis from a Consumer Law Viewpoint’ (1981) JCP, 21 ff. The second decision on product differentiation concerned the right of the biggest producer of home electric appliances on the Swedish market, ’Electrolux*, to market practially identical products under different brands and for different prices. The KO brought an injunction asking the Market Court to enjoin the defendant to give information about the equivalence of the products. This time the claim was upheld by a unanimous court. See MD 1981:4 (“Electrolux”).
1258. 1258See MD 1982:11 (“Bästa bankboken”);MD 1980:19 (“Verdexa”); MD 1980:5 (”Goodyear-!”).
1259. 1259See Bernitz/Draper (1986), 83.
1260. 1260Johansson (1986).
1261. 1261Johansson(l986), 37 ff.
1262. 1262See prop. 1970:57, 164.
1263. 1263Prop. 1970:57, 164.
1264. 1264Prop. 1970:57, 167.
1265. 1265This was the case concerning rule on voting, litigation costs and possibility to review its own decision. See prop. 1970:167.
1266. 1266Förvaltningsprocesslag (SFS 1971:291).
1267. 1267Johansson (1986), 22 f.
1268. 1268As Söderlind and Petersson point out, the adjudicative function was in the Middle Ages a prerogative of the monarch and was then only gradually transferred to public servants with legal competence to be finally fully separated and concentrated in the courts. Nevertheless, they observe that the impact of history can still be traced in the present functioning of Swedish public administration. Formality, legality, requirements of all-sided investigation, communication with the parties and possibility of appeal are all features of Swedish public administrative, which have much in common with judicial activity and flow from the thinking of a law-bound administration, characteristic of the Rechtsstaat. See Söderlind/Petersson (1986), 34.
1269. 1269Johansson (1986), 23.
1270. 1270On the functions of NO and Marknadsrådet, see Bemitz (1969), 425 ff.
1271. 127110 § MFL (SFS 1970:418): ”Fråga om förbud elle åläggande enligt 2-4 §§ uptages efter ansökan. Sådan ansökan göres av konsumentombudsmannen. Beslutar denne för visst fall att ej göra ansökan, får ansökan göras av sammanslutning av konsumenter, löntagare eller näringsidkare eller, beträffande föbud enligt 2 §, av näringsidkare som beröres av handlingen.”
1272. 1272SOU 1983:40, 294.
1273. 127322 § KOV Instruktion (SFS SFS 1976:429).
1274. 1274See SOU 1983:40, 293 ff.
1275. 1275SOU 1983:40, 295 ff.
1276. 1276SOU 1983:40, 205 ff.
1277. 1277SOU 1983:40, 298.
1278. 1278Prop. 1984/85:213, 52: ”Konsumentverket bör därför rent principiellt ha förstahandansvaret för utvecklingen och för lagtillämpningn även i fråga om konkurrentärenden.”
1279. 1279Prop. 1984/85:213, 53.
1280. 1280SOU 1983:40,299. 1000 SOU 1983:40, 308 ff.; prop. 1984/85:213, 56 ff.; 13 a § lag om marknadsdomstol (SFS 1970:417). 1001 Prop. 1970:57, 97. See Johansson (1986), 58. 1002 Prop. 1983/84:92, 22. 1003 See Johansson (1986), 58.
1281. 1281(592), according to Schricker dominant opinion in doctrine and standing case law. Schricker (1975), 216. See also Schricker (1970b), 221. 1042 Following Nipperdey one of the main categories of unfair competition under the general clause is that of "Behindrungswettbewerb" (obstructive competition). Here fall the following situations: Absatz,- Werbe-, Lizenz- and Bezugsbehinderung; Betriebstörung; Preisunterbietung (635-637), Boykott (645-654), Diskriminierung (655-660), Geschäftsverletzung und Anschwärzung (661), Vergleichende Werbung (661-715). Another category of factual situations fully devoted to the protection of competitors is the so called “Exploitation” (Ausbeutung). Within this group Hefermehl orders the imitation of a foreign achievement (Leistung, 718-745), the immediate takeover of someone else’s product (749-758), misuse of foreign advertising (760-764), exploitation of someone else’s reputation (767-782). Beater (2000a), 12 ff. 1043 BGH GRUR 1956, 223 (“Anzeigenblatt”); BGH GRUR 1957, 365 (“SUWA”); BGH GRUR 1965, 489 (“Kleenex”); BGH GRUR 1959, 277 (“Künstleipostkarten”); BGH GRUR 1966, 45 (“Markenbenzin”); BGH GRUR 1965, 315 (“Werbewagen”); BGH GRUR 1969, 295 (“Goldener Oktober”); BGH GRUR 1972, 40 (“Feld und Wald”); BGH GRUR 1976, 637 (“Rustikale Brettchen”). 1044 BGH GRUR 1957, 365 („SUWA“). 1045 RG GRUR 1938, 207 ff. („Persil").
1282. 1282ff. 1057 BGH GRUR 1959, 31 (,, Feuerzeug als Werbegeschenk“). 1058 See Sosnitza (1995), 26 with reference to BGH GRUR 1967, 202 (“Gratisverlosung”). 1059 BGH GRUR 1971, 322 (“Lichdi-Centrum”).
1283. 1283on advertising in case of death with further references to case law. 1080 See BGH GRUR 1989, 753 („Telefonwerbung II“). 1081 For a general criticism at the “Vorspungsgedanke” see Beater (2000a), 41. See also Micklitz, ‘Die Rechtsbruchsklage nach § 22 AGBG’ in: Brönneke (ed.), Kollektiver Rechtsschutz im Zivilprozess (Baden­ Baden: Nomos, 2001), 87 ff, at 89 ff. 1082 Schricker (1970b), 261 ff. See Beater (2000a), 38. 1083 See Baumbach/Hefermehl (1998); cf. Köhler/Piper (2002), 731 ff.
1284. 1284__1241 7 ‘ 1241 On the somewhat marginal position of consumer law research in Sweden, cf. the reflections of Olsen (2000­ 2001), 330. 1242 For a discussion on advantages and disadvantages of specialised courts in the US American context, see Sunstein, ‘Participation, Public Law and Venue Reform’ (1982) 49 U Chi. L. Rev., 976 ff., at 998: “Specialisation carries with it a risk of partisanship, and it is naïve to believe that experts or technocrats can impartially discern the ‘public interest’. Prolonged exposure to a particular agency tends to produce bias in one direction or another and perhaps an illusion of competence in handing complex regulatory issues. To be sure there are potential advantages to specialization as well; familiarity with a subject may aid in the resolution of cases. Moreover centralization of cases in one forum tends to promote predictability and uniformity in the law. Nonetheless, specialization would be an undeniable departure from the convenional understanding of the proper role of federal courts.”
1285. 1285The dichotomy between these two models corresponds, mutatis mutandi, to the observation made by Dine in the area of company law. Dine points out that company law may be seen either, in a private perspective, as an ‘enabling framework’ or, in a public one, as a ‘tool of social engineering’. I submit that the attitude to marketing practices law in Germany and in Sweden can be ordered under these two categories - the ‘enabling’ private perspective of German unfair competition law and the ‘social engineering’ public perspective - of Swedish market law. See Bernard, ‘The Future of European Economic Law in the Light of the Principle of Subsidiarity’ (1996) 33 CMLRev., 633 ff., (649 quoting Dine, ‘The Harmonisation of Company law in the European Community’ (1989) 9 YEL, 93).
1286. 1286Joerges/Brüggemeier, ‘Europäisierung des Vertrags- und Haftungsrechts’ in: Müller-Graff (ed.), Gemeinsames Privatrecht in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993), 238: “Wer deshalb dem Integrationsprozess eine eigene Bedeutung zuweist behauptet damit zugleich, dass die Logik der Privatrechtsentwicklung und die Logik der Integration zu unterscheiden seien, dass man es mit einem Spannungsverhältnis zu tun habe und weder von einem harmonischen Gleichlauf noch von einem natürlich oder normative vorgegebenen Rangverhältnis ausgehen dürfe.”
1287. 1287„Konflikte zwischen der Logik der Integration und der Logik der Privatrechtsentwicklung können weder durch eine Vorrangregel zugunsten der Integration noch durch Vorbehaltsansprüche des nationalen Rechts gelöst werden. ... Es geht bei der Vermittlung von Privatrechtsentwicklung und Integration um ein Kollisionsverhältnis, für das praktische Kompatibilitätsprinzipien und -regeln gefunden werden müssen. Weil beide Prozesse, die Privatrechtsentwicklung und die Integration offen sind, weil man weder den einen noch den anderen auf präskriptive Endmodelle festlegen kann, ist die Europäisierung des Privatrechts nur als kontinuierlicher Prozess der Vermittlung zwischen der Autonomie der Privatrechtssysteme und der integrationspolitischen Intervention vorstellbar.” Ibid., 239 f.
1288. 1288Micklitz speaks of European fair trading law praeter legem, in Micklitz et al. (2000), 337 ff.
1289. 1289See Koopmans (1991).
1290. 1290See Gerber (1994), 71 ff.
1291. 1291See Joerges (1997), 382 ff.; Joerges, ‘European Economic Law, the Nation-State and the Maastricht Treaty’ in: Dehousse, R., Europe After Maasstricht. An Ever Closer Union? (München: Law Books in Europe, 1994), 29 ff.
1292. 1292Ulmer (1932); Fikentscher (1958).
1293. 1293See Müller-Graff (1984), 209 ff.; Fikentscher, ‘Das Veihältnis von Kartellrecht und Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs im deutschen und europäischen Recht’ in: Festschrift Hallstein (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1966), 127 ff., 158 ff.
1294. 1294Müller-Graff (1984), 222 with reference to Fikentscher, Wirtschaftsrecht, Bd. 1 (München: Beck, 1983), 667.
1295. 1295See Beier (1984), 71; Müller-Graff (1984), 219. Müller-Graff refers to one sectoral provision which he considers as a specific reference to fair competition, namely Art. 60(1) ECSC Treaty referring to “unfair competitive practices” and “discriminatory practices”.
1296. 1296Now Art. 3(1) (g) with slightly amended wording.
1297. 1297Dethloff (2001), 8 ff.
1298. 1298On the jurisprudence of the ECJ rejecting such interpretation see below, Ch. 6.3
1299. 1299See the comments by the representative of the Commission Hans von der Groeben, in Ulmer (1965), VI.
1300. 1300On the dichotomy between ‘market-building’ and ‘market-correcting’ policies in the European Community, see Scharpf, ‘European Governance: Common Concerns vs. the Challenge of Diversity’ (2001), retrievable at: http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.0rg/papers/01/010701.html (8-05-2003), 4. Scharpfuses the notions of market­ building and market-correcting measures, classifying in the first group measures directed at creating a free market (negative integration and competition rules) and in the second one social policies purpoting to correct market failures such as environmental and consumer protection initiatives.
1301. 1301See Schricker, ‘Die Arbeiten zur Angleichung des Rechts des unlauterne Wettbwerbs inden Ländern der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft’ (1973) GRUR Int., 141 ff., at 144; Schricker, ‘Einleitung: Teil F’ in: Jakobs/Lindacher/Teplitzky, Handbuch des Wettbewerbs (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1994b), 454 ff., at 459.
1302. 1302Majone, Regulating Europe (London: Routledge, 1996), 1 ff.
1303. 1303Ibid., 54 ff.
1304. 1304Majone (1996), 2.
1305. 1305Commission of the Communities, 6th General report of the activities of the European Communities, 1972, Brussels - Luxembourg, 1973, p. 12, point 6, quoted after Bourgoignie (1987), 98.
1306. 1306Bourgoignie (1987), 99 ff.
1307. 1307Council Resolution, OJ 1975 C 92/1.
1308. 1308Council Resolution, OJ 1981 C 133/1.
1309. 1309In the words of Bourgoignie: “Consumer policy, thus, could serve as a useful but somewhat deceptive illustration of the self-proclaimed willingness of the Community to go further than unification of Europe’s economies and markets. This is likely to be a popular option. In addition, the promotion of consumer interests throughout the common market is obviously ‘good politics’ for the European integration process, since... it has immediate popular appeal and, thus, can be used for promoting or reviving the European ideal by giving the Community order a more ‘human face’, fostering the image of a less bureaucratic Community, one not simply focusing on complex international business affairs, but also dealing with the daily problems faced by common citizens.” Bourgoignie (1987), 115.
1310. 1310Chapter B. Protection of the Economic Interests of Consumers, Principles, in Preliminary Programme, OJ 1975 C92/6, 18 and Chapter B., Principles, in the Second Programme, OJ C 1981 133/7, 28.
1311. 1311See Second Programme of the EEC for a consumer protection and education policy, OJ 1981 C 133/1, para 42: “It is important that as far as possible the market itself should be so structured as to facilitate the adjustment of demand to price changes, primarily through increased transparency.”
1312. 1312See Case C-362/88 GB-INNO-BM [1990] ECR I-667.
1313. 1313See Henning-Bodewig (1999), 385.
1314. 1314Beier (1984), 70.
1315. 1315Dehousse (1994) AJCL, 761 ff.
1316. 1316On the concept ‘multi-level governance’ see Scharpf, ‘Regieren im europäischen Mehrebenensystem - Ansätze zu einer Theorie’ (2002) Leviathan, 65 ff.
1317. 1317Case C-26/62 Van Gend and Loos [1963] ECR 1,12.
1318. 1318Case C-6/64 Costa v. Enel [1964] ECR 585.
1319. 1319Ibid., 594 f.; cf. Case C-106/77 ECR Simmenthal [1978] 640, paras 17 and 24.
1320. 1320Hartley (1998), 9. For a review of the debate on ‘divisible sovereignty’ see Maier, L., EU, arbetsrätten och normgivningsmakten (Stockholm: Stockholms Universitet, 2000), 93 ff. with further references.
1321. 1321The doctrine is alternatively known as the doctrine of attributed powers.
1322. 1322In the words of Weiler (1999): “In the 1970s and early 1980s, the principle of enumerated powers as a constraint on Community material jurisdiction (absent Treaty revision) was substantially eroded and in practice virtually disappeared.” Ibid., 42 f.
1323. 1323Art. 308 reads: “If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate measures.”
1324. 1324Elsewhere the same author states: “My point is that die relevant interpretative communities, by choosing to opt for the wide and flexible reading of the Treaty, have transformed strict enumeration into a very flexible notion, practically emptied of material content in the Community.” Ibid, 45, fn. 8345, ft. 83
1325. 1325Weiler (1999), 58.
1326. 1326Weiler (1999), 39 ff.; Bourgoignie (1987), 117.
1327. 1327According to Bourgoignie “there were no budgetary nor administrative constraints limiting the addition of new services to the Commission machinery but, quite the contrary, incentives and even obligations to do so.” Bourgoignie (1987), 117.
1328. 1328Bourgoignie (1987), 119.
1329. 1329Bourgoignie (1987), 119.
1330. 1330Bourgoignie mentions the following organizations: Community of National Consumer Cooperative Organizations in the Common Market (1957); European Organization of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (1958); European Organization of the International Confederation of Christian Trade Unions (1959). Only one organization reportedly had consumer policy as its exclusive objective, namely the European Union of Consumer Unions (1962). Bourgoignie (1987), 122, th. 84.
1331. 1331Bourgoignie (1987), 123.
1332. 1332For a similar general explanation of the role of organized interests in the Community see Maduro, We, The Court. The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998a), 120. “Furthermore, to enhance its powers as a European government the Commission must find support beyond the Member States. Thus it makes alliances with other forces: either Community institutions such as the European Parliament and the European Court or supra-national groups and elite technocrats who support its policies and its image of independence of from national interests.”
1333. 1333See Stuyck, ‘European Consumer Law After the Treaty of Amsterdam: Consumer Policy in or Beyond the Internal Market?’ (2000) 37 CML Rev., 367 ff., 378 with further references to the Community Directives adopted under this provision. Cf. Weatherill, ‘The Evolution of European Consumer Law and Policy: From Well- Informed Consumer to Confident Consumer’ in: Micklitz (ed.), Rechtseinheit oder Rechtsvielfalt in Europa? (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996a), 423 ff.
1334. 1334Nonetheless, see Art. 100a (4) allowing for exceptions in case a Member State can demonstrate ‘major needs’ for retaining more stringent regulation. Cf. Weatherill/ Micklitz, ‘Consumer Policy in the European Community: Before and After Maastricht’ (1993) JCP, 285 ff., 295.
1335. 1335See Art. 3 (t) (ex. (s)): “a contribution to the strengthening of consumer protection”.
1336. 1336See Weatherill/Micklitz (1993), 285, 295 ff.
1337. 1337See Bourgoignie, ‘European Community Consumer Law and Policy: from Rome to Amsterdam’ (1998) CLJ,
1338. 1338ff., at 447 arguing for expanded Community powers in the field of consumer protection after Maastricht. The author also notes the confusion surrounding the issue of distinguishing between measures with common market relevance and measures with no such relevance. On the limited practical implication of the amendment, see Stuyck (2000), 380.
1339. 1339OJ 1998, L80/27.
1340. 1340Case C-192/93 El Corte Ingles [1996]ECR I-1281, para 20; cf. Comment by Stuyck (1996) 33 CMLRev., 1261.
1341. 1341Art. 153 (3)(b). See Stuyck (2000), 383 ff.
1342. 1342For a fully-fledged analysis, see Stuyck (2000), 384 ff.
1343. 1343Art. 129a(3) (new Art. 153(6)).
1344. 1344Stuyck speaks of constitutionalization of the minimum harmonisation approach. Stuyck (2000), 367 ff.
1345. 1345Case C-376/98 Germany v. European Parliament and Council (tobacco advertising)[2000] ECR 1-8419.
1346. 1346Directive 98/43/EC on the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products, OJ L213, 9 ff.
1347. 1347See Usher, ‘Comments on the Case C-376/98’ (2001) CMLRev., 1519 ff.; Byström, ‘Precisering av EGs kompetens: formulering av problem utan lösning i sikte?’ (2001) ERT, 92 ff.
1348. 1348In this sense, see Weatherill, ‘The Commission’s Option for Developing EC Consumer Protection and Contract Law: Assessing the Constitutional Basis’ (2002) EBLR, 497 ff., at 505. See Directive 2003/33/EC, OJ 2003 L 152/16.
1349. 1349On the economic concepts see Molle (1990), 11.
1350. 1350Completing the Internal Market, White Paper from the Commisson, COM (85) 310 final, 18 ff
1351. 1351See Weiler (1999), 17.'
1352. 1352If one subscribes to theories of regulatory competition, Germany has here exerted visible pressure to have its own regulative model recognized as a standard. See Héritier/Mingers/Knill/Becka (1994); Reich, ‘Competition Between Legal Orders: A New Paradigm of European Law’ (1992a) CMLRev., 861 ff.
1353. 1353Ulmer (1965), 15 ff.; Schricker (1973) GRUR Int. 1973, 141 ff.,
1354. 1354Ulmer (1965), 232 ff.
1355. 1355See Steiner, Textbook on EC Law, 4th ed (London: Blackstone, 1994), 26 ff; Weatherill/Beaumont, EU Law, 3rd ed. (London: Penguin Books, 1999), 392 ff., see Case C-14/83 Von Colson v. Land Nrthrein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891.
1356. 1356Ulmer (1965), 245.
1357. 1357Ulmer (1965), 250-256.
1358. 1358Ulmer (1965), 256 ff. Positive to this proposal, Beier (1984), 69.
1359. 1359Ulmer (1965), 258.
1360. 1360Ulmer (1965), 258.
1361. 1361Ulmer (1965), 241.
1362. 1362Ulmer (1965), 241.
1363. 1363Ulmer, ‘Die Bekämpfung des unlauteren Wettbewerbs im gemeinsamen Markt’ (1973) GRUR Int., 135 ff., at 137.
1364. 1364See Ohly (1998-99), 69 ff., at 77.
1365. 1365For a detailed analysis of English law, see Ohly (1997), 73 ff. See also Schricker (1990), 118 ff.
1366. 1366See Krämer, EEC Consumer Law (Brussels: Story Scientia, 1986).
1367. 1367See Henning-Bodewig (1999), 385.
1368. 1368Krämer (1986), 26.
1369. 1369Beier (1984), 70.
1370. 1370OJ 1978 C 70/4 ff. An even earlier draft was submitted in 1975, Doc. XO/C/94/75.
1371. 1371Draft Art. 2, third indent, ibid., 5.
1372. 1372See Krämer (1986).
1373. 1373On the reasons for the failure of these harmonization attempts, see Ohly (1998-99), 69 ff. For an in-depth analysis of the differences between the common law and the German approaches to a general clause on unfair competition, see Ohly (1997), 73 ff.
1374. 1374Council Directive 84/450/EEC concerning misleading advertising, recently amended by Directive 97/55/EC concerning comparative advertising.
1375. 1375See Select Committee, Misleading advertising, House of Lords, London (1978) quoted after Krämer (1986), 153.
1376. 1376Consumer Law Today, Vol. 7, Issue Nr. 10, 1, quoted after Ohly (1998/99), 74.
1377. 1377See Rec. 7 Directive 84/450. See Case C-373/90, Criminal proceedings against X [1992] ECR 131, para 9.
