In fact, this is the threshold when the arbitral rules chosen by the parties explicitly requires a reasoned award. In instances where the parties have not explicitly agreed that a reasoned award is to be rendered, or have not incorporated by reference in their agreement arbitral rules that requires reasons, it is not clear whether it is at all possible to set an arbitral award aside even though there is a total lack of reasons, since the SAA does not insist on reasoning. The Svea Court of Appeal appears to have interpreted NJA 2009 s. 128 as to effectively entail that lack of reasoning in an arbitral award can only constitute grounds for it to be set aside in case it follows from the arbitration agreement that the award is to be reasoned, see Svea hovrätt mål nr T 3780-12, delivered on 10 January 2014 (cf. also footnote 37).
Hänvisas från p. 2 (s. 867)
1.In the absence of an internationally binding standard with respect to assessing if an award is duly reasoned, it is for each state to decide whether its arbitration law should contain a reasoning requirement (and if so to the extent of such requirement). The Swedish Arbitration Act (“SAA”), however, does not contain an explicit requirement that an award — whether domestic or international — be reasoned. In this absence of statutory guidance, the Swedish Supreme Court has determined the Swedish position.s. 866
2.In Soyak v Hochtief (NJA 2009 s. 128), the Supreme Court rejected a challenge based on insufficient reasoning and held that “[O]nly a total lack of reasons, or reasons that are so incomplete that they can be equated to a total lack of reasons” can justify setting an arbitral award aside. At the same time, the Supreme Court also observed that “[P]roviding sufficient reasons in an arbitral award is a guardian of the rule of law, as it forces the arbitrators to analyse the legal issues and submitted evidence”.s. 867
3.Parties prefer arbitration over litigation for a variety of reasons, the most important being procedural flexibility, neutrality, confidentiality and superior chances of recognition and enforcement. The arbitration agreement is also based on the premise that the grounds for judicial review have been limited. However, it is safe to say that parties nonetheless expect the procedure to comply with basic tenets of due process to ensure minimum standards of objectivity, fairness and justice. That arguably includes understanding the reasons why the arbitrators have reached their conclusions. Insufficient or deficient reasoning is prone to dissatisfy the parties (or at least one of them) and ultimately risks undermining the legitimacy of arbitration by giving rise to distrust of arbitral adjudication. This being said, the standard of reasoning can not be too strict either as this might inter alia prolong the arbitral proceedings and increase the costs, thereby jeopardising the features that make arbitration more attractive compared to domestic court-based litigation. This paper aims at discussing whether the Supreme Court has struck a fair balance between the two competing goals of due process on the one hand, ensuring that the parties have a comprehensible and transparent award, and efficiency and finality of awards on the other.s. 867
4.The discussion of the Soyak v Hochtief case contained in Sections 3– 4 should first be put into context. Therefore, Section 2.1 considers why reasoned awards are valuable and useful, while Section 2.2 and 2.3 contains a few observations about the current state of law in relation to reasoned awards internationally.s. 867