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Insufficient reasoning — a proper basis for setting aside an award?

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Jacob Frank, Insufficient reasoning — a proper basis for setting aside an award?, SvJT 2019 s. 866–881
BibTeX
@article{svjt-2019-866,
  author       = {Jacob Frank},
  title        = {{Insufficient reasoning — a proper basis for setting aside an award?}},
  journal      = {Svensk Juristtidning},
  year         = {2019},
  pages        = {866--881},
  url          = {https://svjt.se/svjt/2019/866}
}
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Abstract

The most important product of the arbitration is the arbitral award. A (final) award is the culmination of the arbitration, it embodies the tribunal’s ultimate and binding determination of the dispute between the parties and it is to a very large extent (even more so than court judgments) enforceable in foreign countries. But to what extent must arbitrators provide reasons in their award and what is the standard with which the reasoning must comply? Two separate questions arise in relation to reasons. The first is what constitutes good practice among arbitrators and forms a general requirement in arbitration, i.e. in a sense what level of reasoning that should — but not necessarily must in order for the award to be enforceable and unchallengeable — be contained in an award. The second question is under what circumstances challenges can be made to have an award set aside in instances where reasoning is alleged to be lacking or insufficient.

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