1378. 1378See Art. 1 Directive 84/450.
1379. 1379See Art. 2 Directive 84/450.
1380. 1380See Art. 4 (2) Directive 84/450.
1381. 1381See OJ 1978 C 70/4, 6.
1382. 1382OJ 1979 C 140/23, 26.
1383. 1383Schricker (1991a), 788 ff., at 791; Gamerith, ‘Neue Herausforderungen für ein europäisches Lauterkeitsrecht’ (2003) WRP, 143 ff, at 146 ff.
1384. 1384See Prechal, Directives in European Community Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 44.
1385. 1385See Weatherill/Beaumont (1999), Hartley (1998).
1386. 1386Schricker, ‘Einführung in das Recht der Werbung. Internationales und EWG Recht’ in: Schricker (ed.), Recht der Werbung in Europa, Band 1: (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996b), 85; Schricker (1994b), 456.
1387. 1387Sosnitza (1995), 208.
1388. 1388Art. 1 Directive 84/450/EEC.
1389. 1389See Krämer (1986), 161 with reference to Schricker, ‘Ein bescheidenes Pflänzchen europäischer Harmonisierung’ ZAW-Service, No. 123, 335 ff.
1390. 1390Bourgoignie (1997), 174 ff.
1391. 1391Krämer (1986), 50.
1392. 1392See Ward, Judicial Review and the Rights of Private Parties in EC Law (Oxford University Press, 2000), 158 ff.
1393. 1393Case C-329/88 Commission v Hellenic Republic [1989] ECR 4159; Case C-360/88 Commission v Kingdom of Belgium [1989] ECR 3803.
1394. 1394Schricker (1990), 118 ff.
1395. 1395Case C-14/83 Von Colson [1984] ECR 1891, para 26; Case C-106/89 Marleasing [1990] ECR I- 4135, para 8. On the minimum harmonization character of Directive 84/450/EEC see Case C-373/90 Criminal proceedings against X (Nissan) [1992] ECR I-131, para 7, below Ch. 7.1.1.1.
1396. 1396Doc. N. XI/C94/75-E and Memorandum No. XI/C/93/75-E, Nov. 1975, quoted by Spink/Petty (1998), 855.
1397. 1397This position has been criticized in legal doctrine as conflating information with advertising, the latter being a commercial, and hence biased, marketing instrument. See Bourgoignie, ‘Comparative Advertising and the Protection of Consumer Interests in Europe: Reconcile the Irreconcilable?’ (1992) European CU, 3 ff., at 4 ff. Cf. Howells/Wilhelmsson, EC Consumer Law (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), 145.
1398. 1398Draft Art. 4, OJ 1978, No. C 70, 4 ff. On the history of the Directive, see Krämer (1986) 152 ff. Cf. Rijkens/Miracle, European Regulation ofA dvertising (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1986), 101 ff.
1399. 1399Henning-Bodewig (1999), 385. Similar Ohly (1998/99), 73.
1400. 1400See Gamerith (2003), 143 ff., 146.
1401. 1401Rec. 6 Directive 84/450 includes an explicit commitment to continue with harmonisation of unfair advertising and “as far as necessary” of comparative advertising.
1402. 1402OJ 1992 C 337/136, 137.
1403. 1403OJ 1992 C 337/136, 139.
1404. 1404Spink/Petty (1998), 857.
1405. 1405See para 2.2 , Opinion of the ECOSOC, OJ 1992 C 49/35.
1406. 1406COM (94) 151 final, OJ 1994 C 136/4.
1407. 1407Spink/Petty (1998), 857.
1408. 1408Ibid.-, cf. Henning-Bodewig (1999), 394, fn. 67.
1409. 1409See Kur (1993), 436 ff, 447-48; Bourgoignie (1992), 3 ff.
1410. 1410For instance Art. 3a(l)(b) and (c) require that such advertising ‘compares goods or services’; (b): “it compares goods or services meeting the same needs or intended for the same purpose”; (c): “it objectively compares one or more material, relevant, verifiable and representative features of those goods and services, which include price” (my italics)
1411. 1411See Henning-Bodewig (1999), 391; Spence/Ohly (1999), 693.
1412. 1412BGH GRUR 1996, 983 ff„ at 984 („Preisvergleich”).
1413. 1413Henning-Bodewig (1999), 385; Ohly/Spence (1999), 693; cf. Bernitz (2002a), 11 ff., 21 and 24.
1414. 1414The text of the draft of 1991 was even stricter prohibiting comparative advertising likely to create confusion.
1415. 1415On distinguishing marks and unfair advantage, see Case C-112/99 Toshiba [2001] ECR I-7945.
1416. 1416COM (91) 147 final, Draft Art. 3a(l)(c).
1417. 1417Kur (1993), 449 ff.
1418. 1418This Directive shall not preclude Member States from retaining or adopting provisions with a view to ensuring more extensive protection with regard to misleading advertising, for consumers, persons carrying on a trade, business, craft or profession, and the general public.
1419. 1419Paragraph 1 shall not apply to comparative advertising as far as the comparison is concerned.
1420. 1420Kur (1993), 457.
1421. 1421Joerges/Brüggemeier (1993), 233 ff. See in particular at 253 concerning the Package Tour Directive: „Das Ergebnis ist ... ein Reisevertragsrecht, das die in den Mitgliedstaaten verfolgten Schutztechniken kombiniert und dadurch überbietet.“ Similar regulative drift is discussed at 254 concerning the Doorstep Selling Directive.
1422. 1422Joerges (1994), 29 ff., at 42 f.
1423. 1423Weiler (1999), at 34.
1424. 1424Similar Ohly/Spence: „Die Richtlinie ist in vielerlei Hinsicht ein schwieriges Regelwerk, unklar in ihrem Anwendungsbereich, häufig allzu deutlich das Ergebnis politischer Kompromisse und problematisch hinsichtlich ihrer mögichen Auswirkungen. Obwohl sie vielfach als Massnahme der Liberalisierung begrüsst wurde, beschränkt die Richtlinie den Bereich erlaubter vergleichende Werbung in Grossbritannien und geht hinsichtlich der Liberalisierung des deutshen Rechts nicht so weit, wie teliweise erhofft.“ Ibid., (1999), 682.
1425. 1425COM (91)147 final - SYN 343, 21 June 1991.
1426. 1426For details on the Swedish position in the course of harmonisation negotiations, see Dölling, ‘Jämförande Reklam - Sverige och EU’ (Stockholm: IFIM Series Nr. 84, 1996), 60.
1427. 1427In this sense Sack (1998a), 263, 270.
1428. 1428See Art. 4(2), first and second indent: “to order the cessation of, or to institute appropriate legal proceedings for an order for the cessation of the misleading advertising or unpermitted comparative advertising, or if the misleading advertising or unpermitted comparative advertising has not yet been published but publication is imminent, to order the prohibition of, or to institute appropriate legal proceedings for an order for the prohibition of, such publication” (my italics).
1429. 1429Cf. Henning-Bodewig: “Vor dem Hintergrund von Sinn und Zweck der Richtlinie lässt sich hieraus m. E. kein anderer Schluss ziehen lassen, als dass die Richtlinie einen nach oben und unten verbindlichen Standard setzt.“, Henning-Bodewig (1999), 386 with further references; cf. Tilmann (1999), 551.
1430. 1430See Art. 7(2) as amended by Directive 97/55/EC.
1431. 1431See Henning-Bodewig (1999), 386; Sack (1998a), 271; Tilmann, ‘Anwendungsbereich und Bindungswirkung der Richtlinie Vergleichende Werbung* (1999) GRUR, 546 ff., 550.
1432. 1432Directive 89/552/EEC, OJ 1989 L 298/23.
1433. 1433Directive 97/36/EC amending Directive 89/552/EEC, OJ 1997 L 202/60.
1434. 1434The full provision reads: Television advertising shall not cause moral or physical detriment to minors, and shall therefore comply with the following criteria for their protection: (a) it shall not directly exhort minors to buy a product or a service by exploiting their inexperience or credulity; (b) it shall not directly encourage minors to persuade their parents or others to purchase the foods or services being advertised; (c) it shall not exploit the special trust minors placie in parents, reachers or other persons; (d) it shall not unreasonably show minors in dangerous situations.
1435. 1435For the areas pertaining to fair trading, the relevant rules are listed above.
1436. 1436Cf. also Rec. 26, Preamble Directive 89/552/EEC “Whereas in order to ensure that the interests of consumers as television viewers are fully and properly protected, it is essential for television advertising to be subject to a certain number of minimum rules and standards and that the Member States must maintain the right to set more detailed or stricter rules and in certain circumstances to lay down different conditions for television broadcasters under their jurisdiction”.
1437. 1437On the concept regulatory competition, see Reich (1992a), 861; Sun/Pelkmans, ‘Regulatory competition in the Single Market’ (1995) 33 JCMS, 67 ff.; Van den Bergh, ‘Subsidiarity as an Economic Demarcation Principle and the Emergence of European Private Law’ (1998) 5 Maastricht Jorumal, 129 ff., Bernard, ‘Social Dumping and the Race to the Bottom: Some Lessons for the European Union from Delaware’ (2000) 25 ELRev., 57 ff.Bernard (2000), 57. Cf. Editorial Comments, ‘Are European Values Being Hovered Away?’ (1993) 30 CML Rev., 445.
1438. 1438A number of alternative concepts have been in vogue, such as ‘transmission state principle’ (‘sändarlandsprincipen’), or the more classical term ‘country-of-origin principle’ familiar from the Cassis de Dijon jurisprudence. Given the Court’s interpretation of the notion of jurisdiction in close connection with the broadcaster’s place of establishment, the principle would most strictly be denominated ‘the country-of- establishment principle’. See Lans, Jurisdiktion over TV sändningar i EU (Stockholm: Juristförlaget, 1996), 43.
1439. 1439Equivalent to Art. 2(2) of Directive 89/552/EEC, OJ 1989 L 298/23.
1440. 1440Cf. Arts. 2(1) and 3(2) of Directive 89/552/EEC, OJ 1989 L 298/23.
1441. 1441See Bernitz, ‘TV-reklam och räckvidden av svensk marknadsrätt’ (1997-98) JT, 479 ff., 480.
1442. 1442Cf. Rec. 16 Directive 97/36/EEC: “Whereas it is necessary to ensure the effective application of the provisions of Directive 89/552/EEC as amended by this Directive throughout the Community in order to preserve free and fair competition between firms in the same industry.”
1443. 1443See the discussion in connection with the De Agostini case, Ch. 7.1.1.3 below.
1444. 1444See below on enforcement. Cf. Henning-Bodewig, ‘Die EG Fernsehrichtlinie von 1989’ in: Schricker/Henning-Bodewig, Neuordnung des Wettbewerbsrecht (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998/1999), 81 ff., at 84.
1445. 1445On the developments before the amendment see Lans (1996).
1446. 1446Case C-222/94 Commission v. United Kingdom [1996] ECR 1-4025.
1447. 1447See now Art. 2(2) of Directive 97/36/EC.
1448. 1448Case C-33/74 Van Binsbergen [1974] ECR 1299.
1449. 1449Ibid., para 13.
1450. 1450Case C-141/91 Veronica [1993] ECR 487.
1451. 1451Case C-23/93 TV 10 [1994] ECR 1-4795.
1452. 1452On this issue see the De Agostini ruling of the ECJ discussed below. Ch. 7.1.1.3.
1453. 1453Directive 97/7/EC, OJ 1997 L 144, 4.6.1997, 19 ff.
1454. 1454Rec. 3 Directive 97/7/EC seeks to unite the consumer-related and the internal market logic: “Whereas, for consumer, cross-border distance selling could be one of the main tangible results of the completion of the internal market ...”
1455. 1455See Art.4-8 Directive 97/7/EC.
1456. 1456These provisions are mentioned as setting out rules for advertising and commercial communication in Annex
1457. 1457to the Proposal for a Directive concerning business-to-consumer commercial practices in the Internal Market, COM (2003) 356 final.
1458. 1458See Rec. 17, Directive 97/7/EC.
1459. 1459Directive 98/34/EC, OJ 1998 L 204/37 as amended by Directive 98/48/EC, OJ 1998 L 217/18.
1460. 1460Thus consulting an electronic catalogue in a shop is not an ISS since the parties are present (Annex V, 1 b); telephone and telefax services, direct marketing or consultation are not ISS, because not provided by electronic means (Annex V, 2) and television and radio broadcasting are excluded because involving point to multipoint transmission and no provision upon individual request (Annex V, 3).
1461. 1461The Court has held that although under Art. 60 of the Treaty a service was normally provided for remuneration, the Treaty did not specify the means of financing a particular services, Case C-352/85 Bond van Adverteerders [1988] ECR 2085, para 16.
1462. 1462Art. 6(d), Directive 2000/31/EC.
1463. 1463See COM (1998) 586 final, 98/0325 (COD).
1464. 1464For a critical view see Lehmann (1999), 180.
1465. 1465See Hoeren, “Vorschlag für eine Richtlinie über E-commerce’ (1999) MMR, 192 ff., at 198; Maennel, ‘Elektronischer Geschäftsverkehr ohne Grenzen - die Richtlinienvorschlag der Europäischen Kommission’ (1999) MMR, 187 ff., at 190. On the Internal Market principle, see the sub-section below.
1466. 1466See COM (1998) 586 final, 98/0325 (COD).
1467. 1467COM (1998) 586 final.
1468. 1468Ibid., 21.
1469. 1469See rules on free gifts (Case C-268/81 Oosthoek’s [1982] ECR 4575); on misleading advertising (Case C- 238/89 Pall [1990] ECR I-4827); mandatory consumer protection rules on cancellation of contract (Case C- 91/92 Faccini Dori [1994] ECR I-3325; Case C-45/96 Dietzinger [1998] ECR I-1199. On the ECJ’s jurisprudence on free movement of goods see below Ch. 6.3.
1470. 1470Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ 1978 L304/36; Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ 2001 L12/1.
1471. 1471On the autonomous interpretation of the term civil and commercial matters under the Brussels Convention and on the problems of cross-border enforcement ensuing from different institutional approaches to fair trading see Reich, ‘Rechtsprobleme grenzüberschreitender irreführender Werbung im Binnenmarkt’ (1992b) 56 RabelsZ, 444 ff., 445 ff.
1472. 1472See Ch. 7.1.2.3 below.
1473. 1473Bodewig, ‘Elektronischer Geschäftsverkehr und Unlauterer Wettbewerb’ (2000) GRUR Int., 475 ff.
1474. 1474On the different versions of the minimum harmonisation approach, see Dougan, ‘Minimum Harmonizaion and the Internal Market’ (2000) 37 CML.Rev., 853 ff.
1475. 1475Critical of such interpretation, mainly on normative grounds, Henning-Bodewig (2001), 775.
1476. 1476In this regard see Bogdan, ‘EU Direktivet om förbudsföreläggande för att skydda konsumenternas intressen’ (1998a) SvJT, 532 ff.; Bogdan, ‘Some Reflections regarding the new EU Directive on Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers’ Interests’ (1998b) CLJ, 369 ff.
1477. 1477It has been rightly pointed out in the literature that in the European context the term ‘procedural’ should not be construed narrowly. See Prechal (1995), 149, fh. 17.
1478. 1478Prechal (1995), 149.
1479. 1479Case C-130/79 Express Dairy Foods [1980] ECR 1887, para 12.
1480. 1480Ulmer (1965), 257.
1481. 1481Ulmer (1965), 258.
1482. 1482The prominent position of enforcement in the Misleading Advertising Directive has been noticed by Steiner, Enforcing EC Law (London: Blackstone, 1995), 58.
1483. 1483A similar view concerning Directive 92/28 on the advertising of medicinal products, which contains the same procedural provisions as the Misleading Advertising Directive, is expressed by Prechal (1995), 150, fh. 25.
1484. 1484Cf. Art. 4(1), third subparagraph: “It shall be for each Member State to decide which of these facilities shall be available and whether to enable the courts or administrative authorities to require prior recourse to other established means of dealing with complaints, including those referred to in Article 5.”
1485. 1485On Nordic legal cooperation, see Ch. 5.4.1.
1486. 1486Schricker (1994b), 454.
1487. 1487See the Opinion of the European Parliament on the initial Commission’s proposal, OJ C 1979 140/23, 27. The Commission’s amended proposal OJ 1979 C 194/3, at 5. Cf. Krämer (1986), 160.
1488. 1488Art. 4(3), second subparagraph.
1489. 1489Art. 4(3), second subparagraph, in fine.
1490. 1490Directive 97/7/EC on the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts, OJ 1979 L 144/19.
1491. 1491See amendment of the proposal for a Council Directive concerning misleading and unfair advertising, OJ 1979 C 194/3. Cf. Reich (1992b), 444 ff., at 449; see also Krämer (1986), 159 ff.
1492. 1492COM (93) 576.
1493. 1493Directive 93/13/EEC, OJ 1993 L 95/29.
1494. 1494Steiner (1995), 112.
1495. 1495See Micklitz, ‘Verbandsklage und die EG-Richtlinie über missbräuchliche Klausulen’ (1998a) 19 Zeitschrift för Wirtschaftsrecht, 937 ff.; Dean, ‘Unfair Contract Terms: the European Approach’ (1993) 56 MLR, 581 ff; see
1496. 1496Micklitz (1998a), 937.
1497. 1497Case C-82/96 R. v. Secretary for Trade and Industry, ex parte CA/Which, OJ 1996 C145, 3.
1498. 1498Rott (2001), 401 ff.
1499. 1499COM (92) 11 final, Annex 1, Table 3, See Dickie, ‘Consumer Confidence and the EC Directive on Distance Contracts’ (1998) 21 JCP, 217 ff., 226.
1500. 1500See Dickie (1998), 225-26.
1501. 1501Micklitz, ‘Richtlinie 97/7/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rats über den Verbraucherschutz bei Vertragsabschlüssen im Fernabsatz (Fernabsatzlinie)’ in: Grabitz/Hilf (eds.), Das Recht der Europäischen Union, Vol.4 A.3 (München: Beck, 2000). See Rott (2001), 403 with fruther references.
1502. 1502Art. 10(1) EC Treaty reads: “Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community’s tasks.”
1503. 1503Art. 4(2), subparagraph 2.
1504. 1504Rec. 14 Whereas it may be desirable to order the publication of decisions made by courts or administrative authorities or of corrective statements in order to eliminate any continuing effects of misleading advertising;
1505. 1505Schricker (1994), 454: „Als hauptsächliche Sanktionsmassnahmen schriebt die Richtlinien zwingend die Möglichkeit der Anordnung einer Einstellung der irreführenden Werbung und einer Unterlassung einer bevorstehenden irreführenden Werbung vor...“ (my italics)
1506. 1506Rec. 12, Directive 84/450/EEC.
1507. 1507See below Ch. 7.1.1.1.
1508. 1508See Ch. 6.2.3.2 below.
1509. 1509Case C-222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 1651, para 18. See Ward (2000), 71 ff. with analysis of subsequent case law. Most cases concerned Art. 6 Equal Treatment Directive and Art. 6 ECHR.
1510. 1510See Ward (2000), 30 ff.
1511. 1511“The general opinion is that there is indeed a growing influence of EC law on Dutch administrative law. This influence is of a ‘creeping’ character, brought to bear through, in particular, the case law of the Court of Justice.” Jans/de Jong ‘Between Direct Effect and Rewe/Comet: ‘Remarks on Dutch Administrative Law, Procedural Defects and the EIA Directive’ in: Ladeur (ed.), The Europeanisation of Administrative Law (Dartmouth: Ashgate, 2002).
1512. 1512See Weatherill (2000), 14. Cf. De Bùrca/Ryall, ‘The ECJ and Judicial Review of National Administrative Procedure in the Field of EIA' in: Ladeur (ed.), Europeanisation of Administrative Law (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), 145 ff., 159.
1513. 1513On the Misleading Advertising Regulation in the UK and, in particular, on the mechanism of enforcement see Schricker (1990), 118 ff.
1514. 1514Bastian, ‘Sanktionensysteme im Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs’ in: Schricker/Henning-Bodewig (eds.), Neuordnung des Wettbewerbsrecht (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998-99), 199 ff.
1515. 1515See Bastian (1998-99); Bastian, ‘Recht der Werbung in Italien’ in: Schricker (ed.), Recht der Werbung in Europa (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996c).
1516. 1516See Henning-Bodewig (1998/99), 84.
1517. 1517The first report concluded with proposal to revise the Directive, COM (95) 86 final.
1518. 1518Most recently, see the Commission’s White Paper on European Governance COM (2001) 428 final. For a critical comment see Joerges, ‘Guest Editorial: The Commission’s White Paper on governance in the EU - A Symtom of Crisis?’ (2002) 39 CMLRev., 441 ff.
1519. 1519See Maduro (1998a), 120.
1520. 1520Cf. Art. 22 and 22a in connection with Art. 2a Television Directive.
1521. 1521Art. 19 Directive 2000/31/EC.
1522. 1522Reportedly, British industry had credibly threatened to withdraw its financial support from the self-regulatory bodies in case their independence and authority would be jeopardized by increased public intervention in the field. See Kramer (1986), 160.
