To help the reader, a new paragraph has been inserted into the text at this point. so known and communicated. But, on the other hand, if these special circumstances were wholly unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at the most, could only be supposed to have had in his contemplation the amount of injury which would arise generally, and in the great multitude of cases not affected by any special circumstances, from such a breach of contract. For such loss would neither have flowed naturally from the breach of this contract in the great multitude of such cases occurring under ordinary circumstances, nor were the special circumstances, which, perhaps, would have made it a reasonable and natural consequence of such breach of contract, communicated to or known by the defendants. In such cases [where the defendant is a carrier] the courts have been slow to allow loss of profit as an item of damage. This was not, it would seem, because a different principle applies in such cases, but because the application of the same principle leads to different results. A carrier commonly knows less than a seller about the purposes for which the buyer or consignee needs the goods, or about other “special circumstances” which may cause exceptional loss if due delivery is withheld. … [the defendants] knew they were supplying the boiler to a company carrying on the business of laundrymen and dyers, for use in that business. The obvious use of a boiler, in such a business, is surely to boil water for the purpose of washing or dyeing. A laundry might conceivably buy a boiler for some other purpose; for instance, to work radiators or warm bath water for the comfort of its employees or directors, or to use for research, or to exhibit in a museum. All these purposes are possible, but the first is the obvious purpose which, in the case of a laundry, leaps to the average eye. If the purpose then be to wash or dye, why does the company want to wash or dye, unless for purposes of business advantage, in which term we, for the purposes of the rest of this judgment, include maintenance or increase of profit, or reduction of loss? (We shall speak henceforward not of loss of profit, but of “loss of business.”) No commercial concern commonly purchases for the purposes of its business a very large and expensive structure like this – a boiler 19 feet high and costing over 2,000l. – with any other motive, and no supplier, let alone an engineering company, which has promised delivery of such an article by a particular date, with knowledge that it was to be put into use immediately on delivery, can reasonably contend that it could not foresee that loss of business (in the sense indicated above) would be liable to result to the purchaser from a long delay in the delivery thereof. The suggestion that, for all the supplier knew, the boiler might have been needed simply as a “standby,” to be used in a possibly distant future, is gratuitous and was plainly negatived by the terms of the letter of April 26, 1946. Swedish text: Av läran om adekvat kausalitet följer att det för skadeståndsansvar inte är tillräckligt att det föreligger ett faktiskt eller logiskt orsakssamband mellan handling och effekt. Det krävs också att sambandet är av viss särskild beskaffenhet eller har viss kvalitet (jfr Håkan Andersson, Skyddsändamål och adekvans, 1993, s. 87 ff., särskilt s. 95 med omfattande hänvisningar). Kausalsambandet måste värderas för att utröna om, som det anförs i förarbetena till skadeståndslagen (se prop. 1972:5 s. 21 f.), skadan har framstått som en beräknelig och i viss mån typisk följd av det skadegörande beteendet. Skadan ska alltså ha varit i någon mening förutsebar (jfr exempelvis NJA 1991 s. 217). Det som ska skäras bort från ett konstaterat skadeståndsansvar är sålunda effekter av den skadegörande handlingen som är så osedvanliga eller osannolika att den skadevållande parten inte borde ha tagit dem i beräkning. Inhouse translation: It follows from the doctrine of adequate causation that it is not sufficient for liability that there is an actual or logical causal link between the act and the effect. It is also
To help the reader, a new paragraph has been inserted into the text at this point. so known and communicated. But, on the other hand, if these special circumstances were wholly unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at the most, could only be supposed to have had in his contemplation the amount of injury which would arise generally, and in the great multitude of cases not affected by any special circumstances, from such a breach of contract. For such loss would neither have flowed naturally from the breach of this contract in the great multitude of such cases occurring under ordinary circumstances, nor were the special circumstances, which, perhaps, would have made it a reasonable and natural consequence of such breach of contract, communicated to or known by the defendants. In such cases [where the defendant is a carrier] the courts have been slow to allow loss of profit as an item of damage. This was not, it would seem, because a different principle applies in such cases, but because the application of the same principle leads to different results. A carrier commonly knows less than a seller about the purposes for which the buyer or consignee needs the goods, or about other “special circumstances” which may cause exceptional loss if due delivery is withheld. … [the defendants] knew they were supplying the boiler to a company carrying on the business of laundrymen and dyers, for use in that business. The obvious use of a boiler, in such a business, is surely to boil water for the purpose of washing or dyeing. A laundry might conceivably buy a boiler for some other purpose; for instance, to work radiators or warm bath water for the comfort of its employees or directors, or to use for research, or to exhibit in a museum. All these purposes are possible, but the first is the obvious purpose which, in the case of a laundry, leaps to the average eye. If the purpose then be to wash or dye, why does the company want to wash or dye, unless for purposes of business advantage, in which term we, for the purposes of the rest of this judgment, include maintenance or increase of profit, or reduction of loss? (We shall speak henceforward not of loss of profit, but of “loss of business.”) No commercial concern commonly purchases for the purposes of its business a very large and expensive structure like this – a boiler 19 feet high and costing over 2,000l. – with any other motive, and no supplier, let alone an engineering company, which has promised delivery of such an article by a particular date, with knowledge that it was to be put into use immediately on delivery, can reasonably contend that it could not foresee that loss of business (in the sense indicated above) would be liable to result to the purchaser from a long delay in the delivery thereof. The suggestion that, for all the supplier knew, the boiler might have been needed simply as a “standby,” to be used in a possibly distant future, is gratuitous and was plainly negatived by the terms of the letter of April 26, 1946. Swedish text: Av läran om adekvat kausalitet följer att det för skadeståndsansvar inte är tillräckligt att det föreligger ett faktiskt eller logiskt orsakssamband mellan handling och effekt. Det krävs också att sambandet är av viss särskild beskaffenhet eller har viss kvalitet (jfr Håkan Andersson, Skyddsändamål och adekvans, 1993, s. 87 ff., särskilt s. 95 med omfattande hänvisningar). Kausalsambandet måste värderas för att utröna om, som det anförs i förarbetena till skadeståndslagen (se prop. 1972:5 s. 21 f.), skadan har framstått som en beräknelig och i viss mån typisk följd av det skadegörande beteendet. Skadan ska alltså ha varit i någon mening förutsebar (jfr exempelvis NJA 1991 s. 217). Det som ska skäras bort från ett konstaterat skadeståndsansvar är sålunda effekter av den skadegörande handlingen som är så osedvanliga eller osannolika att den skadevållande parten inte borde ha tagit dem i beräkning. Inhouse translation: It follows from the doctrine of adequate causation that it is not sufficient for liability that there is an actual or logical causal link between the act and the effect. It is alsos. 551