In fact, this is the threshold when the arbitral rules chosen by the parties explicitly requires a reasoned award. In instances where the parties have not explicitly agreed that a reasoned award is to be rendered, or have not incorporated by reference in their agreement arbitral rules that requires reasons, it is not clear whether it is at all possible to set an arbitral award aside even though there is a total lack of reasons, since the SAA does not insist on reasoning. The Svea Court of Appeal appears to have interpreted NJA 2009 s. 128 as to effectively entail that lack of reasoning in an arbitral award can only constitute grounds for it to be set aside in case it follows from the arbitration agreement that the award is to be reasoned, see Svea hovrätt mål nr T 3780-12, delivered on 10 January 2014 (cf. also footnote 37).
Hänvisas från p. 2 (s. 867)
2.In Soyak v Hochtief (NJA 2009 s. 128), the Supreme Court rejected a challenge based on insufficient reasoning and held that “[O]nly a total lack of reasons, or reasons that are so incomplete that they can be equated to a total lack of reasons” can justify setting an arbitral award aside. At the same time, the Supreme Court also observed that “[P]roviding sufficient reasons in an arbitral award is a guardian of the rule of law, as it forces the arbitrators to analyse the legal issues and submitted evidence”.s. 867