1523. 1523Art. 5: “This Directive does not exclude the voluntary control, which Member States may encourage, of misleading or comparative advertising by self-regulatory bodies and recourse to such bodies by the persons or organizations referred to in Art. 4, if proceedings before such bodies are in addition to the court or administrative proceedings referred to in that article.”
1524. 1524As mentioned above, a similar outcome may be observed in some areas of harmonisation of substantive rules, especially under the rule of full harmonisation. See the example of comparative advertising above.
1525. 1525Art. 18(2) Directive 2000/31/EC.
1526. 1526OJ 1998 L 166/51.
1527. 1527Micklitz, ‘Cross-border Consumer Conflicts - A French-German Experience’ (1993) 16 JCP, 411 ff.
1528. 1528See LG Achen, Verbraucher und Recht 1994, 36 with a comment by Micklitz; OLG Köln, Verbraucher und Recht 1995, 292 with a comment by Koch. Cf. Franck/Goyens, ‘L’action en cessation des organisations de consommateurs à l’épreuve du Marché Unique’ (1995) REDC, 27 ff.
1529. 1529Micklitz (1993), 411 ff. Cf. Rott (2001), 401 ff.,
1530. 1530See Bogdan (1998), 532 ff., at 533.
1531. 1531On the complexities of cross-border litigation of collective consumer interests with the associated problems of jurisdiction and applicable law, see Reich (1992b), 444 ff.
1532. 1532See now Art. 1 Brussels Regulation. See Reich (1992b), 455 ff.
1533. 1533Preamble of Directive 98/27/EC, Rec. 3. See Rott (2001), 403.
1534. 1534Preamble of Directive 98/27/EC, Rec. 4.
1535. 1535Bogdan (1998), 542.
1536. 1536See Commission Working Paper on Enforcement of European Consumer Legislation, 26 May 1998.
1537. 1537Changes to the list of national qualified entities within these six-month periods shall be published without delay. See Art. 4(3). For the most recent communication updating the list, see OJ 2003 C159/2.
1538. 1538Art. 4(2) Directive 98/27/EC.
1539. 1539See Baetge (1999), 344.
1540. 1540See Rott (2001), 401 ff.
1541. 1541Directive 84/450 (Misleading Advertising Directive); Directive 89/552/EEC (Television Directive); Directive 92/28/EEC (Directive on Advertising of Medicinal Products for Human Use); Directive 85/577/EC (Doorstep Selling Directive); Directive 2000/31/EC (Electronic Commerce Directive); 97/7/EC (Distance Selling Directive). The Commission has issued a document, clarifying which of the provisions in these Directives the Commission considers as directed at collective consumer interests. Rott (2001), 406.
1542. 1542See Rott (2001), 405.
1543. 1543Member States are of course only obliged to grant such rights to foreign ‘qualified entities.’ However, the political unpopularity of situations of ‘reverse discrimination’ in most cases prompts national lawmakers to extend the new rules to domestic entities as well. See Rott (2001).
1544. 1544See Art. 2(1)(c) Directive 98/27/EC.
1545. 1545See Baetge (1999), 346 ff.
1546. 1546On the subsidiarity of the right of action of business and consumer associations in Swedish marketing practices law, see above. This requirement has been annulled by the 1995 MFL, but remains in force for actions under 4 § Act on Contract Terms in Consumer Relations (SFS 1994:1512).
1547. 1547Art. 7 Directive 98/27/EC ‘Provisions for wider action’.
1548. 1548Rott (2001).
1549. 1549On the notions of ‘purely internal situation’ and ‘reverse discrimination’, cf. Maduro, ‘The Scope of European Remedies: The Case of Purely Internal Situations and Reverse Discrimination’ in: Kilpatrick, C./Novik, T./Skidmore, P., The Future of Remedies in Europe (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000), 117 ff., 120 ff. See also Nicolaysen, ‘Inländerdiskriminierung im Warenverkehr’ (1991) Europarechl, 95 ff.
1550. 1550See Baetge (1999), 336 with reference to OJ 1996 C 107/5.
1551. 1551See Beatge (1999), 336.
1552. 1552See the Commission statement in respect to access to justice: “Any failure or difficulty in guaranteeing access to justice to individual consumers automatically leads to failures in the enforcement of European law at national level.” Commission’s Working Paper on Enforcement of European Consumer Legislation, 26 May 1998.
1553. 1553The literature on the subject is abundant. See among others Hauschka, ‘Lauterkeitsrecht und Verbraucherschutz zwischen nationalem Regelungsanspruch und der Rechtsprechung des EuGH’ (1990) ZVergl.RW, 166; Steindorff, ‘Unlauterer Wettbewerb im System des EG-Rechts’ (1993) WRP, 214 ff.; Joliet,
1554. 1554See Case C-6/81 Beele [1982] ECR 707 ff; Case C-58/80 Dansk Supermarked [1981] ECR 181, ff. See Beier, ‘Industrial Property and the Free Movement of Goods in the Internal European Market’, (1990) IIC, 131 ff.; Rose, ‘Passing-off, Unfair Competition and Community Law’ (1990) EIPR, 123 ff.
1555. 1555Beier (1990) IIC, 131 ff, 145.
1556. 1556Commission Directive 70/50/EEC, OJ L 13, 29-31. With this Directive the Commission sought to provide guidance as to the measures to be abolished until the end of the transitional period.
1557. 1557Cf. Marenco, ‘Pour une interprétation traditionelle de la notion de mesure d'effet équivalent à une restriction quantitative’ (1984) CDE, 291 ff, at 325 ff.
1558. 1558Furthermore, to fall under the scope of Art. 30 EC Treaty, the enforcement organs had to make sure that “the restrictive effect of such measures on the free movement of goods exceeds the effects intrinsic to trading rules.” This was the case in particular where: “the restrictive effects on the free movement of goods are out of proportion to their purpose or where the same objective can be achieved by other means which are less of a hindrance to trade.” See Art. 3 (1) and (2) Directive 70/50/EEC. See further Weatherill/Beaumont (1999), 565 ff.
1559. 1559Case C-8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837. On the Dassonville judgment and its consequences see Gormley, ‘Actually or Potentially, Directly or Indirectly? Obstacles to the Free Movement of Goods’ (1989) Yearbook of European Law, 196 ff.
1560. 1560In the literature and especially in ordo-liberal accounts, this approach has been conceptualised as constitionalising economic freedom. Economic freedom was arguably recognized as a higher-order constitutional value in the Community legal order, taking precedence over national regulatory policies. For a presentation of these interpretations and critical anlaysis, see Joerges (1994), 37 ff.; Maduro (1998a), 35 ff.
1561. 1561Case C-120/78 Rewe-Zentrale Ac. V. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649.
1562. 1562See Weiler (1999), 39 ff.; Pinder, ‘The Single Market: A Step Towards European Union’ in: Lodge, The European Community and the Challenge of the Future (London: Pinter Publishers, 1989), 94 ff., 97.
1563. 1563Case C-120/78 [1979] ECR 649, para 14.
1564. 1564See Weatherill/Beaumont (1999), 569.
1565. 1565Completing the Internal Market, White Paper from the Commisson, COM (85) 310 final, 18 ff. See Pinder (1989), 97; Pelkmans, The New Approach to Technical Harmonization and Standardization (1987) 25 JCMS,
1566. 1566ff. According to Maduro the programmatic importance attached to the Cassis de Dijon judgement was not intended or foreseen by the Court. See Maduro (1998a), 33.
1567. 1567Case C-152/78 Commission v French Republic [1980] ECR 2299 ff.
1568. 1568It suffices to note that following the scheme advertising of cognac was allowed whereas that of whisky - prohibited.
1569. 1569Ibid., para 11.
1570. 1570Case C-177/83 Kohl v Ringelhan & Rennett (r+r) [1984] ECR 3651, para 15.
1571. 1571“Even though a provision of national legislation on unfair competition applies without distinction to the marketing of domestic and imported goods it cannot fulfil the condition [of non-discrimination against imported goods] if it is interpreted in such a way that it becomes possible to prohibit the use of a distinctive symbol for the sole reason that the public may be mislead as to the domestic of foreign origin of the goods.” Ibid. See the critical comments of Rose (1990), 123 ff., at 125, who points that the case rather concerned possible confusion as to the connection with a particular manufacturer.
1572. 1572On discriminatory rules related to fair trading see further C-113/80 Commission v. Ireland (Irish Souvenirs Case) [1981] ECR 1625, concerning mandatory rules on indication of country of origin.
1573. 1573Case C-268/81 Oosthoek [1982] ECR 4575. See Greaves (1998), 305 ff., 309.
1574. 1574For instance by printing two different sets of advertising materials, see Case C-268/81 Oosthoek [1982] ECR 4575 ff, at 4577.
1575. 1575Ibid, para 15.
1576. 1576Case C-382/87 Buet v. Ministère public [1989] ECR 1235.
1577. 1577Case C-362/88 GB-INNO-BM v Confederation du commerce luxembourgeois ASBL [1990] ECR I-667.
1578. 1578Ibid., para 14 of the AG’s Opinion.
1579. 1579OJ 1975 C 92/1; OJ 1986 C 167/1. See Case C-362/88 GB-INNO [1990] ECR I-667, para 14-16 of the judgment.
1580. 1580Case C-362/88 GB-INNO [1990] ECR I-667, para 8.
1581. 1581Ibid., para 18.
1582. 1582See, for instance, Case C-155/80 Oebel [1981] 1993 on legislation on night-work in bakeries and Case C- 145/88 Torfaen Borogh Council [1989] ECR 3851 and Case C-169/91 Stoke-on-Trent [1992] ECR I-2361 on Sunday trading. See the emphasis on the cross-frontier element in AG Lenz, Case C-362/88 GB-INNO [1990] ECR I-667, para 15.
1583. 1583Joerges (1997), 402.
1584. 1584Case C-126/91 Yves Rocher [1993] ECR I-2361.
1585. 1585Other cases of relevance for fair trading law are: Case C-241/89 SARPP [1990] ECR I 4695; Case C-238/89 Pall [1990] ECR I-4827, para 13.
1586. 1586Joint Cases C-1/90 and 176/90 Aragonesa de Publicidad Exterior [1991] ECR I-4151, para 11.
1587. 1587Case C-152/78 Commission v French Republic [1980] ECR 2299 ff.
1588. 1588Joint Cases C-1/90 and 176/90 Aragonesa de Publicidad Exterior [1991] ECR I-4151, para 17.
1589. 1589Joined Cases C-267 & 268/91 Keck and Mithouard[1993] ECR I-6097. The commentaries on Keck in legal doctrine are legion. See, among others, Reich, ‘The ‘November Revolution’ of the European Court of Justice: Keck, Meng and Audi Revisited’ (1993) 31 CMLRev., 459 ff.; Maduro, ‘Keck: The End? The Beginning of the End? Or Just the End of the Beginning?’ (1994) 1 Irish Journal of European Law, 30 ff.; Weatherill, ‘After Keck: Some Thoughts on How to Clarify the Clarification’ (1996) CMLRev., 885 ff.; Heermann, P., ‘Artikel 30 EGV im Lichte der „Keck“-Rechtsprechung: Anerkennung sonstiger Verkaufsmodalitäten und Einführung eines einheitlichen Rechtfertigungstatbestands?’ (1999) GRUR Int., 578 ff.
1590. 1590Joined Cases C-267 & 268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR 1-6097, para 16.
1591. 1591Ibid., para 15.
1592. 1592Ibid., para 14.
1593. 1593See Reich (1994).
1594. 1594Reich (1994), 465 ff. The test followed by the Court had been elaborated and advocated earlier by a member of its legal service. See White, ‘In Search of the Limits to Article 30 of the EEC Treaty’ (1989) 26 CMLRev.,
1595. 1595ff.
1596. 1596Weatherill (1996b), 885.
1597. 1597See Reich (1994), 470 ff.; Weatherill (1996b) 885 ff; Maduro (1998a), 83 ff.
1598. 1598Reich (1994), 471.
1599. 1599Case C-292/92 Hünermund [1993] I-6787, Opinion of AG Tesauro.
1600. 1600Ibid., para 11.
1601. 1601Ibid., para 22.
1602. 1602Weatherill (1996), 897.
1603. 1603Reich (1994), 487.
1604. 1604Case C-315/92 Clinique [1994] ECR I-317 ff. The case involved interpretation of the provisions on deceptive advertising in Directive 76/768/EEC of 27 July 1976 and will be discussed in more detail below, Ch. 7.2.1.
1605. 1605Case C-470/93 Mars [1995] I-1923. See also below Ch. 7.2.1.
1606. 1606Case C- 368/85 Familiapress [1997] ECR I-3689. See Greaves (1998), 310; see Maduro, ‘The Saga of Article
1607. 1607EC Treaty: To Be Continued’ (1998b) 5 Maastricht Journal, 298 ff.
1608. 1608Case C-368/85 Familiapress [1997] ECR I-3689, para 11.
1609. 1609Ibid., para 11-12.
1610. 1610The rationale behind the restriction was to channel adverts to the press and thus promote this sector.
1611. 1611Case C-412/93 Leclerc-Siplec [1995] ECR I-179. What appears specific of Lecler-Siplec is that the advertising restriction at issue affected a whole distribution sector and not of a specific product. Therefore its impact on the market access of specific products was not obvious. See Woodridge, ‘Article 30 and TV Advertising; the ECJ Judgment in Leclerc-Siplec’ (1996) EBLR, 3 ff.
1612. 1612Joint Cases C-34/95 & 35/95 De Agostini & TV Shop [1997] ECR I-384; Case C-405/98 Gourmet [2001] ECR I-1795.
1613. 1613On the question of fairness of competition as a principle of primary Community law, see also Beier (1985), 139.
1614. 1614Case C-113/80 Commission v. Ireland (Irish Souvenirs Case) [1981] ECR 1625; cf. Case C-12/74 Commission v. Germany (Sekt/Weinbrand) [1975]ECR 181. See Oliver (1996), 237-243. For a critical view see Beier (1990), 131 ff., at 145.
1615. 1615Case C-177/83 Kohl v. Ringelhan & Rennett [1984] ECR 3651, para 19.
1616. 1616See Case C-6/81 Beele [1982] ECR 707, para 9.
1617. 1617Müller-Graff (1984), 220.
1618. 1618See in this sense Maduro (1998a), 51.
1619. 1619See Maduro (1998b), 306 ff.; cf. Case C-405/98 Gourmet [2001] ECR I-1795.
1620. 1620See Dougan (2000), at 864 ff.
1621. 1621Bernard (1996), 633 ff, at 646-7.
1622. 1622Slot, ‘Harmonisation’ (1996) 21 EL Rev., 378 ff, at 385.
1623. 1623Buet, Case 382/87 [1989] ECR 1235; SARPP, Case 241/89 [1990] ECR I-4695. After Keck, Case C-39/96 Aher-Waggon [1998] ECR 1-4473.
1624. 1624Oliver (1996), 376 ff.; Stuyck (2000), 367; Dougan (2000), 870 ff.
1625. 1625Case C-169/89 Gourmetterie Van den Burg [1990] ECR I-2143; Case C-1/96 R v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Compassion in World Fanning (CIWF) [1998] ECR I-1251.
1626. 1626Case C-155/73 Sacchi [1974] ECR 409.
1627. 1627Case C-352/85 Bond van Adverteerders [1988] ECR 2085.
1628. 1628Case C-52/79 Procureur du Roi v. Debauve [1980] ECR 33.
1629. 1629See Hatzopolous, ‘Recent Developments of the Case Law of the ECJ in the Field of Services’ 37 (2000) 43 ff.
1630. 1630See Joint Cases C-34/95 & 35/95 De Agostini & TV Shop [1997] ECR I-3843; Case C-405/98 Gourmet [2001] ECR 1-1795.
1631. 1631See Joint Cases C-34/95 & 35/95 De Agostini & TV Shop [1997] ECR I-3843.
1632. 1632See Case C-405/98 Gourmet [2001] ECR 1-1795.
1633. 1633Hatzopoulos (2000), 58.
1634. 1634See Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments [1995] ECR I-1141.
1635. 1635See also the ruling in Schindler & Schindler, Case C-275/92 [1994] ECR I-1039, where the Court found a prohibition on lotteries to be restrictive for intra-Community trade, but recognized the protection of the freedom of the press as a sufficient public interest. A more peculiar case in this group is the case on abortion publicity C-159/90 SPUC v. Grogan [1991] ECR I-4675. A private organisation, brought legal proceeding to prevent student unions in Ireland from publicizing the addresses of British abortion clinics. The students argued that abortion was a service within the terms of Art. 49 (ex 59) and that Community law therefore prohibited Ireland from placing restrictions on the right of Irish residents to have abortions in another Member States. The Court accepted that abortion should be regarded as a service despite objections on the part of SPUC but finally held that the students could not benefit from this right because they were not acting on behalf of the abortion clinics. See Hartley (1998), 136-7. For criticism of this judgment see Phelan, ‘Right to Life of the Unborn v. Promotion of Trade in Services: the ECJ and the Normative Shaping of the European Union’ (1992) MLR, 670 ff., at 674.
1636. 1636See Hatzopolous (2000), 68.
1637. 1637See Maduro (1998a), 99 ff.
1638. 1638See Maduro (1998a), 3 ff
1639. 1639On developments in the Court’s case law after Keck see Weatherill, S., ‘Recent Case Law Concerning the Free Movement of Goods: Mapping the Frontier of Market Deregulation’ (1999) 36 CMLRev., 51 ff.
1640. 1640Expressly in this sense ith a detailed analysis of the ECJ’s jurisprudence, see Maduro (1998a).
1641. 1641See Maduro (1998a), 3, 150 ff.
1642. 1642INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTATION TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: Germany AND
1643. 1643Knill speaks of changes in opportunity structure, see Knill (2001), 215.
1644. 1644This is the so-called Stockholm Convention between Austria, Denmark, Great Britain, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland. On EFTA and Sweden’s ‘long way’ to EU membership see Bernitz/Kjellgren, Europarättens grunder (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1999), 11 ff.
1645. 1645The Treaty on the EEA was signed on 2 May 1992 and entered into force at the beginning of 1993, at the same time as the completion of the Internal Market was announced.
1646. 1646On the EEA, see Bernitz/Kjellgren (1999), 164 ff. On the effect of the EEA Agreement on consumer protection in Sweden see Eklund, P. ‘The Effect of the EEA Agreement on Consumer Protection Interests in Sweden’ (1994) JCP, 123 ff.
1647. 1647Ibid., 166.
1648. 1648See Bernitz/Kjellgren (1999), 21 ff.
1649. 1649SOU 1992:49.
1650. 1650Art. 7(1) Directive 84/450.
1651. 1651On Germany see Schricker (1991a), 788 ff., 790. On Sweden see SOU 1992:49.
1652. 1652A similar attitude was adopted by the governments of Denmark, France and the Netherlands. In contrast, Spain, United Kingdom and Greece passed statutory amendments in close approximation to the Directive, Schricker (1990), 114 ff.; Schricker (1991a), 792.
1653. 1653Schricker (1981), 537 ff.
1654. 1654Schricker (1981), 542; Beier (1985), 161.
1655. 1655„Anknüpfen sollte man dabei nicht an den letzten, fast gänzlich in das Fahrwasser des Verbracuherschutzes abgedrifteten Entwurf, sondern - und hier sehen Sie mich nach, wenn ich pro domo spreche - an die rechtsvergleichend fundierten, zurückhaltenden, sorgfältig abgewogenen Vorschläge Ulmers zur Gesamtharmonizierung des Wettbewerbsrechts der Gemeinschaft.“ Beier (1984), 71.
1656. 1656Keilholz, K., ‘Die misslungene Harmonisierung des Verbots der irreführenden Werbung in der EG und ihre Konsequenzen für die deutsche Rechtsprechung’ (1987) GRUR, 390 ff, 392 ff.
1657. 1657Prop. 1992:49, 39.
1658. 1658SOU 1992:49, 39 with reference to Danelius, Mänskliga rättigheter, 4th ed. (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1989), 71.
1659. 1659SOU 1992:49, 17.
1660. 1660SOU 1992:49, 21 ff.
1661. 1661See Art. 4(2), second indent of Directive 84/450.
1662. 1662SOU 1992:49, 44.
1663. 1663See Art.4(3), third indent, Directive 84/450.
1664. 1664TF 7:6 and Freedom of Expression Act (YGL) 7:5.
1665. 1665See “Member States may confer...” Art. 4(2) second indent.
1666. 1666SOU 1992:49, 45.
1667. 1667For analysis of this act see Ch. 7.3.2 below.
1668. 1668Bernitz (1997), 23.
1669. 1669Bernitz (1997), 23.
1670. 1670See Svensson/Stenlund/Brink/Ström (1996), 582.
1671. 1671Keilholz (1987), 391. Schricker (1990), 120 with reference to a statement of the Federal Minister of Justice.
1672. 1672This interpretation was supported by Schricker (1991), 790; Möllering, ‘Das Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs in Europa: Eine neue Dimension’ (1990) WRP, 1 ff., 9 ff.; Meyer ‘Das Verbraucherleitbild des Europäischen Gerichtshofs - Abkehr vom „fluchtigen Verbraucher“’ (1993) WRP, 215 ff., at 217; Spätgens, ‘Wandel der deutschen Rechtsprechung?’ in: ZAW,Irreföhrende Werbung in Europa. Masstäbe und Perspektiven (Bonn: 1990). 71 ff., 77) as quoted in Köhler, ‘Irreführungsrichtlinie und deutsches Wettbewerbsrecht’ (1994) GRUR Int., 396 ff., 397.
1673. 1673See reference in Keilholz (1987), Tilmann, ‘Irreführende Werbung in Europa - Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Rechtsentwicklung’ (1990) GRUR, 87 ff.
1674. 1674Tonner (1987), 1987, 1922 ff. The nature of the requirement on reversed burden of proof, however, is uncertain. Tonner seems to interpret it as a mandatory requirement to the implementing Member States.
1675. 1675Schricker (1991a), at 793.
1676. 1676Schricker (1991a), 793.
1677. 1677Schricker, ibid.
1678. 1678See Keilholz (1987), 390 ff.; Schwanhäuser (1988), 180 ff.
1679. 1679„Verstärkte subjective Anforderungen an die Irreführung könnten manche vielleicht mehrdeutige, aber unschädliche Behauptungen durch die Maschen des Gesetzes lassen und würden uns mehr Spielraum geben, um die Spreu vom Weizen zu sondern.“ Schwanhäuser (1988) 180 ff., 184.
1680. 1680„Es ist bei weitem früh, eine ca 80 Jahre alte, grossenteils bewährte und vor allen Dingen sehr differenzierte Rechtsprechung mit groben Schlägen von den gesicherten Geleisen zu holen. Es wird sich um einen langwierigen Prozess handeln. Die Darlegungen sollten allein dem ewig jungen, alten Ziel dienen, erlebte wettbewerbsrechtliche Erfahrung unter den Herausforderungen der europäischen Harmonisierung zu überdenken.“ Schwanhäuser (1988), 184.
1681. 1681See Keilholz (1987), 392. „Zunächts einmal muss zur Kenntnis genommen werden, dass auch diese Richtlinie Harmonisierung bewirkt. Auf die Dauer wird auch sie durch das, was sie bestimmt hat und das, was sie offengelassen hat, zu einer EG-einheitlichen Behandlung der irreführenden Werbung fuhren.“
1682. 1682The reference is to the so-called Nussbaum-doctrine requiring application of German unfair competition law to competitive acts between German enterprises, even when the competition takes place on foreign markets. On the origins of the doctrine in the jurisprudence of the RG and its subsequent evolution see Keilholz (1987), 392 ff. On German private international law of unfair competition see Joerges (1972); Schricker (1994b), 371.
1683. 1683Everling, ‘Zur Bedeutung der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofes für die Werbung in Europa’ in: ZAW (ed.), Irreführende Werbung in Europa - Maßstäbe und Perspektiven (Bonn, 1990), 43 ff.; Sympathetically, Köhler (1994), 396, 399 ff.; Schricker (1994a), 586, 592, fn. 69.
1684. 1684Sosnitza (1995), 208. The author is, however, aware of the difficulties to sustain such an interpretation.
1685. 1685At the same time, it is difficult to reconcile Everling’s interpretation with the clear language of Art. 7(1) Directive 84/450.
1686. 1686„Die bisherige nationale Rechtsprechung mit ihrem kaum übersehbaren Präzedenzfällen wird dadurch überlargert und muss neu durchdacht werden.“ Everling (1990), 51 ff.
1687. 1687ECJ C-238/89 Pall [1990] ECR I-4827 ff., para 22.
1688. 1688Ibid., para 22.
1689. 1689Case C-373/90 Criminal proceedings against X (Nissan) [1992] ECR I-131.
1690. 1690Loi No. 73-1193 of 27 December 1973 on the Orientation of Business and Crafts. Art. 44 of this law prohibits untruthful and unlawful advertising.
1691. 1691Case C-373/90 Nissan [1992] ECR I-131, para 14.
1692. 1692Case C-373/90 Nissan [1992] ECR I-131, para 19.
1693. 1693See Steiner (1994), 37 ff.
1694. 1694Case C-373/90 Nissan [1992] ECR I-131, Opinion of the AG Tesauro, para 2.
1695. 1695Case C-373/90 Nissan [1992] ECR I-131.
1696. 1696Certify in particular qualifications like: “I will only say”, “in the present case”, “in any case”.
1697. 1697Case C-373/90 Nissan [1992] ECR I-131.
1698. 1698On the discussion in German legal doctrine.
1699. 1699In a similar sense Beater (2000a), 77 ff.; Beater, ‘Zum Verhältnis von europäischem und nationalem Wettbewerbsrecht’ (2000b) GRUR Int., 963 ff.
1700. 1700Everling, Die Einwirkung der Grundfreiheiten des EWG- Vertrages auf das Werberecht der Mitgliedstaaten, Referat im Rahmen der Tagung ‘Werbung in Europa’ (Bonn, 1992). Similar view by Sosnitza (1995), 206 and Köhler (1994), 396, 399 ff. The latter, however, introduces corrections to this view in the light of the subsequent Clinique ruling of the ECJ.
1701. 1701Köhler (1994), 396, 399 ff.
1702. 1702Art. 5 EC Treaty as interpereted by the ECJ in Marleasing, von Colson and Kammann etc. See Sosnitza (1995), 206.
1703. 1703Deutsch, ‘Der Einfluß des europäischen Rechts auf den Irreführungstatbestand des § 3 UWG’ (1996) GRUR,
1704. 1704ff.; Heermann, ‘Auswirkungen der Europäischen Rechtsentwicklung auf das deutsche Wettbewerbsrecht’ (1993) WRP, 578 ff. Kisseler, ‘Das deutsche Wettbewerbsrecht im Binnenmarkt’ (1994) WRP, 1 ff., 3 ff.
1705. 1705See in particular Kisseler (1994), 2.
1706. 1706Deutsch (1996), 541 ff., at 544 ff.
1707. 1707A similar reading of the Nissan judgment is suggested by AG Gulmann in his opinion in Case C-315/92 Clinique [1994] ECR I-317 ff., fn., 6. Against this understanding one may wonder why a national court would submit a question lacking relevance for the interpetation of domestic law.
1708. 1708On the concept of ‘legal irritants’ see Teubner (2000).
1709. 1709Case C-315/92 Clinique [1994] ECR I-317, Opinion of AG Gulmann, para 12.
1710. 1710Case C- 315/92 Clinique ECR [1994] I-317 ff., para 10, judgment. The Court furthermore held that even a directive providing for exhaustive harmonisation of national rules, such as the Directive on the packaging and labelling of consmetic products, should be interpreted n the light of the Treaty rules on the free movement of goods. Ibid., para 11-12.
1711. 1711Case C-470/93 Mars [1995] ECR I-1923, Opinion of AG Leger, para 58.
1712. 1712See Beater (2000a), 88.
1713. 1713BR-Drs. 459/91, Beschluss des Bundesrats, 5.
1714. 1714Spink/Petty (1998), 854 ff.
1715. 1715BGH GRUR Int. 1998, 891 („Testpreis-Angebot“); BGH GRUR Int. 1999, 453 („Vergleichen Sie“); BGH GRUR Int. 1999, 69 („Preisvergleichsliste“).
1716. 1716Tilmann (1999), 546.
1717. 1717See Sack, ‘Die Berücksichtigung der Richtlinie 97/55/EG über irreführende und vergleichende Werbung bei der Anwendung der §§ 1 und 3 UWG' (1998b) WRP, 241 ff.
1718. 1718BT-Drs. 14/2959, 6 with reference to Commission v. Germany Case C-361/88 [1991] I-2567.
1719. 1719Henning-Bodewig (1999), 394; Ohly/Spence (1999), 696
1720. 1720Cf. BR-Drs. 459/91; BT-Drs. 14/2959 Gesetzesentwurf der Bundesregierung.
1721. 1721Köhler/Piper (2002), 875.
1722. 1722Thus Henning-Bodewig directs attention at the dissonance between the language of the Directive and the traditional prohibitive approach in UWG and proposes a substantial revision of the UWG beyond a literal transposition of the text of the Directive, Henning-Bodewig (1999), 394.
1723. 1723In this sense Bastian (2000),151 ff., 159.
1724. 1724BT-Drs. 14/2959, 6.
1725. 1725On Gut Springenheide and Estée Lauder, see below Ch. 7.2.1.
1726. 1726In Tilmann (1997), 790, 796; Tilmann (1999), 550; Henning-Bodewig (1999), 386; Sack (1998b), 242; Sack (1998a), 271; more hesitant Ohly/Spence (1999), 689-90; Bastian (2000),151 ff., 161.
1727. 1727Art. 7(1) as amended by Directive 97/55/EC.
1728. 1728This is debatable. In my view the reference to the first parapraph of Art. 7 is to the principle of minimum harmonisation as such, and not to its specific application to misleading advertising. German commentators preferred the second inteipetation, despite that such a reading could not explain the reference to Art. 7(1) in Art. 3a(l)(a).
1729. 1729See Henning-Bodewig (1999), 385 ff.; Ohly/Spence (1999), Sack (1998b), 242.
1730. 1730Art. 3(l)(a), Directive 84/450 as amended by Directive EC/97/55.
1731. 1731Tilmann (1999), 550.
1732. 1732Tilmann (1999), 550; Henning-Bodewig (1999), 385 ff.
1733. 1733See Dölling (1996), 61.
1734. 1734Doc. SN/281/95. Quoted after Drs. 14/2959, 7.
1735. 1735Drs. 14/2959, 7.
1736. 1736See, however, the recent interpretation by the ECJ in Pippig this section, below.
1737. 1737See Ch. 6.2.2.2.
1738. 1738See Henning-Bodewig (1999), 391. Henning-Bodewig gives the example of a ‘Pepsi-Cola’ advert, where an archeologist in the distant future ‘excavates’ a ‘Coca-Cola’ bottle and wonders what this strange object had been used for. The competitor in this advert is clearly identified, so the advertising should arguably be classified as comparative under the Directive. The comparison, however, is not of objective features but of such elusive traits like potential to survive in competition. Should it be prohibited for failure to comply with Art. 3a(l)(b).
1739. 1739See Tilmann (1999), Henning-Bodewig (1999), 385 ff.; Ohly/Spence (1999).
1740. 1740See Henning-Bodewig (1999), 385 ff.
1741. 1741In this sense Köhler/Piper (2002), 866 ff.
1742. 1742Tilmann (1999), 546. § 14 UWG thus is viewed as exempted from the scope of the Directive.
1743. 1743Henning-Bodewig considers advertisings of the sort “Only Revlon has more colours” for leather furniture and “Our Yoghurt is the Rolls Royce of yoghurts” to fall outside the scope of the Directive due to lack of competitive relationship. Henning-Bodewig (1999), 392. Of different opinion apparently Spink/Petty (1998), 855, at 862.
1744. 1744This interpretation is supported by the history of the Directive. In its opinion on the 1991 Commission proposal for a Directive, the European Parliament proposed a new condition of permissibility, namely that comparative advertising “does not extend to the competitor’s person or circumstances.” OJ C 337/140. This provision, somewhat revised, was incorporated in the amended proposal by the Commission reading: “does not refer to the personality or personal situation of a competitor.” Neither of these proposals, however, was included in the final text of the Directive. Instead the term “circumstances” is inserted in the prohibition against discrediting or denigrating comparative advertising. In the German version of the Directive “circumstances” is translated as “Verhältnisse” (i.e. “relations”).
1745. 1745BGH GRUR 1996, 983 (“Preisvergleich”), 983 ff.
1746. 1746BGH GRUR 1996, 983 (“Preisvergleich”), 983 ff., at 984
1747. 1747BGH GRUR 1996, 983 (“Preisvergleich”), 983 ff, at 984-85.
1748. 1748BGH GRUR Int. 1998, 891(“Testpreis-Angebot”).
1749. 1749BGH GRUR Int. 1999, 69 („Preisvergleichsliste II”); BGH GRUR Int. 1999, 453 („Vergleichen Sie“).
1750. 1750See Ch. 5.5.1.1 above
1751. 1751See Ohly/Spence (1999); Henning-Boweig (1999) .
1752. 1752Bastian (2000), 160.
1753. 1753See BVerfG WRP 2001, 1160 (“Therapäutische Äquivalenz”)
1754. 1754See BVerfGE 102, 347 („Benetton-Werbung“)
1755. 1755BVerfG WRP 2001, 1162.
1756. 1756Ibid., 1163.
1757. 1757Ibid., 1162.
1758. 1758Jesper Alwall, Legal Adviser in the Consumer Unit of the Ministry of Public Administration (Civildepartementet), Promemoria: Ang. Förslag till direktiv om jämförande reklam, 1995-12-12, quoted after Dölling (1996), 60 (my translation).
1759. 1759Bernitz (2002a), 11 ff., 16.
1760. 1760Howells/Wilhelmsson (1997), 145.
1761. 1761Dölling (1996), 60-61; Bernitz (2002a), 19.
1762. 1762Bernitz (2002a), 25, 27 ff.
1763. 1763In this sense Bernitz (2002a), at 21, 24, 25
1764. 1764See on the new MFL below.
1765. 1765See Council on Legislation, prop. 1999/2000:40, 51.
1766. 1766See MD 2002:20 (“Champagne”). See also MD 2003:16 (“L 0 Smith”) with explicit reference to the Directive and to the Toshiba ruling of the ECJ seeking to find argument for a broad prohibition of comparative advertising.
1767. 1767See MD 2002:20 (“Champagne”)
1768. 1768Eventually the Court proceeded to try the case under the doctrine of goodwill exploitation (renommésnyltning) and found the marketing to be in conflict with the general clause on good marketing practice on the basis of this doctrine.
1769. 1769See Nordell, Marknadsrättens goodwillskydd (Stockholm, Media Mercur, 2003a), 83; Nordell, ‘Champagnesmak! Kommentar till MD 2002:20’ (2003b) NIR, 94 ff.
1770. 1770Case C-112/99 Toshiba [2001] ECR I-7945.
1771. 1771“Is advertising by a supplier of spare parts and consumable items for an equipment manufacturer’s product to be regarded as comparative advertising within the meaning of Art. 2a of the Directive if the advertising indicates the manufacturer’s product numbers (OEM numbers) for the relevant original parts and consumable items for reference purposes in order to identify the supplier’s products?”
1772. 1772Case C-112/99 Toshiba [2001] ECR I-7945, para 22.
1773. 1773Ibid., para 23 ff.
1774. 1774Ibid., para 26.
1775. 1775Ibid., para 31.
1776. 1776Ibid., para 33.
1777. 1777Directive 89/104/EEC, OJ 1989 L 40/1.
1778. 1778Ibid., para 36 f.
1779. 1779Case C-44/01 Pippig Augenoptik, judgment of the Court of 8 April 2003, nyr.
1780. 1780“Faced with the apparent textual contradiction, those provisions [of Arts. 3a(l)(a) and 7(2)] must be interpreted in such a way as to take account of the objectives of Direcive 84/450 and in the light of the case-law of the Court accordnng to which the conditions required of comparative advertising must be interpreted in the sense most favourable to it.” Ibid., para 42.
1781. 1781Directive 89/552/EEC, OJ 1989 L 298/23 as amended by Directive 97/36/EC, OJ 1997 L202/61.
1782. 1782See the semi-official title of the Directive ‘Television Without Frontiers.’
1783. 1783On the doctrine of * Vorsprung durch Rechtsbruch’ in German unfair competition law, and on lagstridighetsprincipen ' in Swedish marketing practices law, see Ch. 5.5.1.1 and Ch. 5.5.2.4.
1784. 1784Staatsvertrag über den Rundfunk im vereinten Deutschland of 31.8.1991 (RfStV, most recently amended GVBl. I 2002 Land Hessen, 779).
1785. 1785See Eisenhardt, ‘Werbung gegenüber Kinder’ (1997) WRP, 283 ff., at 287; Engels, ‘Wettbewerbsrechtliche Grenzen der Fernsehewerbung für Kinder’ (1997) WRP, 6 ff.
1786. 1786Gemeinsame Richtlinien der Landesmedienanstalten für die Werbung, zur Durchführung der Trennung von Werbung und Programm und für das Sponsoring im Fernsehen, 10.2.2000.
1787. 1787Engel gives television broadcasting as a typical area of German law, building on ‘regulation through organization and procedure’. See Engel, ‘Regulierung durch Organisation und Verfahren’ in: Immenga/Möschel/Reuter, Festschrift för Mestmäcker (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996), 119.
1788. 1788§ 6(1) RfStV, see Engels (1997), 7.
1789. 1789Engels (1997), 15; Eisenhardt (1997), 293.
1790. 1790See Engels (1997), 15; Eisenhardt (1997), 293.
1791. 1791Channel 1 was launched in 1956 and Channel 2 - in 1969.
1792. 1792See prop. 1995/06:160, 41-42; 84. Cf. Kallersand, TV-reklam riktad till barn - regler och attityder (Stockholm: IFIM series. Nr. 96, 1998), 8 ff.
1793. 1793SOU 1973:10. See Levin, Satellitreklam och konsumentskydd (Stockholm: Nordstedts, 1987b).
1794. 1794This meant that the programmes had to comply with the requirements of ‘geographic justice’, ‘editorial independence’, and ‘diversity and balance’ and provide a varied programme content of high quality.
1795. 1795Prop. 1990/91:149. The rights and obligations of TV4 are determined by agreement between the company and the Swedish state. In return for the right to broadcast commercial advertising TV4 pays concession fees to the state.
1796. 1796Prop. 1995/96:160, 106; SOU 1994:105.
1797. 1797SOU 1992:49, 87.
1798. 1798Ibid.
1799. 1799Radiolag (SFS 1966:755), amended by SFS 1991:1066.
1800. 180011 § RL (SFS 1966:755) as amended by SFS 1991:1066. See prop. 1990/91:149. Cf. prop. 1995/96:160, 106. Similar rules were later on introduced in the Cable Broadcasting Act (lag om kabelsändningar till allmänheten (SFS 1991:2027), prop. 1991/92:53.
1801. 18017:4 RTVL (SFS 1996:844).
1802. 180217 a§RL.
1803. 18032 § MFL (SFS 1975:1418); 4 1 § MFL (SFS 1995:450).
1804. 1804See Ch. 5.5.2.5.
1805. 18059:2 RTVL (SFS 1996:844), cf. 10:7 RTVL. This division of supervisory activities between the Supervisory Board for Radio and Television and the KO was made possible not least by the approximation of the sanctions under the RTVL and MFL. Both statutes allow the imposition of a fine for breach of relevant provisions of 5,000 to 5m. Swedish crowns, though not exceeding 10 percent of the broadcasting company’s annual turnover. Cf. 10:6 RTVL and 24 § MFL. This sanction is clearly inspired by the system of fines in Community competition law.
1806. 1806Other provisions to be enforced in the same manner are the restrictions on alcohol advertising in 4:10 Alcohol Act (alkohollagen, SFS 1994:1738) and the prohibition of tobacco advertising in 14 a § Tobacco Act (tobakslagen, SFS 1003:581)).
1807. 1807See SOU 1992:49, 86, referring to the statements by the Minister responsible on children advertising in prop. 1990/90:149, 121.
1808. 1808SOU 1992:49, 85 ff.
1809. 1809SOU 1992:49, 86.
1810. 1810To arrive to this conclusion the Inquiry referred to the case of a Greek prohibition of television advertising of toys. In 1986 the Commission had made objections to Greece as to the compatibility of this prohibition with the principle of free movement of goods. In a reply to a parliamentary interpellation the Commission had stated that the Television Directive indeed allowed Member States to lay down stricter rules in respect to children advertising. However, these rules ought to be consistent with Art. 30 of the Treaty. As a consequence thereof Greece limited the prohibition to military toys. See ibid., 86.
1811. 1811Note, however, the dissenting opinion of the Deputy KO Per Eklund on the issue, SOU 1992:49, 91.
1812. 1812On the ‘effektlandsprincipen’ see prop. 1970:57, 93.
1813. 1813Prop. 1992/93:75, 33 ff.; 1992/93:110. Cf. 2 § 1975 MFL, introduced with SFS 1992:1361.
1814. 1814Prop. 1992/93:75, 35 ff.
1815. 1815Dir. 1995:32, see Skr. 1995/96:181, Konsumentpolitiken i EU - mål och inriktning for det svenska arbetet, Bilaga 1, 66. The Television Directive was at that time in the process of amendment, resulting in Directive 97/36/EC amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC.
1816. 1816Skr. 1995/95:181, 45 ff. Förbud mot TV-reklam riktad till bam.
1817. 1817Skr. 1995/96:181, 45.
1818. 1818Ibid.
1819. 1819See Common Rules on the Evaluation of TV-advertising of August 1991 issued by the Consumer Ombudsmen of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (Felles spilleregler for fjernsynsreklamen), attachment 5, SOU 1992:49, 143 ff.
1820. 1820Nordiska Ministerrådet, Barn og TV-reklame - tre nordiske undersogelser. Nord 1992:4. The report claimed that children aged under 8 could generally differentiate between advertising and programme content, but not when the advertising was expressly directed at them. Ibid., 200 f, 141.
1821. 1821‘Vad sänder TV3 till barnen?’ KO rapport 1995/96:12, 8-17. See Kallersand (1998), 51.
1822. 1822Granskningsnämnden for Radio och TV, Årsbok 1997, 61. Quoted after Kallersand (1998), 51.
1823. 1823Joined Cases E-8/94 and E-9/94 (reference for an advisory opinion from Markedsrådet): Forbrukerombudet vs. 1. Mattel Scandinavia A/S and 2. Lego Norge A/S, OJ C 239, 14/09/1995, 6; Joined Cases Konsumentombudsmannen v. De Agostini Verlag C-34 & 35, C-36 [1998] ECR.
1824. 1824Joined Cases E-8/94 and E-9/94 Mattel and Lego Norge A/S, OJ C 239, 14/09/1995, para 6. Reference for an advisory opinion from Markedsrådet.
1825. 1825Cf. the press release issued by the KO on 20th November 1998, on the occasion of the decision of the Market Court confirming the ECJ ruling. The release is entitled: “Success for the Consumer Ombudsman concerning TV
1826. 1826On this organisation, see Ch. 7.4.2.2 below.
1827. 1827Sveriges Konsumentråd, “Vill du att dina barn ska kunna titta på TV utan att behöva utsättas för reklam?”, 1997. On the boycott, see Kallersand (1998), 58 ff.
1828. 1828See Kallersand (1998), 59.
1829. 1829Ibid.
1830. 1830Kallersand (1998), 63.
1831. 1831See Reich (1992a), 861 ff.; Bernard (2000) 25 ELRev, 57 ff.
1832. 1832The Court has consistently refused to regard reverse discrimination as falling under Community law, see Nikolaysen (1991), 95 ff, Maduro (2000), 120 ff
1833. 1833See Sun/Pelkmans (1995), 67; Van den Bergh (1998), 129. Critical Reich (1992a), 861; Editorial Comments, Are European values being hovered away?, 30 CMLRev. 1993, 445.
1834. 1834For a convincing criticism of this theory based on constitutional and institutional economic analysis, see Maduro (1998a), 136 ff.
1835. 1835This may be an impracticable choice, though, given the system of ‘channel packages’ that are usually used by distribution companies.
1836. 1836To quote the terse language in an info to be found on TV4 webpage: “TV4 is a television channel that lives on advertising income. Without advertisers who buy advertising time, there will be no TV4.” http://www.tv4.se, Reklam och nyhetsavbrott i program.
1837. 1837Case C-268/81 Oosthoek [1982] ECR 4575.
1838. 1838Case C-362/88 GB-INNO-BM [1990] ECR I-667.
1839. 1839Case C-126/91 Yves Rocher [1993] ECR I-2361.
1840. 1840See Ch. 6.2.2.5; Art. 6(c) and (d) of the E-Commerce Directive.
1841. 1841COM (2001) 546 final.
1842. 1842Rabattgesetz, RGB1 I 1933, 1011, repealed by BGB1 I 2001, 1663.
1843. 1843Zugabeverordnung RGBl. I 1932, 121, repealed by BGB1.I 2001, 1661.
1844. 1844On the history of the acts and more recent legislative developments see Meyer, ‘Rabatt- und Zugabe­ Regulierung auf dem Prüfstand’ (2001) GRUR, 98 ff. 552A detailed review of the caselaw of the BGH and the State Courts can be found in Sosnitza (1995), 127 ff.
1845. 1845Sosnitza (1995), 139 and 163 with further references.
1846. 1846See Lehmann (1995), 380 ff., at 381; Schricker (1994a), 586 ff., 590 ff.
1847. 1847Case C-362/88 GB-INNO [1990] ECR I-667.
1848. 1848Schricker (1994a), 586 ff.; Lehmann (1995), 380 ff.
1849. 1849Case C-126/91 Yves Rocher [1993] I-2361.
1850. 1850See BT-Drs. 12/6722 ; BT-Drs. 12/6723.
1851. 1851See BR-Drs. 116/94, 5 ff; BT-Drs. 12/7271.
1852. 1852Case C-126/91 Yves Rocher [1993] I-2361.
1853. 1853Reasoned opinion by the Commission A/88/189, quoted by the Federal Government in BT-Ds. 116/94, 5 ff. See Schricker, ‘Reformen im Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs’ (1994c) ZRP, 430 ff., at 432.
1854. 1854Micklitz, ‘Perspektiven eines Europäischen Privatrechts’ (1998b) ZEuP 253 ff., at 255 with reference to Kasseler (1994), 1 ff., 9.
1855. 1855BT-Plenarprotokoll 12/233, 20282. Judging from statements of other MPs the reform plans had unleashed a mass protest among small and medium-sized enterprises. One of the MPs speaks of a storm of protest letters and another claims that he had never received so many faxes and letters. Ibid.
1856. 1856„Es ist ja eine ganze Mauer, die wir dann anpacken müssen, und wenn mann enen Stein herauszieht, bricht die ganze Mauer zusammen.“ Ibid., 20287.
1857. 1857The law was passed with the decisive votes of the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition. See BT-Plenarprotokoll 12/233, 20304.
1858. 1858See Minister of the economy Günter Rexrodt, Parliamentary records, Ibid.,20291.
1859. 1859See BR-Drs. 116/94, Stellungnahme des Bundesrates, 2.
1860. 1860Ibid., 2-4.
1861. 1861BT-Drs. 12/7715; BR-Drs. 602/94.
1862. 1862This practice had been previously qualified by the BGH as an impermissible combined offer, BGH GRUR 1991, 542 (“Biowerbung mit Fahrpreiserstattung”). See Fezer (1992), see Ch. 5.5.1. See Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Rechtssausschusses, BT-Ds. 12/7911; BT-Ds. 12/3164. Gesetz zur Änderung der Zugabeverordnung, BGBl. I 1994, 1688. See Schricker (1994c), 436.
1863. 1863Cf. Art. 6 (c) and (d).
1864. 1864BT-Drs. 14/5441, 5 ff.
1865. 1865BT-Ds. 14/5594.
1866. 1866Ibid., 1.
1867. 1867BT-Drs. 14/5441, 7-8.
1868. 1868BR-Drs. 12/01; BR-Drs. 13/01.
1869. 1869Gesetz zur Aufhebung des Rabattgesetzes, BGBl. I 2001, 1663; Gesetz zur Aufhebung der Zugabeverordnung, BGBl. I 2001, 1661.
1870. 1870Cf. BT-Drs. 14/6098.
1871. 1871In the Economic Commission of the German Bundestag the Christian-Democrats still voted against the reform. In the Parliamentary debates several deputies criticised the reform as hostile to the Mittelstand. The phenomenon of ‘hiding’ behind decision made at the European level is well documented in the political science literature on European integration. See Marks/Hooghe/Blank, ‘Integration Theory, Subsidiarity and Internationalisation of Issues: The Implications for Legitimacy, EUI Working Papers, RSC No. 7, 26: “Lack of autonomous control has advantages as well as disadvantages for member states executives. State executives can hide behind decisions that are made in the European Council or in interlocking policy making with the Commission. They can fend off domestic opposition and defuse ideologically charged issues by claiming that they must adjust to arrangements they cannot change.”
1872. 1872Political scientist speak of veto points. See Knill (2001), 24; Immergut (1992), 57 ff.
1873. 1873See Ch 5.4.2.3.
1874. 18747-8 §§ MFL (SFS 1975:1418). Cf. Kombinationserbjudanden (KOV, 1984), 47 ff.
1875. 18752 § MFL (SFS 1975:1418).
1876. 187613 § MFL (SFS 1995:450), see Ch. 7.4.2 below.
1877. 1877See prop. 1994/95:123.
1878. 1878See Ds. 2001:13, 95 f.: “Those requirements set in Art. 6 of the Directive already exist in Swedish law, mainly in the form of different provisions in the MFL.”
1879. 1879Ds. 2001:13, 96 ff.
1880. 1880Directive 97/7/EC.
1881. 1881OJ 1998 L 24/1.
1882. 1882Directive 2000/31/EC.
1883. 1883Baumbach/Hefermehl (1998), Belästigung (at 508) with sub-catogries: Anreissen; Strassenwerbung; Telefon­ , Telefax, E-Mail, Briefkastenwerbung; Zusendung unbestellter Waren; Hausbesuche; Werbung im Todesfall; Haustürgeschäfte; Geschmakloses Werben (508-526).
1884. 1884See a summary report by the KOV on aggressive marketing methods, Ds. 1999:35, 71 ff.
1885. 1885See prop. 1999/2000:40, 14; Ds. 1999:35, 19 ff.
1886. 1886The two alternatives are known as an ‘opt in’ solution (Art. 10.1) and ‘opt out’ solution (Art. 10.2). See Reichelsdorfer, ‘eMails zu Werbezwecken - ein Wettbewerbsverstoss?’ (1997) GRUR, 191 ff.; Leupold. ‘Die massenweise Versendung von Werbe e-Mails: Innovatives Direktmarketing oder unzumutbare Belästigung des Empfängers?’ (1998) WRP, 270 ff.; Lehmann (1999), 180 ff.; Busche, ‘Werbung per electronic mail: Eine neue Herausforderung für das Wettbewerbsrecht?’ (1998) WRP, 1142 ff.; Leistner ‘Werbung, Commercial Communication und E-Commerce’ in: Lehmann (ed.), Electronic Business in Europa (München: Beck, 2002),
1887. 1887ff., at 282 ff. with a review of the case law.
1888. 1888See the case law reported by Leistner (2002), 282 ff.
1889. 1889Cf. Annex ‘Derogations from Article 3’, last indent: “the permissibility of unsolicited commercial communication by electronic mail.” Concerning the debate in the German scholarly literature prior to adoption of the Directive see Hoeren (1999), Lehmann (1999), Spindler, ‘Kapitalmarktgeschäfte im Binnenmarkt. Der Einfluss der E-Commerce Richtlinie auf das Internationale Vertragsrecht’ (2001) IPRax, 400 ff.
1890. 1890BT-Drs. 14/6098, 12. That the solution is not altogether satisfactory becomes evident from the ongoing debate in the legal literature described by Leistner and the lack of case law from the BGH. Leistner (2002).
1891. 1891Among them SWEDMA, the Association of Direct Marketing Enterprises (Direkthandelsföretagens förening), Swedish Post Order Association (Svenska postorderföreningen), the Advertising Association of Sweden (Sveriges Reklamförbund, SRF), Association of Swedish Advertisers (Annonsföreningen, AF), the TU, Näringslivets delegation för marknadsrätt, the Swedish Marketing Federation (Sveriges Marknadsförhund), the SI, Swedish Federation of Trade (Svensk Handel, SH), a number of major enterprises in the telecommunication industry.
1892. 1892Ds. 1999:35, 27.
1893. 1893Cf. draft 16 § MFL: “A trader cannot use (telephone) telefax and electronic mail, automatic calling machines and other similar automatic systems for messages, unless the consumer has agreed thereto in advance.” Ds. 1999:35, 95.
1894. 1894See 13 a § MFL (SFS 1995:450).
1895. 1895See prop. 1999/2000:40, 20.
1896. 1896Prop. 1999/2000:40, 20. Cf. the critical comments by the SKR, “Cowardly decision on e-mail advertising”, press release of 25.1.2000.
1897. 1897See Ds. 2001:13; 95 ff.; prop. 2001/02:150, 73.
1898. 1898See KO Rapport 2000:21, Spärrregister for e-postreklam.
1899. 1899See 13 a and 3 §§ MFL (SFS 1995:450).
1900. 1900See the proposal by the Consumer Agency on aggressive marketing, Ds. 1999:35, 71 ff., referring to Rapport 1997:3, KOV.
1901. 1901Olsen (2001-02), at 840.
1902. 1902The position of these countries is diligently given as a positive example in the Swedish debate. See SKR, Press release of 25.01.2000.
1903. 1903Note, however, that in some Member States even these weak requirements provoked changes. For instance, England was forced to introduce a separate administrative procedure for tackling fair trading claims as a last resort. Changes were also considered necessary in the Italian system of enforcement. See Bastian (1998/99), 199 ff.
1904. 1904See Micklitz (1998a), 937 ff.
1905. 1905One of the main targets of this Directive seems to have been Great Britain, where consumer associations have been step-motherly treated in respect to procedural rights. See Reich (1992b), Rott (2001), 401.
1906. 1906See Basedow/Hopt/Kötz/Baetge (1999).
1907. 1907Basedow/Hopt/Kötz/Baetge (1999), 3-5.
1908. 1908Basedow/Hopt/Kötz/Baetge (1999), 4.
1909. 1909Basedow/Hopt/Kötz/Baetge (1999), 6.
1910. 1910„Nicht empfohlen werden kann schliesslich die Schaffung von Zivilklagebefugnissen für Behörden oder andere öffentliche Stellen (z. B. Ombudsmänner). Dies würde die Errichtung eines in Deutschland bislang unbekannten Typs von Behörde erfordern, dessen Aufabe darin bestünde, die Rechte Privater einzuklagen. Das erscheint nicht nur ineffizient, sondern gerät auch leicht in den Geruch staatlicher Zwangsbeglückung der Bürger. Die klagweise Geltendmachung ihrer privaten Recht überlässt man den Bürgern daher besser selber.“ Basedow/Hopt/Kötz/Baetge (1999), 7. See, however, the more balanced view by Koch, ‘Der Verbandsklage in Europa’ (2000) ZZP, 413 ff., 428.
1911. 1911Schäffer (1999), at 86 ff.
1912. 1912„Der Schutz von Interessen, die nicht mit konkreten personen verbunden sind, ist in erster Linie Aufgabe des öffentlichen Rechts. Ein praktisches Bedürfnis zur Einräumung zusätzlicher zivilprozessualer Verbandsklagemöglichkeiten in diesem Bereich ist nicht erkennbar.“, ibid., 7.
1913. 1913BGBl 2000 I, 897; Art. 3: Änderung des AGB-Gesetzes; Art. 4: Änderung der UWG. See BT-Drs. 14/2658.
1914. 1914See Greger, ‘Verbandsklage und Prozessrechtsdogmatik: Neue Entwicklungen in einer schwierigen Beziehung’ (2000) 113 ZZP, 399 ff., 400. According to commentators this refom created three sets of procedural rules: for litigation in the area of consumer law in general, for litigation on the basis of unfair contract terms and for unfair competition. See Rott (2001), 412.
1915. 1915BGB1. 20011, 3173. Cf. BT-Drs.14/6040, 37 ff.
1916. 1916An underlying objective of this legislative endeavour was the integration of the scattered consumer protection rules, partly resulting from transposition of Community Directives, into a cohesive well-balanced regulative framework within a reformed BGB. See Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Modernisierung des Schuldrechts, BT-Drs. 14/6040. Cf. BGB, BGBl. I, 42 ff.
1917. 1917See § 2 UKlaG. The term ‘collective interests’ is not explicitly used in the new German legislation, but this restriction can be inferrred from the travaux préparatoires as well as from the phrase ‘im Interesse des Verbraucherschutzes’ in § 2 I UKlaG. See Rott (2001), 415, with reference to BT-Drs. 2658, 27. Cf. Micklitz (2001), 87 ff.
1918. 1918§ 3 I Nr. 2 and 3 UKlaG. Cf. BT-Drs. 14/6040, 37 ff.
1919. 1919See Baetge (1999), 336.
1920. 1920Baetge notes that in the language of the Directive the public bodies have to be specifically responsible for the protection of consumers. Ibid., 336 f.
1921. 1921See § 2 III UKlaG about abusive litigation restating § 13 V UWG.
1922. 1922See § 4 II UklaG in conjunction with § 13 II Nr. 3 UWG
1923. 1923§4 UKlaG.
1924. 1924See Greger (2000), 399 ff., at 403, pointing at the change in language from „Ansprüche auf Unterlassung... können geltend gemacht werden“ (§ 13 AGBG, old) to „Ansprüche stehen zu“ (§ 22 III AGBG). Cf. BT-Drs. 14/2659, 52.
1925. 1925On proposals for annulment of this requirement in the new comprehensive UWG reform see below, Ch. 7.3.1.2.
1926. 1926See Micklitz (2000), 87, 102.
1927. 1927For a detailed analysis of the question of litigation costs of consumer associations, see Halfmeier (2001).
1928. 1928For the critical view on compensation of notification costs see Baetge (1999), 348-49.On this doctrine see Ch. 5.3.3.3.
1929. 1929Greger (2000), 411.
1930. 1930Lag om talerätt for vissa utländska konsumentmyndigheter och konsumentorganisationer (SFS 2000:1175); prop. 2000/2001:34; Ds. 2000:32.
1931. 1931Prop.2000/2001:34, 31 ff.
1932. 1932See Commission communication concerning Art. 4(3) of Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests, concerning the entities qualified to bring an action under Art. 2 of this Directive, OJ 2003 C 159/2.
1933. 1933Provided, of course, that the latter was a Community Member State. In this sense Bogdan (1998a), 534; Bogdan (1998b), 371.
1934. 1934See prop. 2000/2001.
1935. 193510:5-6 RTVL (1996:844).
1936. 1936See Bogdan (1998), 537 who suggests that the list of qualifed entities should be kept broad.
1937. 1937Preamble, Rec. 23 Directive 2000/31/EC.
1938. 1938Hoeren (1999), 192, 195.
1939. 1939See Reich/Nordenhaus, Verbraucher und Recht im elektronischen Geschäftsverkehr (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000), 147 ff.; Mankowski, ‘Das Internet im Internationalen Vertrags- und Deliktsrecht’ (1999a) RabelsZ, 256 ff.; Mankowski, ‘Internet und internationales Wettbewerbsrecht’ (1999b) GRUR Int., 909, at 1001.
1940. 1940See Thünken, ‘Multi-State Advertising over the Internet and the Private International Law of Unfair Competition’(2002) 51 ICLQ, 909 ff, at 928 ff; see also Roth ‘Der Einfluss des Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht auf das IPR’ (1991) 55 RabelsZ, 623 ff., at 666 ff. Roth rightly notes that the Community’s efforts to accomplish the Internal Market are mainly directed towards the area of economic (supervisory) law. Consequently, he sees the country-of-origin principle as primarily belonging to the domain of international administrative law. The same author nevertheless identifies a number of intricate repercussions on private international law, including the areas of advertising and unfair competition law.
1941. 1941Spindler (2001), 400 ff., 401.
1942. 1942See Thünken (2002), 927.
1943. 1943Brussels Convention, OJ 1978 L304/36.
1944. 1944Brussels Regulation (EC) No 44/2001, OJ 2001 L12/1.
1945. 1945See Mankowski, ‘Das Herkunftslandprinzip als Internationales Privatrecht der E-Commerce-Richtlinie’ (2001) 100 ZvgIRWiss, 137 ff, at 175-6.
1946. 1946Case C-21/76 Mines de Potasse d’Alsace [1976] ECR 1735. According to the Court’s ruling in Sheville concerning the distribution of allegedly defamatory publication in more than one country, this is the place where the harmful event has caused damage to the injured party. See C-68/93 Sheville v. Presse Alliance S.A. [1995] ECR I-415. See Kur, ‘Das Herkunftslandprinzip der E-Commerce-Richtlinie: Chancen und Risiken’ in: Festschriftför Willie Erdmann (Köln: Carl Heymann, 2002), 629 ff., 635 ff.; Thünken (2002), 925 ff.
1947. 1947See Rec. 22 Directive EC/2000/31.
1948. 1948See Kur (2002), 629 ff, 635; Mankowski (2001), 175 ff.
1949. 1949Kur (2002), 636.
1950. 1950Ibid.
1951. 1951How one should qualify the impact of the country-of-origin principle - as a conflict-of-law rule or as a substantive law restriction - is, allegedly, not a purely academic matter. Kur sees the practical relevance of such distinction in that in the first case the more favourable (i.e. less strict for the ISP) law of the country of establishment should be considered by the court ex officio, whereas in the second case the objection about more restrictive rules in the applicable law should be treated as an exception to be substantiated by the defendant in the proceedings. See Kur (2002), 629 ff., 638; see also Ohly, ‘Das Herkunftslandprinzip und Kollisionsrecht’ (2001) GRUR Int., 899ff, 902 ff. Contra Ahrens, ‘Das Herkunftslandprinzip in der E-Commerce-Richtlinie’ (2000) CR,
1952. 1952ff, 838.
1953. 1953Hoeren (1999), 195.
1954. 1954Dethloff, ‘Marketing im Internet und Internationales Wettbewerbsrecht’ (1998) NJW, 1596 ff., at 1599; Dethloff, ‘European Conflict-Of-Law Provisions Governing Unfair Competition’ (1999) Commercial Communications, 2 ff., at4 ff; Dethloff, ‘Europäisches Kollissionsrecht des Unlauteren Wettbewerbs’ (2000) JZ, 179 ff at 181. A more hesitant view is expressed by Dethloff after entry the into force of the E-Commerce Directive, especially in light of the blunt statement in Art. 1(4) that the Directive does not purport to establish new rules of private international law. See Dethloff (2001), 54.
1955. 1955Dethloff (2001), 179 ff.
1956. 1956Basedow, ‘Der kollissionsrechtliche Gehalt der Produktfreiheiten im europäischen Binnenmarkt: favor offerentis’ (1995) 59 RabelsZ, 1 ff. On the basis of a survey of ECJ jurisprudence on the basic Community freedoms Basedow elicits a general principle of application of the law more favourable of intracommunity trade to be inherent in these rules. In the area of unfair competition the principle is seen to materialize in cases like GB-INNO, Yves Rocher and Clinique. Ibid., 50 ff. More generally on the influence of Community law on private international law, see Roth (1991), 623 ff.
1957. 1957See Mankowski (2001), 137 ff, 140; Mankowski (1999b), 909 ff, at 912; Spindler (2001), 400, at 403; Thünken, ‘Die EG-Richtlinie über den elektronischen Geschäftsverkehr und das internationale Privatrecht des unlauter Wettbewerbs’ (2001) IPRax, 15 ff, at 20; Thünken (2002), 940.
1958. 1958Spindler (2001), 401: „Dieses Dilemma wird sich wohl nur so lösen lassen, dass man zwar Art. 3 I, U als kollisionsrechtlichen Normen begreift, jedoch nur als eine eigenartige hybride Konstruktion zwischen Kollsionsrecht und sachrechtlichem Korrektiv,die sich weder befriedigend kollisions- noch europarechtlich erklären lässt.“
1959. 1959Thünken (2001), 21, 22.
1960. 1960The most vocal critic appears to be Mankowski. Thünken agrees on some of the critical points but on balance considers the arguments in favour of the country-of-origin principle as a new conflict-of-law rule to weigh heavier than those against. Thünken (2002), 936 ff.
1961. 1961Fezer/Koos, ‘Das gemeinschaftsrechtliche Herkunftslandprinzip und die E-commerce -Richtlinie’ (2000) IPRax, 349; Sack, ‘Das internationale Wettbewerbsrecht nach der E-Commerce-Richtlinie (ECRL) und dem EGG-/TDG-Entwurf' (2001) WRP, 1408 ff., at 1409, 1417; Ohly, (2001), at 901; Ahrens (2000, at 837; Nickels, ‘Neues Bundesrecht für den E-Commerce’ (2001) DB, 1919 ff., at 1922.
1962. 1962Sack (2001), 1408 ff., at 1409.
1963. 1963Sack (2001), 1411; Ohly (2001), 901; Kur (2002), 637-38. Kur rightly notes that in contrast to the general principles of free movement of goods and services the filter here consists not of primaiy Community law, but of the substantive rules in the country of origin. The law of the market remains applicable, but it may be restricted in its substantive scope after being subject to an evaluating “filtering” test, namely the substantive standards in the country of origin.
1964. 1964See Bodewig (2000) 475 ff, at 479 ff. Discussing the possibilities for exemption from the country-of-origin principle laid down in Art. 3(4) Bodewig notes that, in contrast to the ‘Cassis de Dijon', such possibility exists only on grounds of consumer protection and not of fairness of commercial transactions. He rightly expresses doubts that national regulations with mixed objectives (e.g. the German regulation on combined offers) would pass this test, ibid., 480.
1965. 1965See Ohly (2001), 902; Kur (2002), 638.
1966. 1966And conversely, in case the advertiser would make it clear that he differentiates his marketing in order to comply with local legal rules, then he might be refused the protection under the countiy of origin regime (provided the latter is less restrictive). Kur (2002), 642, 644.
1967. 1967„Zwar enthält [das Herkunftslandprinzip] eine ausdrückliche Bestätigung des Grundsatzes, dass für die Entscheidung über die Rechtmäßigkeit einer grenzüberschreitenden Handlung nicht die Rechtsordnungen aller berührten Länder zu beachten sind, sondern dass das Recht des Herkunftslandes den entscheidenden Maßstab bildet. Allerdings ist nach dem oben ausgeführten Sinn und Zweck der Richtlinie zu entnehmen, dass dieser Grundsatz nicht dazu herangezogen werden kann, die Verbreitung von Kommunikationsdienstleistungen zu verhindern, die im Herkunftsland selbst keine kommerzielle Wirkung entfalten, während sie nach dem Recht anderer Länder (möglicherweise) zulässig sind.“ Kur (2002), 642.
1968. 1968For a detailed analysis see Mankowski (1999), 909 ff.; Kur (2002), 639 ff with further refernces.
1969. 1969§ 4 TDG-E „Herkunftslandprinzip“: (1) „In der Bundesrepublik Deutschland niedergelassenen Diensteanbieter und ihre Teledienste unterliegen den innerstaatlichen Nonnen auch dann, wenn die Teledienste in einem anderen Staat innerhalb des Anwendungsbereichs der Richtlinie 2000/31 ... im Binnenmarkt geschäftsmäßig angeboten oder erbracht werden, soweit sich nicht aus den Regeln des internationalen Privatrechts etwas anderes ergibt.“ BT-Drs. 14/6098, 5.
1970. 1970§ 4 I Nr. 2 TDG-E: “Auf solche Teledienste ist das nach den Regeln des internationalen Privatrechts maßgebliche Recht eines anderen Staates jedoch nicht anwendbar, soweit dadurch der freie Dienstleistungsverkehr über die Anforderungen des deutschen Rechts hinausgehend eingeschränkt werden würde.“ BT-Drs. 14/6098, 5.
1971. 1971Referring to a much debated rule of § 38 EGBGB, see Sack (2001), 1412.
1972. 1972§ 4 II (2) TDG-E: „Auf solche Teledienste sind die nach den Regeln des internationalen Privatrechts maßgeblichen Normen nicht anwendbar soweit dadurch der freie Dienstleistungsverkehr über die Anforderungen des Niederlassungsstaates hinausgehend eingeschränkt werden würde.“ BT-Drs. 14/6098, 5
1973. 1973BT-Drs. 14/6098, Stellungnahme des Bundesrates, Anlage 2, 32 ff.
1974. 1974BT-Drs. 14/6098, Gegenäußerung der Bundesregierung, Anlage 3, 36.
1975. 1975Ibid.
1976. 1976BT-Drs. 14/7345, 31, Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Ausschusses für Wirtschaft und Technologie, Begründung, Deutscher. „Die schwierige Umsetzung des Herkunftslandprinzips kann am besten bewerkstelligt werden, indem man sich möglichst eng an dem Wortlaut der einschlägigen Richtlinienbestimmungen orientirert. Die Fassung des § 4 I TDG wird dementsprechend angepasst. Des Weiteren wird § 4 Abs 1 TDG an den im Entwurf in § 4 V (1) TDG-E synonym verwandten Begriff des „Geltungsbereichs“ der Richtlinie angepasst.“
1977. 1977Hoffmann, ‘EGG - Eine Reihe von Problemen des elektronischen Rechtsverkehrs ungelöst’ (2002) MMR, 65 ff.
1978. 1978Hoffmann (2002), 66.
1979. 1979See the numerous possible interpretations of these provisions for various hypothesis discussed by Sack (2001), 1408 ff.
1980. 1980BGB1. I 1997, 1870 ff. amended through BGB1. I 2001, 3721 ff.
1981. 1981For a more sophisticated view on the private international law of multistate advertising, informed by comparative analysis of divergent regulative models; see Reich (1992b); see also Roth (1991), 671 in die context of the right of corrective statement in the Television Directive.
1982. 1982See Bernitz (1969), cf. Ch. 5.2.2.3 above.
1983. 1983Prop. 1970:57, 92 f.
1984. 1984See Levin (1987b), 143; Bernitz, Marknadsrättslig kontroll av reklam-TV, No. 76 (Nordisk Ministerråd NORD, 1988), 17 ff. with reference to decisions where the Market Court has applied Swedish law to the marketing conduct of foreign traders. The doctrine of noticeable effect was tested in the case MD 1989:6 (“Scanorama”). The case concerned an alcohol advertisement inserted in a publication distributed by SAS on board its aircraft. According to a statement in the Government Bill to the Act on Advertising of Alcohol and
1985. 1985See Pålsson, Svensk rättspraxis i internationell processrätt (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1989), 53; Bogdan (1998) 541.
1986. 1986“Men även i de fall där talan väckts av t.ex. en berörd näringsidkare eller en sammanslutning av konsmenter, näringsidkare eller en sammanslutning av konsumenter, näringsidkare (se t.ex. 38 § MFL) måste den anses vara av övervägande offentligrättslig karaktär, eftersom den direkt eller i förlängningen handlar om böter vilka betalas till staten.” In a footnote the author nevertheless adds that the situation could change if the claim concerned compensation of damages or other payment to the affected competitor or association. “Saken skulle kunna komma i ett annan läge om talan avsåg skadestånd eller annat slags belopp betalbart till den näringsidkare eller sammanslutning som väckt talan.” Bogdan (1998a), 533-54. Similar Bogdan, ‘Kollektiva konsumentintressen i den internationella processrätten’ (1994/95) JT, 905. (1994/95), 905.
1987. 1987It was only after the entry into force of the Injunctions Directive, obliging national courts to award foreign entities’ standing to litigate in defence of collective consumer interests before national courts and authorities, that the question was given some consideration. See Bogdan (1998a), 541. On the transposition of the Injunctions Directive see Ch. 7.1.2.2 above.
1988. 1988See prop. 2000/2001:34, 23.
1989. 1989See 1 § Lagrådsremissens lagförslag, prop. 2000/2001:34, 47 ff.
1990. 1990Ibid.
1991. 1991Prop. 2000/2001:34, 27.
1992. 1992Prop. 2000/2001:34, 23 ff.
1993. 1993Ibid., 27.
1994. 1994Ibid.
1995. 1995Ds. 2001:31, 90.
1996. 1996Ds. 2001:13, 87.
1997. 1997Prop. 2001/02:150, 59 ff.
1998. 1998”En svensk författningstext skulle ju normalt tolkas på detta sättet. Direktivet är dock resultat av ett omfattande och bitvis besvärlig förhandlingsarbete där flera viljor har måst tillgodoses inom ramen för kompromisslösningar. Detta innebär att direktivtexten inte kan tolkas på samma sätt som en svensk författningstext. Enligt regeringen talar mycket för att bedömningen som gjordes i promemorian är riktig. Samtidigt är Direktivet oklart och någon uttrycklig regel som anger att civilrättsliga frågor inte omfattas av direktiver finns inte. I sista hand är det en uppgift för EG-domstolen att avgöra direktivets innebörd. Den svenska regleringen bör därför nära ansluta till direktivtexten, vilket också är den lagstiftnings teknik som valts i de flesta länder.” Ibid., 62.
1999. 1999Prop. 2001/02:150, 63.
2000. 2000Åkerman/Thunman, ‘Jurisdiktions- och lagvalsproblem på Internet’ (1997-98) JT, 432 ff.
2001. 2001Bogdan (1998), 542.
2002. 2002Kur indicates that the two may not necessarily coincide. Kur (2002), 634.
2003. 2003A change may be underway, though. See the discussion in the Government Bill above; cf. the comments by Bogdan provoked by the recent ECJ judgment C-167/00 Verein för Konsumentinformation v. Henkel [2002] ECR I-8111. Bogdan, ‘Om Bryssel/Luganoreglernas tillämpning i marknadsrättsliga mål’ (2002-03) JT, 410 ff. In this judgment the Court holds a dispute between a consumer organization and a private company concerning unfair terms of consumer contract to be “civil and commercial matter” in the sense of the Convention. Moreover, the Court sees no objection for the dispute to be tried by the court in the place where the damage occurred (forum delicti). In the opinion of the Court, the optional jurisdiction rule of Art. 5(3) did not require actual damage to have occurred. It sufficed with potential damage. Given the uncertain distinction between market law disputes and civil law disputes, at least in Swedish law, Bogdan suggests to extend the scope of application of the Brussels Convention to expressly cover market law subject-matter and avoid drawing an arbitrary line between private law and public law lawsuits.
2004. 2004See Mankowski, ‘Wettbewerbsrechtliche Gerichtspflichtigkeits- und Rechts-anwendungsrisiko bei Werbung über Websites’ (2000) CR, 763 ff., at 769.
2005. 2005Such interpretation is at least advanced by Ohly (2001), 905.
2006. 2006See the reaction of the Parliamentary Committee on Civil Law, 2001/02:LU 29.
2007. 2007Prop. 2001/02:150, 64 ff.
2008. 2008Joerges, ‘Interactive Adjudication in the Europeanisation Process: A Demanding Perspective and a Modest Example’ (2000) ERPL, 1 ff.
2009. 2009See the rather early introduction of a Doorstep Selling Act (Hemförsälningslag, SFS 1981:1361)
2010. 2010In this sense Knill (2001), 215 ff.
2011. 2011On different,consumer images’ in the European union see Wilhelmsson, T., ‘Consumer Images in East and West’ in: Micklitz, H.-W. (ed.), Rechtseinheit oder Rechtsvielfalt in Europa? (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996c), 53 ff.
2012. 2012For a detailed discussion see above Ch. 5.5.1.2.
2013. 2013See among others Case C-261 Walter Rau [1982] ECR 3961; Case C-178/84 Commission v. Germany (beer purity) [1987] ECR 1227.
2014. 2014See OJ 1975 C 92/1; OJ 1981 C 133/1.
2015. 2015Case 16/83 Criminal proceedings against Karl Prantl, [1984] ECR 1299, para 1306.
2016. 2016See BGH GRUR 1994, 306 ( “Yves Rocher II”) confirming the ECJ’s ruling and dismissing the injunction claim.
2017. 2017“Moreover, the prohibition in question goes beyond the requirements of the objective pursued in that it affects advertising which is not at all misleading and contains comparisons of prices actually charged, which can be of considerable use in that it enables the consumer to make his choice in fiill knowledge of the facts.” Case C- 126/91 Schutzverein gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft e. V. v. Yves Rocher GmbH [1992] I-2361, para 17.
2018. 2018See Leible (1994), 179, with further references.
2019. 2019See Reuter, ‘Neues zu Euro-Marketing und §§ 6e, 7 UWG: Der EuGH-Entscheid zu Schlussvekauf und Preisgegenüberstellungen’ (1990) BB, 1649 ff.; On the conceptual model of homo economicus in European law, see Doepner, ‘Verbraucherleitbilder zur Auslegung des wettbewerbsrechtlichen Irreführungsverbots’ (1997) WRP, 999 ff.; Doepner/Hufnagel (1998), 177 ff.
2020. 2020Case C-238/89 Pall [1990] ECR I-4827, para 19.
2021. 2021Case C-315/92 Clinique [1994] ECR I-337, para 21.
2022. 2022Ibid., para 23.
2023. 2023See C-315/92 Clinique [1994] ECR I-337, Opinion of AG Gulmann, para 2, sixth indent, at I-320.
2024. 2024See Weatherill (1999), 56, 69.
2025. 2025See Leible (1994), 179; general on the concept of a European ‘Verkehrsauffassung’ see Streinz, ‘Gibt es eine europäische Verkehrsauffassung?’ (1991) Zeitschrift för Lebensmittelrecht, 242 ff.
2026. 2026The often advanced criticism that the decision disregarded a linguistic problem which was probably specific to the German language (meaning hospital) does not consider the fact that the term ‘Clinique’ has the same connotation in at least three other Community languages: English (clinic), French (clinique) and Danish (klinik). The ‘majority’ logic of the Court might have therefore been justified. For criticism, see Weatherill (1999b), 56.
2027. 2027See Leible (1994), 179.
2028. 2028Art. 2 (2) Directive 84/450. In this sense Schricker (1990), 112 ff.
2029. 2029According to Schwanhäuser: “Nach bisheriger Auffassung reicht es aus, wenn die beanstandete Angabe geeignet ist, die Kauflust des Verkehrs „irgendwie“ - im Sinne der allgemeinen Wertschätzung - zu beeinflussen.“ Schwanhäuser (1988), 180 ff.
2030. 2030See Case C- 373/90 Nissan [1992] ECR I-131, para 16.
2031. 2031See Sack, ‘Die Beurteilung irreführender Webung für Importfahrzeuge aus EG-Staaten nach EG Recht’ (2000) WRP, 23 ff.; Sack (1998b), 242.
2032. 2032BGH GRUR 1225 (“EG-Neuwagen II”).
2033. 2033BGH GRUR 1122 (“EG-Neuwagen I").
2034. 2034In the event this was the case, the practices were suspected of constituting breach of the antitrust rules of the German GWB, restraining producers from imposing binding prices on the distributors.
2035. 2035Case C-470/93 Mars [1995] I-1923, para 24.
2036. 2036See Keilholz (1987), 393.
2037. 2037See Reese, ‘Das “6-Korn-Eier”-Urteil des EuGH -Leitentscheidung för ein Leitbild?’ (1998), WRP, 1035 ff.
2038. 2038„Unter diesen Voraussetzungen muss man wissen, dass eine Quote von zehn bis fünfzehn Prozent einem Bevölkerungsanteil von acht bis zwölf Milionen Bundesbürgern entspricht. Würde man deshalb von dieser gewährten Methode (der Demoskopie) abgehen, dann müsste man zugleich even die Meinung vertreten, dass acht bis zwölf Millionen Bundsbürger irregeführt werden dürfen, weil sie einen unbeachtlichen Teil der Verbraucherschaft darstellen“. Kisseler (1994), 5. Of the same opinion Deutsch (1996), 541, at 546.
2039. 2039See Deutsch (1996), 541 ff., at 546 with further references. On recent developments in the case law, see Köhler/Piper (2002), § 3, Rdnr. 139, 986.
2040. 2040„Dabei bietet dieses Mittel eine wirklich repräsentative Möglichkeit die Meinung der Verbraucher zu erfassen. Schliesslich wird in allen Ländern der Gemeinschaft die Demoskopie im politischen Bereich eingesetzt und die dabei erzielten Ergebnisse stellen doch in der Regel einen sehr klaren Annährungswert an tatsächliche Meinungen, insbesondere im Vorgriff auf Wahlen dar. ...Die gleiche Glaubwürdigkeit geniesst die Demoskopie in Deutschland auch hinsichtlich der Ergebnisse von Meinungsumfragen im Bereich des Wettbewerbsrechts, und zwar zu Recht, weil dort die Fehlerquoten ebenso gering sind wie bei der Demoskopie im politischen Bereich“. Kisseler (1994), 5.
2041. 2041Schricker (1975), 225; Emmerich (1990), 203.
2042. 2042Sosnitza (1995), 204; cf. Keßler (1990), 73 ff.
2043. 2043Sosnitza (1995), 181 ff. Similar Keßler (1990), 73 ff.
2044. 2044Beater (2000a), 82 ff.
2045. 2045Case C-210/96 Gut Springenheide [1999] 1-4657.
2046. 2046See the critique of this catch-all approach in Reese (1998) WRP, 1035 ff., at 1038.
2047. 2047See Case C-210/96 Gut Springenheide [1999] I-4657, para 27.
2048. 2048Ibid., para 31.
2049. 2049Ibid., para 37.
2050. 2050Ibid., para 35.
2051. 2051Ibid., para 37, in fine.
2052. 2052Case C-210/96 Gut Springenheide [1999] I-4657, para 35-36.
2053. 2053It is interesting to note that the Swedish Government also intervened in the proceedings. It advocated a normative consumer model (“how consumers in general could be assumed to understand [a statement]”) and against the need for opinion polls. Case C-210/96 Gut Springenheide [1999] I-4657, Opinion of AG Mischo, para 49.
2054. 2054Ibid., Opinion of AG Mischo, para 51-53. The German Government asserted in particular: “Only when the legal rule covers all consumers and is intended to protect them from the danger of being misled and the
2055. 2055Case C-220/98 Estee Lauder (‘lifting’) [2000] ECR I-117.
2056. 2056Case C-465/98 Adolf Darbo AG [2000] ECR I-2297.
2057. 2057Ibid., para 21.
2058. 2058Ibid., para 22, with reference to Case C-51/94 Commission v. Germany [1995] ECR I-3599, para 34.
2059. 2059See Beater (2000a), 77 ff.; Beater (2000b), 967 ff.
2060. 2060Beater (2000a), 78.
2061. 2061See Case C-16/83 Prantl [1984] ECR 1299, para 2; Case C-179/85 Commission v. Germany (p‘étillant de raisin’) [1986] ECR 3879, para 11.
2062. 2062Dehousse (1994), 761 ff., at 765 with reference to Singer’s classical analysis of comparative politics, Singer, ‘The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations’ in: Knorr/Verba (eds.), The International System: Theoretical Essays (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), 77 ff.
2063. 2063Case C-170/78 Commission v. United Kingdom [1980] ECR 417, para 2; Case C-178/84 Commission v. Germany (purity requirement for beer) [1987] ECR 1227, para 32. See Weatherill (1999), 51.
2064. 2064Case C-178/84 Commission v. Germany [1987] ECR 1227, para 32.
2065. 2065Notably, a number ofj udges have throughout the years produced voluminous commentaries on unfair competition law and procedure, cf. Pastor/Ahrens (2001); Gloy, Handbuch des Wettbewerbsrechts (München: Beck, 1994); Köhler/Piper (2002).
2066. 2066Joined Cases C-34/95 & 35/95 De Agostini & TV Shop [1997] ECR I-3843, para 42-43.
2067. 2067Greaves (1998), 318.
2068. 2068Ibid., para 50.
2069. 2069Ibid., para 54.
2070. 2070See Greaves (1998), 318.
2071. 2071MD 2000:4 (”De Agostini”).
2072. 2072Case C-405/98 Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v Gourmet International Products (GIP) [2001] ECR I-1795.
2073. 20732 § alkoholreklamlagen (SFS 1978:763). The Act introduced a sophisticated system of control over alcohol advertising, building on a combination of express prohibitions, prescriptions and KOV guidelines. See Ch. 5.4.2.4. Interestingly, already back in 1976 the Commission devoted some attention to the question of possible restrictive effects of the proposed legislation on free trade within the framework of GATT and EFTA. The Commission, however, quickly reached the conclusion that the relevant international agreements allowed exemptions from the principles of free trade on grounds of protection of human life and health. See SOU 1976:63, 192 f. Since 1 January 2000 the provisions of this act were transferred largely unchanged to the Alcohol Act, cf. 4:8-13 alkohollagen (SFS 1994:1738).
2074. 2074For a brief account of the history of alcohol policy in Sweden, see prop. 1998/99:134, 28 ff. Wamling-Nerep refers to earlier examples of ‘public’ measures restricting alcohol consumption dating back as far as 1622; see Wamling-Nerep, ‘När svenska alkoholrestriktioner möter europeiska dryckestraditioner’ (2002-03) JT, 991 ff.
2075. 2075Retail sale of alcoholic beverages was handed over to special municipal companies (systembolag) as early as 1855. Since 1873 these companies were directed to abstain from profit (desinteresseringsprincipen). In the 1920s also wholesale trade and production of alcoholic beverages were monopolized. The ration-book was introduced in 1914 and was abolished in 1955. The same year the municipal systembolag merged into a single state company called ‘Systembolaget’. See prop. 1998/99:134, 29 f.
2076. 2076Calabresi/Melamed (1972), 1113.
2077. 2077On the complex relationship between Swedish alcohol policy and Community law, see Wamling-Nerep (2002-03), 991.
2078. 2078With Sweden’s accession to EU the monopoly on production and wholesale trade was abolished. In the wake of the Franzén ruling of the ECJ licensing rules were liberalized and supervision fees reduced. See Case C- 189/95 Franzén [1997] ECR I-5909; prop. 1998/98:134, 30 ff., 76 ff.
2079. 2079The objective has not been liberalisation, but rather sharpening of the advertising restrictions which were seen to play an important role in a climate of plurality of actors and widened access to alcohol. See SOU 1998:8, 304, Dir. 1996:33.
2080. 2080The restrictions were based on genuine health policy grounds, which the Community Court had recognised as legitimate in its Aragoneza judgment. SOU 1998:8, 211 ff.
2081. 2081SOU 1998:8, 177.
2082. 2082Prop. 1998/99:134, 133.
2083. 2083The Government’s attention was probably distracted by more important questions related to liberalisation of licensing and taxes, which were discussed in the same Bill.
2084. 2084Alkohollagen (SFS 1994:1738).
2085. 20852 § alkoholreklamlagen (SFS 1978:763)
2086. 2086See MD 1999:6 (“Gourmet”!)
2087. 2087Case C-189/95 Franzen [1997] ECR I-5909.
2088. 2088With reference to RB 49:7.
2089. 2089Case C-405/98 Gourmet [2001] ECR I-1795, Opinion of AG Jacobs, para 33.
2090. 2090Ibid., Opinion, para 33.
2091. 2091Ibid., Opinion, para 48.
2092. 2092Ibid., Opinion, para 55.
2093. 2093Ibid., Opinion, para 61; see also para 59.
2094. 2094Case C-405/98 Gourmet [2001] ECR I-1795, para 25: ”A prohibition on advertising such as that at issue in the main proceedings must therefore be regarded as affecting the marketing of products from other Member States more heavily than the marketing of domestic products and as therefore constituting an obstacle to trade between Member States.” (emphasis added).
2095. 2095Joined Cases C-267 & C-268/91 Keck and Mitouard [1993] ECR I-6097, para 17.
2096. 2096Joined Cases C-34/95 & 35/95 De Agostini & TV Shop [1997] ECR I-3843, para 42.
2097. 2097Case C-405/98 [2001] ECR I-1795, para 21.
2098. 2098Similar Bernitz, ‘Gourmet-målet - kan det diskriminerande svenska förbudet mot alkoholreklam godtas av folkhälsoskäl?’ (2001a) ERT, 402 ff., at 422.
2099. 2099Case C-405/98 [2001] ECR I-1795, para 33.
2100. 2100For a comprehensive analysis of the ECJ jurispridence on Arts. 28-30 from a comparative institutional perspective, see Maduro (1998a), 150 ff.
2101. 2101Case 384/93 Alpine Investments [1995] ECR 1-1141, para 35.
2102. 2102Case C-405/98 [2001] ECR I-1795, para 37.
2103. 2103Ibid., para 39.
2104. 2104Feiden, ‘Europeanisation of European Law Adjudication. A Comment’ (2000) ERPL, 17 ff.
2105. 2105See Bernitz (1999), 425; Favoreu, ‘Constitutional Review in Europe’ in: Henkin/Rosenthal (eds.), Constitutionalism and Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 38 ff, at 24
2106. 2106T 8-1111-97, judgment of 4 April 2002 (“Gourmet”).
2107. 2107MD 2003:5 (“Gourmet” II).
2108. 2108It may be interesting to note that the plaintiff GIP in its defence argued that the proportionality of the Swedish prohibition should be assessed following the methodology advanced by the Commission in its Communication “TheFollow-up to the Green Paper on Commercial Communication in the Internal Market”, COM (1998) 121 final. MD 2003:5, 19.
2109. 2109MD 2003:5, 10 (“Gourmet IP’).
2110. 2110MD 2003:5, 27 ff. (“Gourmet II”).
2111. 2111T 8-1111-97, 28 with reference to Art. 10 EC; MD 2003:5, 24;
2112. 2112This development is in line with the predictions of Abrahamsson about the increased role ofj udicial norm control and the increased role of courts to provide protection to individuals against measures by national legislatures. See Abrahamsson, ‘Domstolsväsendets anpassning till EES och EG’ (1993) SvJT, 805 ff.
2113. 2113That these fears were exaggerated was evidenced by the almost marginal increase of alcohol advertisements after the Market Court decision.
2114. 2114Prop. 2002/03:87, 13.
2115. 2115Swedish Brewers’ Association (Svenska Bryggareföreningen), The Association of Alcohol and Wine Suppliers (Sprit & Vinleverantörsföreningen), TU och AF. Prop. 2002/03:87, 7, 17.
2116. 2116Prop. 2002/03:87, 17.
2117. 2117Prop. 2002/03:87, 20.
2118. 2118Prop. 2002/03:87, 14.
2119. 2119SFS 2003:166.
2120. 2120On these notions see Ch. 2.2.3 above.
2121. 2121See Weiler (1999), 62-63; Wheatherill (2000), 107.
2122. 2122According to Komesar: “Where the skewed distribution produces majoritarian bias, the resulting action by the political process converts the skewed distribution into a uniform high distrbution. The side that wins in the political process does not have to muster the resources to litigate the constitutionality of the resulting legislation. The state will bear the burden of defending the legislation in court.” Komesar (1994), 136.
2123. 2123See Komesar (1994), 137. “Judicial review of legislation can serve as a means to counteract or deal with political malfunctions such as majoritarian and minoritarian bias. The effectiveness of such review, however, depends on whether the government action will be challenged in court. The courts cannot review what they do not see. The analysis of litigation presented in this book strongly suggests that concentrated high stakes victims are more likely to litigate than dispersed low stakes interests. Thus, roughly speaking, if courts offer protection
2124. 2124Interestingly, there is to my knowledge no single case of consumer association that has reached the ECJ under the ‘consumer image’ debate.
2125. 2125See MD 2003:5, with reference to the opinion by Bernitz.
2126. 2126See Weatherill (1999), 51 ff., at 54.
2127. 2127Similar Stuyck (2000), 389.
2128. 2128Maduro, ‘Keck: The End? The Beginning of the End? Or Just the End of the Beginning?’ (1994) Irish Journal of European Law, 30 ff.; Maduro, ‘Reforming the Market or the State?’ (1997) 3 ELI, 55 ff.; Maduro (1998a).
2129. 2129For a categorization of different consumer interests, see Beater (2000a), 139 ff. Beater differentiates roughly between two major categories of consumer interests: protection against exaggerated prices and protection against disadvantageous decisions. The second category is then subdivided into: protection of the basis of decision; protection of the decision process; protection against excessive pressure through combined offers.
2130. 2130In a similar vein, Drexl regards the standard of deception and the underlying Verbraucherleitbild to imply the weighing of interests of different groups of consumers against each other. The model of normative efficiency advanced by Drexl builds on recognising the interdependedness between markets and legal institutions. In this light, a larger European Market logically requires raising the threshold of deception because a Common Market means more competition, which decreases the need for intervention. At the same time, a low threshold of deception, by insulating national markets, deprives ‘intelligent’ consumers from broader choices. “So ist es nur konsequent, för den europäischen Binnenmarkt die Irreföhrungsschwelle anzuheben, weil auf einem grösseren Markt potentiell mehr Wettbewerb besteht und umgekehrt ein national strengeres Irreföhrungsrecht Entscheidungsalternativen der “intelligenteren“ Verbraucher durch eine Abschottung des nationalen Marktes verhältnissmässig stärker einschränken würde.”Drexl (1998), 203 ff.
2131. 2131Deregulierung des unlauteren Wettbewerbsrechts: Gesetz zur Änderung des UWG BGBl I 1994, 1738. See BT-Drs. 12/7325. For a comprehensive analysis of the reform see Schricker (1994a); Schricker (1994c).
2132. 2132See Schreiben des Bundesministerium der Justiz von 15. September 1993 zur Novellierung des Gesetzes gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (1993) GRUR, 877 ff.
2133. 2133BT-Drs. 12/5620, Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Zukunftssicherung des Standorts Deutschland, in particular at 50.
2134. 2134BT-Drs. 12/7345,4.
2135. 2135Schricker (1994a), 586 ff.
2136. 2136See Lehmann (1994), 380 ff.
2137. 2137Schricker calls these provisions “Mittelstand-political saplings engrafted in unfair competition law”, see Schricker (1994a), 432.
2138. 2138The BGH had reportedly adapted its case law to these rulings in the case “Meister-Aktuell”, GRUR 1990,
2139. 2139See (1994) DZWir, 213.
2140. 2140The restrictive regime for advertising direct sales by producers and wholesalers to end-consumers (§§ 6a and 6d UWG) was likewise qualified as unnecessary and having nothing to do with the objectives of consumer protection. Pointing at the extensive interpretation of these provisions by the courts, Schricker deplores the attempts of the judiciary to conserve the forms of trade distribution stemming from the 19th century and carry them over into the 20th. See Schricker (1994a), 592.
2141. 2141Schricker (1994a), 588.
2142. 2142Schricker (1994a), 592.
2143. 2143See Lehmann (1995), 381.
2144. 2144BGH GRUR 1993, 679 (“PS-Werbung I“); BGH GRUR 1994, 220 („PS Werbung II“).
2145. 2145See the examples given by Schricker (1994c), 432.
2146. 2146For criticism of this basic core of the doctrine, see Micklitz (2001).
2147. 2147Borck, ‘Bauchlandung der fliegenden Gerichtsbarkeit’(1994) WRP, 350 ff.
2148. 2148Stellungnahme der GRUR Vereinigung, Eingabe zur UWG Novelle (1994) GRUR, 435, at 437. Critical comments in respect of the association’s position are expressed by Beater (1995), 217 ff., 227.
2149. 2149See BT-Drs. 12/8089.
2150. 2150See the report of the GRUR Vereinigung (1994) GRUR, 435.
2151. 2151Of interest in this context are the critical comments by Leible on the changed practice of German courts after the Keck ruling. Thus the Regional Court of Düsseldorf considered the application of § 6e to a foreign undertaking as irrelevant to intra-Community trade, and therefore refused to refer the case to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. See Leible (1994), 180, fn. 36 with further references.
2152. 2152On a more general level a similar conclusion is suggested by Alec Stone Sweet and Thomas Brunell on the basis of analysis of broad comparative statistical data on all references for preliminary ruling sent by national courts to the ECJ in the period 1958-1998. Germany stands out as the country with the highest rate of references per year in all areas including free movement of goods and approximation of laws. One explanation advanced by the authors for the variations between countries is “the relative extent to which EC rule-making, as it evolves through case law or legislation, generates tensions or disjunctions between EC and national legal regimes... The more any national regime is required to change in order to meet the (new) demands of EC law, the more references will be produced.” In the particular field of free movement of goods Germany has also excelled, with an average of 303 out of 832 references per year. See Stone Sweet/Brunell, ‘The European Court, National Judges and Legal Integration: A Researcher’s Guide to the Data Set on Preliminary References in EC Law 1958­ 98’(2000) ELJ, 117 ff., 125-26.
2153. 2153Belgium, a country with a relatively brisk litigious activity in fair trading, reported 600 cases in 1993, and in Spain the total number of proceedings reached 120, including those of self-regulatory bodies. See the comparative data submitted by Schricker (1994a), 587. Naturally, representative statistical data in the area are difficult to gather and analyse due to the broad subject-matter and the different venues of enforcement in different countries. Thus the fact that England had only one case brought by the Director of Fair Trading before the courts in three years does not take into account the lawsuits brought by private plaintiffs under common law and equity (passing off, defamation, etc.) as well as self-regulation. Nevertheless, even when the differences in size and population and in ways of enforcement between the different Member States are taken into account, the litigation rate in Germany remains remarkably high.
2154. 2154Vultejus, ‘Die Kostenstruktur der Gerichte’ (1994) ZRP, 150 ff., 151.
2155. 2155“Wo kein Kläger, da kein Richter, oder anders ausgedrückt: Zivilprozesse gibt es nur, wo jemand Interesse hat, solche in Gang zu setzen. Es fragt sich, wer all die wettbewerbsrechtlichen Imponderabilien vor Gerich bringt.“ Schricker (1994a).
2156. 2156See Ch. 5.3.3.3, and the discussion by Pastor (1969), Borck (1978), Kur (1981).
2157. 2157The situation was assessed in the following way: “Insgesamt hat diese Entwicklung dazu geführt, dass die hohe Verfolgungsintensität und die Konzentration der Abmahn- und Klagevereine auf Bagatellverstösse sowie die rigorose Durchsetzung von Ansprüchen die Gefahr mit sich bringt, dass das gesamte Rechtsgebiet diskreditiert wird.“ Schreiben des Bundesministerium der Justiz (1993), 879.
2158. 2158It should be reminded that § 13 II Nr. 1 UWG, determining the locus standi of competitors, did not require that they were actually affected in their business activity. See Schricker (1994a), 588.
2159. 2159See Schreiben des Bundesministerium der Justiz (1993), 878 ff.
2160. 2160See the objections voiced by the GRUR association (1994) GRUR, 435 ff.
2161. 2161Schricker observes that the new provision does not speak of members thus implicitly authorizing the litigious activity of umbrella organizations (so called “Dachverbände”). See Schricker (1994c), 434.
2162. 2162§ 13 UWG: In den Fällen der §§ 1, 3 ,4 ,6bis, 6c, 7 und 8 kann der Anspruch auf Unterlassung geltend gemacht werden:
2163. 2163von Gewerbetreibenden, die Waren oder gewerbliche Leistungen gleicher oder verwandter Art auf demselben Markt vertreiben, soweit der Anspruch eine Handlung betrifft, die geeignet ist, den Wettbewerb auf diesem Markt wesentlich zu beeinträchtigen.
2164. 2164von rechtsfähigen Verbänden zur Förderung gewerblicher Interessen, soweit ihnen eine erhebliche Zahl von Gewerbetreibenden angehört, die Waren oder gewerbliche Leistungen gleicher oder verwandter Art auf demselben Markt vertreiben, soweit sie insbesondere nach ihrer personellen, sachlichen und finanziellen Ausstattung imstande sind, ihre satzungsgemässen Aufgaben der Verfolgung gewerblicher Interessen tatsächlich wahrzunehmen, und soweit der Anspruch eine Handlung betrifft, die geeignet ist, den Wettbewerb auf diesem Markt wesentlich zu beeinträchtigen.
2165. 2165Borck (1994).
2166. 2166In this sense Schricker (1994c), 433.
2167. 2167Stellungnahme des MPI (1993) GRUR, 880, 883.
2168. 2168See Mitteilungen aus der GRUR Vereinigung (1994) GRUR, 435.
2169. 2169See the position of the Consumer Union (Verbraucherschutzverein), although it asserted it did not claim such costs in its own activity. Stellungnahme des Verbraucherschutzvereins e. V. (1994) Verbraucher und Recht, 40 ff., 42 ff.
2170. 2170See BT-Drs. 12/7345, 6.
2171. 2171Melullis (1995), 437.
2172. 2172„Auf die Dauer wird man freilich kaum umhin können, das eigentliche Fundament des Abmahnunwesens, den aus dem Gesichtspunkt der Geschäftsführung ohne Auftrag abgeleiteten Aufwendsersatzanspruch erneut kritisch ins Auge zu fassen. ... Dass der Gesetzgeber nicht schon 1986 den Aufwendungsersatz abgeschafft hat, ist nur eine Folge der Hoffnung auf die Wirksamkeit der damals neu eingeführten Missbrauchsklausel des § 13 Abs. 5 UWG; diese Hoffnung hat sich aber nicht erfüllt. Sollte sich erweisen, dass auch die vom Änderungsgesetz 1994 in § 13 eingeführten Kautelen nicht greifen, müsste der Aufwendungsersatzanspruch fallen. Da eine richterrechtliche Korrektur nicht zu erwarten ist, sollte der Gesetzgeber klarstellen, dass der Abmahnende auf eigene Rechnung handelt“. Schricker (1996a), 478.
2173. 2173Beater (1995), 219 ff.
2174. 2174„Die Regelung des Klagerecht schließlich führt das UWG in Richtung auf seine deliktsrechtlichen Ursprünge zurück. Die Klage der gewerblichen Verbände wird ihres Charakter einer korporativen Populärklage entkleidet, den sie in der Praxis der Abmahn- und Klagevereine angenommen hatte; das Klagerecht wird allgemein wieder enger mit dem materiellen Wettbewerbsinteresse verbunden.” Schricker (1994c), 430 ff. Similar Schricker (1996a), 473.
2175. 2175Beater (1995), 220.
2176. 2176See Ibid.
2177. 2177See Gloy, ‘Hat die Einschränkung der Klagebefugnis gewerblicher Verbände sich bewährt?’ (1999) WRP, 34 ff., at 40: “Es hat sich für die agilen Verbände gezeigt, dass es ein Leichtes war, sich auf die neue Situation einzustellen und die nötigen Voraussetzungen für die Zuerkennung der Klagebefugnis hinsichtlich der erheblichen Zahl der Mitglieder zu schaffen.“
2178. 2178See Ulrich, ‘Die UWG-Novelle 1994 und der Streitwert in Wettbewerbssachen’ (1995) WRP, 362 ff.
2179. 2179Lehmann (1995), 382. The ‘filter’ function of a public authority on the definition of the public interests and on dampening on prosecution of trifle cases is underlined by Bastian: “Grundsätzlich spricht für eine Behördenlösung, dass durch sie die Verfolgung von Bagatellverstössen engedämmt würde, da sich eine Behörde bei Ausübung ihres Aufgreifermessens auch an Zweckmässigkeitsüberlegungen orientieren müsste.“ Bastian (1998/99), 213
2180. 2180„Zwischen unerwünschten gewinnorientierten Verbände und seriösen Verbänden abzugrenzen, fällt freilich schwer. Ganz allgemein muss die Verbandsklage den Effekt haben, tendenziell das Verbotsniveau zu erhöhen. Wenn in der Mehrzahl der Wettbewerbsprozesse auf der Klägerseite eine routinierte, sachkundige Partei steht, die aus Gebührengründen, zur Erfüllung von Aufträgen oder in Verfolgung des Satzungszwecks systematisch darauf hinarbeitet, Geschäftspraktiken als unlauter verbieten zu lassen, während die Beklagtenseite typischerweise an Wissen und Erfahrung unterlegen ist, muss sich dieses Übergewicht der Klägerseite im Laufe der Zeit auswirken. Die konstant bessere Darstellung der Verbotsargumente wird sich in zunehmender Strenge der Judikatur niederschlagen.“ Schricker (1996a), at 478.
2181. 2181Schricker (1996a), 478.
2182. 2182Ibid.
2183. 2183See Ch. 5.6.2.1 with reference to Schäfer (1999), 86 ff.
2184. 2184See BR-Drs. 301/03, Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung; BR-Drs. 301/1/03, Empfehlung der Ausschüsse.
2185. 2185See Fezer (2001), 989 ff.; cf. the objectives of ther reform stated in the Government Bill: „Das geltende Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb ist modernisierungsbedürftig. .. Auch unter europapolitischen Gesichtspukten gilt es, das deutsche Lauterkeitsrecht zu liberalisieren. Ausserdem soll der Verbraucher den ihm gebührenden Stellenwert in einem modernen Lauterkeitsrecht erhalten.“ Drs. 301/03, 1.
2186. 2186Köhler, H./Bomkamm, J./Henning-Bodewig, F., ‘Vorschlag für eine Richtlinie zum Lauterkeitsrecht und eine UWG-Reform’(2002) WRP, 1317 ff., at 1324.
2187. 2187BT-Drs. 323/03, 17.
2188. 2188BT-Drs. 301/03, 18.
2189. 2189See the press release of the Federal Ministry of Justice, announcing Government Bill Nr. 32/03 of 7.5.2003: „Die Novelle verstärkt den Schutz der Verbraucherinnen und der Verbraucher vor unlauteren Wettbewerbshandlungen. Das Gesetz schafft einen angemessenen Ausgleich zwischen den Interessen der Wirtschaft und denen der Verbraucherinnen und Verbraucher.“ Cf. the statements of the Minister of Justice
2190. 2190COM (2001) 546 final; OJ 2002 C 75 E/11; Opinion of the ECOSOC, OJ 2002 C 221/73; Amended proposal COM (2002) 585 final, 25.10.2002.
2191. 2191See Micklitz et al. (2000).
2192. 2192See the Commission’s Green Paper on European Union Consumer Protection, COM (2001) 531 final; Follow-up Communication to the Green Paper on EU Consumer Protection, COM (2002) 289 final; Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices in the Internal Market and Amending Directives 84/450/EEC, 97/7/EC and 98/27/EC (the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive),COM (2003) 356 final.
2193. 2193On these developments see Ch. 8 below.
2194. 2194The term ‘interlocking politics’ is occasionally used in the political science literature on European integration as a translation of the concept ‘Politikverpflechtung’ first advanced by Scharpf (1988). See for instance Börzel, ‘What can Federalism Teach Us About the European Union. The German Experience’, The Federal Trust, May 2003. I believe, however, that the German term ‘Verpflechtung’ is better translated as ‘interweaving’. ‘Interlocking’ would correspond to the German word ‘Verzahnung’ and conveys the idea of a joint and interdependent movement, associated with gear-wheels.
2195. 2195See Fezer (2001); Köhler/Bornkamm/Henning-Bodewig (2002).
2196. 2196Press-release of the Federal Ministry of Justice Nr. 32/03 of 7.5.2003 “Kabinett verabschiedet modernes Wettbewerbsrecht.”, 239.
2197. 2197Cf. Regierungsentwurf: “Der Verbraucher wird als Schutzsubjekt erstmals ausdrücklich im Gesetz erwähnt.“, BR-Drs. 301/03, 20.
2198. 2198See BR-Drs. 323/03, Bericht der Bundesregierung - Aktionsplan Verbraucherschutz.
2199. 2199Press-release Nr. 32/03 (2003).
2200. 2200Entwurf eines Gesetzes gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG-E). BR-Drs. 301/03, 1.
2201. 2201See Fezer (2001), 991: “Die Entwicklung des Lauterkeitsrechts zwischen Beginn und Ende des 20. jahrhunders, die Rechtsprechung des EuGH zur Verwircklichung des Binnenmarktes als eines Rechtsprinzip und zum Schutz der Freiheit des Waren.- und Diesnstleistungsverkehrs, die rechts- und wirtschaftliche Diskurs zur Integration des Verbraucherrechts in das Recht der Wirtschaftsordnung, die Rechtserheblichkeit dr Konsuumentensouveränität in einer marktwirtschaftlichen Wettbewerbsordnung und die Stellung der Verbracuher als glechgewichtiger Marktpoartner sind schlaglichtartig formulierte Daten eines Paradigmenwechsels zum Schutz der Verbraucherinteressen im Wettbewerbsrecht. Verbraucherschutz ist in eigenständiger Topos einer europäioschen Rechtsharmonisierung im Wettbewerbsrecht.“
2202. 2202„Dadurch wird die Rechtsprechung zum geltenden UWG aufgenommen und gleichzeitig eine Forderung der Verbraucherverbände erfüllt.“ BR-Drs. 301/03, at 20 under the subtitle „Inhaltliche Schwerpunkte“ and at 22 with reference to the ‘Schutzzweckwandel’ and the case law giving more recent recognition of the triad of protected interest, including those of consumers: BGH GRUR 1999, 75 ( “Güllepumpen ”); BverfG WRP, 2001, 1160 (“Benetton”), BverfG GRUR 2002, 455 ff. Cf. Referentenwurf, 23.01.2003, 19.
2203. 2203See the discussion in Fezer (2001), 998 f.
2204. 2204See Fezer (2001), 994: „Ihrer rechtlichen Struktur nach sind Generalklauseln als Delegationsnormen zu verstehen die die Jurisdiktive als Institution zur Bildung von Rechtsätzen anhand einer einen einzelnen Rechtsfall entscheidenden Rechtsprechung ermächtgen.“ With reference to Teubner (1971).
2205. 2205Explicitly on the need of a 'de minimis’ threshold ('Bagatellklausel') and, with reference to the ECJ case law on a European consumer image, Fezer (2001), 1000.
2206. 2206See Fezer’s interpretation of the Keck ruling of the ECJ as a test of appreciable impact on the Internal Market, Fezer (2001), 993.
2207. 2207BR-301/03, Regierungsentwurf, 31.
2208. 2208See Köhler/Bornkamm/Henning-Bodewig (2002), 1319 ff.
2209. 2209§ 4 Nr. 2 UWG-E. On the case law under the present UWG cf. Ch. 7.1.1.3 above.
2210. 2210On these categories see Baumbach/Hefermehl (1998), Verlockung, Wertreklame, at 527; Verunsichernde Werbung, at 573, and Umweltbezogene Werbung, at 576.
2211. 2211Fezer (2001), 998, quoting approvingly the systematisation introduced by Hefermehl : Kundenfang, Behinderung, Ausbeutung, Rechtsbruch, Marktstörung.
2212. 2212Cf. the comments in the Government Bill on obstructive competition: “Die weite generalkaluselartige Fassung stellt sicher, dass alle Erscheinungsformen des Behinderungswettbewerbs einbezogen werden, einschliesslich des Boykotts, des Vernichtungswettbeweb, aber auch z. B. des Missbrauchs von Nachfragemacht zur Ausschaltung von Mitbewerbern.“ BR-Drs. 301/03, 36.
2213. 2213Fezer (2001), 1001.
2214. 2214See Schricker (1994); Lehmann (1995), Fezer (2001).
2215. 2215Cf. § 4 Nr. 4 and Nr.5 UWG-E.
2216. 2216Cf. § 5 II UWG-E.
2217. 2217See the following comments of the Bundesrat: „Seitens der Befürworter von weiteren Informationspflichten wird zur Begründung eines weitergehenden Regelungsbedarfs ein Paradigmenwechsel im Lauterkeitsrecht angeführt. Dieser Wechsel soll darin liegen, dass die generellen Verbote durch Informationspflichten ersetzt werden. Eine Lokerung des Wettbewerbsrechts sei indes nur dann vertretbar, wenn der Abnehmer ausreichend informiert werde. ... Der Gesetzentwurf trägt diesem Grundsatz insoweit Rechnung, als mit Blick auf die Aufhebung des Rabattgestezes und der Zugabeverordnung für diese Formen der Wertreklame in § 4 Nr. 4 Informationspflichten geregelt werden. Im Übrigen findet jedoch kein Paradigmenwechsel durch eine generelle Aufhebung von Verboten statt, weshalb es nicht gerechtfertigt wäre, die Unternehmen mit weitergehenden Informationspflichten zu belasten.“ BR-Drs. 301/03.
2218. 2218Fezer (2001), 994.
2219. 2219Similar Fezer (2001), 998.
2220. 2220On the critique of the general clause as a source of uncertainty, see Fezer (2001), 994, underlining the consensus in German legal literature as to the success of the method ofj udicial law-making via general clause. A plea for clearer analysis of values underlying the general standards of fair trading is to be found in Beater (2000),
2221. 2221ff.
2222. 2222§ 12 I UWG-E
2223. 2223BR-Drs. 301/03, Entwurf der Bundesregierung, 53.
2224. 2224BR-Drs. 301/03, Entwurf der Bundesregierung, 46.
2225. 2225BR-Drs. 301/03, Stellungnahme des Bundesrates, 10-11.
2226. 2226BR-Drs. 301/03, Stellungnahme des Bundesrates, 12.
2227. 2227For details of this proposal, see Köhler, H., ‘UWG und Verbraucherschutz’ (2003) GRUR, 265 ff.; Micklitz/Stadler, ‘Der Reformvorschlag der UWG-Novell für eine Verbandsklage auf Gewinnabschöpfung’ (2003) WRP, 559 ff.
2228. 2228See Bernitz (1984), 115 ff.
2229. 2229Dir. 1991:79, Direktiv om översyn av marknadföringslagen, SOU 1993:59, Bilaga 1, 599.
2230. 2230The investigator was Prof. Bernitz.
2231. 2231See reference to the general instruction to all committees and individual investigators to consider aspects of adaptation to EU law, dir. 1988:43.
2232. 2232SOU 1992:49.
2233. 2233“Saken måste emellertid ses i ett bredare perspektiv. Helt oavsett den rättsliga formen för det svenska samarbetet med EG pågår en stark, faktisk ekonomisk integration. Svenska företag arbetar på alltmer internationaliserad marknad och över huvud under i stort sett samma marknadsbetingelser som företag i andra västeuropeiska länder. Det behov av skydd mot otillbörlig konkurrensåtgärder som föreligger i dessa länder kan man utgå ifrån i regel också finns hos oss. Europeiska företag torde normalt räkna med att de i Sverige får ett skydd mot otillbörliga konkurrensåtgärder som ungefår motsvarar en europeisk normalstandard som den i korthet presenterats i 10-punktsuppräkningen i föregående avsnitt. Det bör vara en deluppgift inom ramen för en allmän Europaharmonisering av svensk rätt att tillse att vi når upp till denna skyddsnivå.” See Bernitz (1993), 39 f.
2234. 2234Compare 1 § MFL (SFS 1975:1418) ”Denna lag har till ändamål att främja konsumenternas intressen i samband med näringsidkarens marknadsföring av varor, tjänster och andra nyttigheter och att motverka marknadsföring som är otillbörlig mot konsumenter och näringsidkare“ with 1 § MFL (SFS 1995:450) ”Denna lag har till syfte att främja konsumenternas och näringslivets intressen i samband med marknadsföring av produkter och att motverka marknadsföring som är otillbörlig mot konsumenter och näringsidkare.”
2235. 2235„Till skillnad mot 1 § den nuvarande lagen anges att lagen inte bara skall främja konsumenternas intressen i samband med marknadsföring, utan även näringslivets intressen. Även om lagen till största delen är inriktad på konsumentintressena är det enligt regeringens mening angeläget att också framhålla näringslivets intressen i sammanhanget.” Prop. 1994/95:123, 162.
2236. 2236”Denna lag har till ändamål att främja konsumenternas och näringslivets intresse av en vederhäftig, tillbörlig och från konkurrenssynpunkt väl fungerande marknadsföring samt att säkerställa att konsumenterna har tillgång till behövlig information i samband därmed”, SOU 1993:59, 59.
2237. 2237Bernitz (1997).
2238. 2238Directive 84/450.
2239. 2239Bernitz (1997), 28.
2240. 2240Concerning the institutional discussion, see Ch. 4 and 5.
2241. 2241See SOU 1993:59, 194.
2242. 2242As indicated earlier, preparatory material had stressed that no extension of such rights should occur by way of marketing practices law. See Ch. 5.4.I.2.
2243. 2243See prop. 1994/95:123, 56. The most critical comments to the proposal came from the Competition Agency, which cited the risks to free competition inherent in such a proposal, ibid., at 57.
2244. 2244Comparing with Germany, one can surmise that an absence of a sizeable entrepreneurial middle class in Sweden is one reason for the relatively low profile of marketing practices law as a strategic instrument.
2245. 2245Prop. 1994/95:123,
2246. 2246Konkurrenslagen (SFS 1993:20).
2247. 2247In this sense Nordell, Marknadsrätten. En introduktion (Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik, 2002), 17.
2248. 2248Bernitz (1969).
2249. 2249SOU 1993:59, 198.
2250. 2250”Det är fortfarande inte ovanligt att det i olika västeuropeiska länders marknadsföringslagstiftning finns kvar bestämmelser som utgör skråmässiga relikter och närmast är till för att bereda småföretagare skydd mot konkurrens. De ...berörda avgörandena av EG-domstolen i rättsfallen GB-INNO och Yves Rocher ger exempel på detta. ... Liksom hittills bör en konkurrenshämmande tillämpning av marknadsföringslagstiftningen inte komma i fråga i Sverige.” SOU 1993:59, 198.
2251. 2251SOU 1994:14.
2252. 2252See prop. 1994/95:140.
2253. 2253Statement of Government Policy, 18th September 2001.
2254. 2254The Board consists of ten members, including the Director-General and two representatives of the staff. The Director-General is also Chairman of the Advisory Board.
2255. 2255See SFS 1995:868, cf. prop. 1994/95:140. See on consumer policy SOU 2000:29 and the following prop. 2000/01:135.
2256. 2256SFS 1995:868.
2257. 225727 § Förvaltningslagen (SFS 1986:223), see prop. 1994/95:123, 98.
2258. 2258SOU 2000:29 Starka konsumenter i en gränslös värld, 367.
2259. 2259A comparison with the Food Administration was also carried out by the Guidelines Committee SOU 1983:40, 59.
2260. 2260SOU 2000:29, 380.
2261. 2261SOU 2000:29, 386.
2262. 2262SOU 2000:29, 401.
2263. 2263SOU 2000:29, 396.
2264. 2264SOU 2000:29, 400.
2265. 2265Prop. 2000/01:135.
2266. 2266Among them NDM, SI, SRF and SH. Prop. 2000/01:135.
2267. 2267On decorporativisation, see the analysis by Hermansson et al. in SOU 1999:121.
2268. 2268SOU 1999:121.
2269. 2269Jacobsson/Laegreid/Pedersen, ‘Transforming States’ (2001) SCORE Rapportserie, No. 4, 11.
2270. 2270See Ch. 5.4.4.1.
2271. 2271See Case Langborger v. Sweden, ECHR 20/1987/143/197, decision of 22/06/89.
2272. 2272See prop. 1990/91:98, in particular at 33 about the MD. SOU1991:59, Del. 2, 372. Cf. also the discussion in JT 1992-93, 376 ff.
2273. 2273See the discussion in Debatt (1989-90) JT, 376 ff.; Bernitz, ‘Marknadsdomstolen och Langborgerdomen’ (1989-90) JT, 396 ff.
2274. 2274Ds 1993:34, Specialdomstolaraa i framtiden, see in particular 21-26 on interest representation.
2275. 2275See Ds 1993:34.
2276. 2276“En förklaring till att det över huvudtaget förekommer intresseledamöter i domstolar är den starka ställningen som organisationer av skilda slag har i det svenska samhället, och det kan hävdas att det genom åren har funnits en benägenhet hos lagstiftaren att tillgodose dessa organisationers intressen på den enskildes bekostnad; de kollektiva regleringar som finns på det aktuella rättsområdena har ju konsekvenser även för den som inte tillhör kollektivet eller den som inte har samma mening som kollektivet. Att dessa regleringar i så stor utsträckning har accepterats i Sverige hänger bl. a. samman med speciella svenska förhållanden som den höga andelen personer och företag som är organiserade i olika intressesammanslutningar.” Ds 1993:34, 23-4.
2277. 2277See SOU 1993:16.
2278. 2278See Dahl, After the Revolution. Democracy in a Good Society (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970).
2279. 2279See SOU 1991:59, 370 ff.; prop. 1992/93:56, 57 ff.; bet. 1992/93:NU 17, rskr. 1992/93:144.
2280. 2280“För Sveriges trovärdighet som europeisk - och internationell - samarbetspartner är det angeläget att MD för en sådan sammanställning att dess ställning som oavhängig och opartisk domstol inte kan ifrågasättas.” SOU 1991:59, 377.
2281. 22813-4 §§ (SFS 1970:417 as amended by SFS 1993:22).
2282. 2282Prop. 1992/93:56,57 with the views of SI, the SKF, KO, LO and TCO.
2283. 2283Motion 1992/93:N7.
2284. 2284Bet. 1992/93:LU45.
2285. 228545-49 §§ MFL. 49 § MFL reproduces the rule in RB 4:10a.
2286. 2286See Ds. 1993:54; SOU 1991:59, Del 1.
2287. 2287SFS 1996:861, cf. prop. 1997/98:188, bet. 1998/99:LU6, rskr. 1998/99:125.
2288. 228838 § MFL (SFS 1995:450).
2289. 2289Prop. 1997/98:188.
2290. 2290SOU 1993:59, 450 ff.; prop. 1994/95:123, 111.
2291. 2291SOU 1983:40; prop. 1984/85:213; 1985/86:LU10, 1988/89:LU13.
2292. 2292With the amendment advanced in prop. 1984/85:213 the position of interested traders in the preliminary procedure before the Ombudsman was somewhat improved, but only marginally. See prop. 1984/85:213, 50 ff; cf. Ch.5.4.4.2 above.
2293. 2293SOU 1993:59, 457 ff.
2294. 2294Prop. 1994/95:123, 132.
2295. 2295On this sanction see Ch. 7.3.2.3 below. 1000 Prop. 1994/95:123, 134. 1001 Prop. 1994/95:123, 134. 1002 See prop. 1994/95:123, 144.
2296. 2296Wie beurteilt er die Arbeit der Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs e. V. in einer Zeit, a) in der nach Lockerung von Wettbewerbsnachteilen gerufen wird und z.B. durch Tankstellen-Kioskbetrieb, den Internetverkauf und den Versandgeschäften über die Fernsehwerbung zu allen tages- und Nachtzeiten geworben wird und z. B. dem Einzelhandel dadurch täglcih Kaufkraft entzogen wird, b) in der nach zusätzlichen Dienstleistungen gerufen wird, aber Handwerksmeistern und andere Gewerbetreibenden unter Strafandrohung die Dienstleistung in Randbereichen der eigetlichen Tätigkeit untersagt wird?
2297. 2297Hält sie die zunehmende Kritik an der Zentrale zur Bekämfung unlauteren Wettbewebs e.V. für berechtigt? 1050 Stellungnahme zum Grünbuch der Kommission zum Verbraucherschutz in der Europäischen Union, February 2002, 2. 1051 „Deutschland is im übrigen das einzige Land, das sein Werberecht über Abmahnorganisationen wie die renommierte Centrale (sic!) zur Bekämfpung unlauteren Wettbewerbs durchsetzen lässt. Diese Form der Selbstkontrolle würde sich zusammenbrechen, wenn es bei Online-Diensten aufgrund des Herkunftslandprinzips nicht mehr oder nur sehr eingeschränkt tätig weren dürfte.“
2298. 2298initiated orders). For statistics from the earlier practice of KO, see SOU 1983:40, 59. 1060 It should be kept in mind that not all notifications concern matters related to fair trading and marketing practices. 1061 Including 4,884 from consumers, 294 from municipalities, 237 from industry, 525 from governmental authorities and organisations, and 428 on KO’s own initiative. KOV Årsredovisning 2000. For 2001 the total number of files is 6,161, the number of consent orders 30 and the cases before MD 7. For 2002 the number of files is 6,484. The number of consent orders is 42 and the cases filed before the MD are 10. KOV Årsredovisning 2001 and 2002. 1062 The grounds for closing the file have been described as follows: the question has been answered, the signal has been transferred to another competent authority, the file does not call for any action, the same question is part of another file, the consumer interest is insignificant according to KOV’s Standing Instructions, KOV has addressed a reprimand (påpekande) to the trader, the case involves a private dispute, settlement with individual enterprise or an undertaking by the enterprise, the conduct is not against the law. 1063 For instance on ecological labelling, on information about electricity consumption of household appliances, etc. 1064 The relation between the total number of cases under the MFL and the number of cases brought by KO has been as follows: for 1988 - 10 out of 23 cases; for 1989 - 10 of 19 cases; for 1990 - 9 of 20 cases; for 1991- 17 of 24 cases; for 1992 - 10 of 27 cases; for 1994 - 7 of 28 cases; for 1996 - 6 of 25 cases; for 1997 - 3 of 8 cases; for 1998 - 6 of 12 cases; for 1999 - 3 of 9 cases; for 2000 - 5 of 20 cases; for 2001 - 4 of 22 cases. Source: Marknadsdomstolensavgöranden, Norstedts Juridik, 1988-2001.
2299. 2299PEERING INTO THE FUTURE: TOWARDS A European FAIR TRADING Law? 1112 COM (2003) 356 final. 1113 Press release IP/03/857, Brussels, 18 June 2003.
2300. 2300One example of the problems with representation of the consumer interest by consumer organisations is their long-standing resistance to liberalisation of the restrictive regime on disounts. This position was abandoned only in 2001. See Drexl (2002), 557 ff., at 578.
2301. 2301Basedow/Hopt/Kötz/Baetge (1999), 7.
2302. 2302Komesar (1994), 136.
2303. 2303Joerges (1997), 394.